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ABSTRACT 
 
A study was conducted in six villages in Muleba and Missenyi districts, Kagera 
region, to analyze types and roles of institutions governing land in the agrarian 
system.  A questionnaire survey, observation and Focus Group Discussion methods 
were employed in data collection.  The main land uses and related economic activities 
in the study area were small holding farming (56%), pastoralism (4.5%), small-hold 
gardening (3.6%) and agro-forest (7.5%). The main live-hood support systems were 
predominantly agrarian basing on agriculture activities. The area was facing serious 
land shortage (98.5%) where the majority of respondents owned between 1 and 2 
acres of land (38.5%); mainly held under customary institutions (34.3%). The land 
was accessed through inheritance (42.4%) and purchases (30.3%).  Tenure security of 
land for most rural communities was guaranteed through customary institutions. There 
was reported increasing land commercialization. The area was also facing increasing 
land-use conflicts (93%). Main conflict types were: farmers’ vs pastoralists in Mleba 
district; and farmers’ vs state agencies in Missenyi district. The local customary 
mechanisms were rated the most efficient in resolving land-use conflicts. While, 
formal institutions were employed to ex-appropriate land from local communities. A 
new customary institution “emiteko” has evolved in the study area to organize 
collective labour of production and safe guard tenure security of land. This is in 
response to increased commercialization of the agrarian system.  It was recommended 
to integrate the local customary conflict resolution mechanism in resolving land-use 
disputes at district level. 
 
 
 
 
 
    
viii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CERTIFICATION ..................................................................................................... ii 
COPYRIGHT ........................................................................................................... iii 
DECLARATION ....................................................................................................... iv 
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................ v 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT ........................................................................................ vi 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. vii 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................. xiv 
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................. xv 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS .............................................. xvi 
CHAPTER ONE ......................................................................................................... 1 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Background to the Study ................................................................................ 1 
1.2 Challenges Facing Land Tenure in Rural Tanzania ....................................... 3 
1.3 Conceptual Issues of Agrarianism in Tanzania .............................................. 4 
1.4  Statement of the Problem ............................................................................... 8 
1.5 Objectives of the Study .................................................................................. 8 
1.5.1  General Objective ........................................................................................... 8 
1.5.2  Specific Objectives of the Study .................................................................... 8 
1.6 Research Questions ........................................................................................ 9 
1.7   The Conceptual Framework ........................................................................... 9 
1.8  Theoretical Framework ................................................................................ 12 
1.8.1  Evolutionary Theory .................................................................................... 15 
 
 
 
 
    
ix 
1.9  Significance of the Study ............................................................................. 18 
CHAPTER TWO ...................................................................................................... 20 
LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................................ 20 
2.1 Overview ...................................................................................................... 20 
2.2 Concepts and Definitions ............................................................................. 20 
2.2.1  The Definition and Nature of Institutions .................................................... 20 
2.2.2 Enforcement as Critical Aspects of Institutions ........................................... 21 
2.2.3  Concept of Agrarian System ........................................................................ 22 
2.2.3  Concept and Practice of Governance ........................................................... 23 
2.3  Property Rights and Regimes ....................................................................... 25 
2.3.1  Property Rights ............................................................................................ 25 
2.3.2 Common Property Regime ........................................................................... 26 
2.3.3 Land Tenure ................................................................................................. 27 
2.3.4 Land Tenure Institutions .............................................................................. 28 
2.3.4.1  Customary Land Tenure ............................................................................... 29 
2.3.4.2  Private Land Tenure ..................................................................................... 31 
2.3.5 Evolution of Land Tenure Regimes in Tanzania ......................................... 32 
2.3  Indigenous Land Tenure systems in Muleba and Missenyi  
 Districts ........................................................................................................ 36 
2.4  Agrarian Systems ......................................................................................... 41 
2.4.1 Agrarian Transformation .............................................................................. 43 
2.5 Experiences of Agrarian Transformation ..................................................... 48 
2.5.1  Regional Overview on Agrarian Reforms and Experiences ........................ 50 
2.5.2  Agrarian Reforms in the Republic of Southern Korea ................................. 52 
 
 
 
 
    
x 
2.5.3  Agrarian Reforms in China .......................................................................... 55 
2.5.4  Agrarian Reforms in Iran ............................................................................. 57 
2.5.5  Agrarian Reform in Russia ........................................................................... 59 
2.7 Agrarian Transformation in Africa .............................................................. 64 
2.8   Agrarian Issues in Tanzania ......................................................................... 68 
2.8.1  Agrarian Issues During the Neoliberal Era .................................................. 72 
2.8.2 Agrarian Change in Tanzania ....................................................................... 76 
2.8.3  Forms of Agrarian Accumulation ................................................................ 79 
2.8.4  Coo-peratives and Agriculture in Tanzania ................................................. 79 
2.8.5  Parastatal Crop Authorities and State Farms ............................................... 83 
2.8.6   Agrarian production  and Liberalization Policies ........................................ 86 
2.9 Tanzania’s Land Law Reform ...................................................................... 87 
2.9.1  The Implementation of Tanzania’s Land Reform ........................................ 93 
2.10 Policy Review .............................................................................................. 94 
2.10.1  National Policies- Governing Land Resource .............................................. 94 
2.10.2  Policy Instrument Governing Access of Land Resources ............................ 95 
2.10.3  The Ujamaa Village Related Policies .......................................................... 99 
2.10.4  Institutional Framework and Functioning of the Village  
 Economy ...................................................................................................... 99 
2.11 The Knowledge Gap .................................................................................. 101 
2.12 Summary .................................................................................................... 104 
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................... 105 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY .......................................................................... 105 
3.1     Overview .................................................................................................... 105 
 
 
 
 
    
xi 
3.2       Description of the study Area and Justification of the Study Area ............ 105 
3.3  Study Population ........................................................................................ 106 
3.4  Study Design .............................................................................................. 106 
3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size ........................................................ 107 
3.4.1  Sampling Procedure ................................................................................... 107 
3.4.2  Sample Size ................................................................................................ 107 
3.5 Data Collection Methods ............................................................................ 108 
3.5.1  Key-informant Interviews .......................................................................... 108 
3.5.2    Focus Group Discussions ........................................................................... 109 
3.5.3  Non- Participant Observations ................................................................... 109 
3.5.4  Questionnaire – Survey .............................................................................. 110 
3.6  Secondary Data Collection ......................................................................... 110 
3.7 Data Analysis ............................................................................................. 111 
3.8 Data Quality Control and Ethical Consideration ....................................... 111 
CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................. 112 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS .......................................................................... 112 
4.1  Introduction ................................................................................................ 112 
4.2  Land uses Characteristics ........................................................................... 112 
4.2.2  Farm Holdings Characteristics ................................................................... 114 
4.2.3  Main Sources of Income in the Study Area ............................................... 115 
4.2.4  Livestock Ownership in the Study Area .................................................... 117 
4.2.5  Reasons for Keeping Livestock ................................................................. 118 
4.2.5  The Challenges Faced by Livestock Keepers ............................................ 120 
4.2.6  Perceived Land Shortages in the Study Area ............................................. 122 
 
 
 
 
    
xii 
4.3  Existing Land Tenure Systems that Influence Access to Land .................. 127 
4.3.1  Perception on the Meaning of Land Tenure ............................................... 127 
4.3.2  Types of Traditional Institutions Governing Access to Land .................... 128 
4.3.2.2  Loan of Land .............................................................................................. 131 
4.3.2.3  Traditional Institution Based on Inheritance .............................................. 131 
4.3.2.4  Tenancy ...................................................................................................... 132 
4.3.2.5  Gift ............................................................................................................. 133 
4.3.2.6  The Formal Arrangement of Mortgage or Pledge of Land ........................ 134 
4.3.3  Land Acquisition Methods ......................................................................... 138 
4.3.4  Legitimacy and Efficiency of Traditional Institutions ............................... 139 
4.3.5  Occurrence of Land use Conflicts .............................................................. 142 
4.4 Strategies for Strengthening Formal Institutions in the  
 Administration of Land Resource .............................................................. 147 
4.5  Features Linked to the Evolution of Customary Institutions  
 in the Land Resource Management ............................................................ 149 
CHAPTER FIVE .................................................................................................... 158 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. 158 
5.1 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 158 
5.1.2  Implications on Existing Land Tenure System and Evolving  
 Land Tenure Institutions ............................................................................ 158 
5.1.3  Factors Driving Changes on Traditional Institutions for Administering  
 Land Resources .......................................................................................... 160 
5.1.4  The Implication on the Strength of Existing Institutions for  
 Management of Land Resources ................................................................ 161 
 
 
 
 
    
xiii 
5.2 Recommendations ...................................................................................... 161 
5.3   Recommendetion for Further Research ..................................................... 162 
REFERENCES ....................................................................................................... 163 
APPENDICES ........................................................................................................ 194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
xiv 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 4.1(A): Responses on Main Land uses in Muleba District .............................. 112 
Table 4.1(B): Responses on Main Land uses-activities in Misenyi District .............. 112 
Table 4.2:  Responses Distribution of Opinions on Sources of Household  
 Income ................................................................................................... 116 
Table 4.3:  Response Distributions on Household Livestock Ownership ............... 116 
Table 4.4:   Responses Distribution on Reasons for Livestock Ownership in  
 Study Area ............................................................................................. 117 
Table 4.5:  Reasons for Raising Livestock as Revealed by FGD ........................... 118 
Table 4.6:  Responses Distribution on Limitations of Raising Livestock ............... 119 
Table 4.7:  Responses on Challenges Faced by Livestock – Keepers ..................... 120 
Table 4.8:  Perceived Land Shortages in the Study Area ........................................ 123 
Table 4.9:  FGD Scores on Reasons of Land Shortage in the Study Area .............. 124 
Table 4.10:  Reasons for Land shortage .................................................................... 125 
Table 4.11:  Perceptions on the Meaning of Land Tenure from the FGD ................ 127 
Table 4.12:  FGD Scores on the Type of Traditional Institutions Determining Access 
to Land in the Study Area ..................................................................... 129 
Table 4.13:  FGD Scores on Institutional Arrangements Characterized by Land 
Conflicts in the Study Area ................................................................... 135 
Table 4.14:  Methods of Land Acquisition in the Study Area as Revealed by FGD 138 
Table 4.15:  Responses Distribution on Occurrence of Land use Conflicts ............. 143 
Table 4.16:  Features Linked to the Evolution of Customary Institutions in the  
 Land Resource Management as Given by FGD .................................... 150 
Table 4.17:  Opinions a Sustainable Institutional Framework .................................. 156 
 
 
 
 
    
xv 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic Representation of Conceptual Framework ........................ 12 
Figure 3.1: Map of the Study Area. ............................................................................ 105 
Figure 4.1: Strategies used to Strengthen Existing Formal Institutions in the 
Administration of Land Resource in the Study Area .............................. 148 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
xvi 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
ADB Asian Development Bank  
ADR   Alternative Dispute Resolution   
ANC  African National Congress  
ARD  Agricultural and Rural Development  
ASDP             Agricultural Sector Development Strategy 
BEST  Business Enterprises Strategy for Tanzania  
CCM  Chama cha Mapinduzi  
CORECT  Commission for Regulation of Land Tenure  
DC   District Commissioner  
DED   District Executive Director  
EAC  East African Community  
ERP  Economic Recovery Programme  
FAO  Food and Agricultural Organization  
GCB  Global Corruption Barometer  
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development  
IMF  International Monetary Fund  
IPRI  International Property Index  
JALA Judicature and Application of Laws and Acts  
JLL  Jones Lang la Sale  
LBP                Land Bank Parcels 
LDS                Land delivery Services 
LUAs   Land User Associations  
LUP                Land use plans 
 
 
 
 
    
xvii 
MLP  Malawi Land Policy  
NESP  National Economic Survival Programme  
NLP  National Land Policy  
PRA  Rapid Assessment Appraisal (Participatory Rapid Appraisal) 
RETI  Real Estate Transparency Index  
SAP  Structural Adjustment Programme  
SPSS  Statistical Package for Social Science  
UNDP   United Nations Development Programme  
UNECA  United Nations Economic Commission for Africa  
UNESCAP  United Nations Economic Scientific Associations  
URT   United Republic of Tanzania  
VA   Village Assembly  
VC   Village Council  
VEO  Village Executive Officer  
VLA   Village Land Act No 2 of 1999 
WB  World Bank  
WDC   Word Development Committee  
WDCs   Word Council  
WEO   Word Executive Officer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the Study 
Land is a primary asset for survival and development in most of agrarian system of 
Africa, where it supports the livelihoods of most rural people.  The importance of 
land in African development is underlined by the fact that around 60 percent of the 
population derives their livelihood and incomes from farming, livestock production 
and related activities. The contribution of agricultural sector to Gross Domestic 
Production  (GDP) in most sub-Saharan countries exceed 25 percent therefore land 
remains the most important factor in development in the pre-dominantly agrarian 
economies of Africa (Adebayo, 1997). 
 
Land in Tanzania constitutes one of the major four natural resources namely land, 
forest, water and minerals. As the primary resource, Land affects other sectors, 
which are of paramount importance to the existence of the nation state. For instance, 
in Tanzania land is still inextricably tied to labor as it provides employment to nearly 
67% of the population through agricultural activities, which employ about 82% of 
the total rural population. As such land ensures food security and natural security in 
general. The country has a total area of about 945,000 square kilometers, of   which    
approximately 44 million hectors are arable land for agricultural activities. It is 
estimated that about 88% of arable land is found in rural   areas, (Chachage, 2010).  
 
However, of the total arable land, it is estimated that only 23% is currently utilized. 
This status insinuates that Tanzania has vast tracks of unused “virgin land” potential 
 
 
 
 
    
2 
for large scale agricultural investmenst. Thus at the moment there is a move to attract 
huge local and foreign direct investments in village lands in sectors such as 
agriculture, mining, tourism and bio-fuel production. 
 
According to Hayuma and Conning (2004) before Tanzania was subjected  to  
colonialism, land holding was based on customary laws of different tribes (in all 120 
tribes in Tanzania). Thereby, title to the land was based on traditions and customs of 
the respective tribes. Ownership of land was predominantly communal, owned by a 
tribe, clan or family. Chiefs, headmen and elders had the powers of land 
administration in   trust for the community. These powers continued through the 
colonial era though they were limited by the newly introduced German and later 
British land tenure system. All lands were declared to be subject to the crown and 
public lands respectively. The customary land is still in place (to this date), but since 
1963 the chiefs headmen and elders have been replaced by the elected village 
councils. 
 
Upon attainment of Tanzania’s mainland political independence in 1961, the 
Government realized that there was a need to develop a coherent and compressive 
land policy that would define the land tenure and enable proper management as well 
as allocation of land in both urban and rural areas. According to Hayuma and 
Conning (2004) such a policy could help to: Accommodate changes in land use and 
increasing  human population in the country; control large stock – population  which   
increases demand for grazing land and creates serious land degradation and protect 
the environment from extension of cultivation to marginal areas. Thus policies such 
 
 
 
 
    
3 
as Tanzania national Land policy 1995 and the 1997 National land policy plus 1999 
national land Law and village land Act No 5 1999 were formulated by the 
government. 
 
1.2 Challenges Facing Land Tenure in Rural Tanzania 
Despite that Tanzania has the national land law No.4 1999 and village land Act No.5 
of 1999 that aims at promoting harmonious land ownership in the country’s rural 
areas. There exist numerous challenges as far as land ownership in concerned. These 
challenges include; conflicts on land use in rural areas especially between farmers 
and livestock-keepers, persistent land disputes resulting from rapid expansion of 
towns encroaching on surrounding farming areas; tenure conflicts between 
customary and granted land rights (Simbarashe, 2012). Alienation of the people 
through accumulation of land in the hands of big national and multi-national 
companies, leaving small scale producers landless (Chachage, 2010, Nelson and 
Sulle, 2012). There is absence of adequate and coordinated land information. This 
mainly, manifested in the lack of awareness about land information amongst the 
people.  Such a problem has created enormous poor planning for land utilization and 
it has eventually led to the building of houses without planning especially in the 
villages. Additionally, in several parts of Tanzania, there is land insecurity amongst 
small-land holder farmers (ESRF: 2013). 
 
The existence of such challenges is partly attributed to problems inherent in the land 
policies of the country: The national land law No. 4 of 1999 and the village Act No. 
5 of 1999; It appears that these land laws and as well as related Acts, have both 
strength and weakness in handling land ownership matters in the country. The 
 
 
 
 
    
4 
strength of the land law and village land Act are such as its ability to ensure that land 
is put to its most productive use to promote rapid social and economic development 
of the country. It promotes an equitable distribution of and access to land by the 
citizens. And it promotes sound land information management. Its weakness includes 
land conflicts that still exist among agriculturalists (pastoralists and agro farmers) 
especially in rural areas despite the policy-objectives of settling such problems. 
While land is still allocated to individuals, private firms including foreign investors 
regardless of their proven ability to develop them, the law does not have specific 
statements which are reversing this and information system based in various aspects  
on  land  such  as  the  names,  addresses,   size, location and use of parcels is  still  
ambigious  that  is  why  some  homes  are  being destroyed  to pave way  for 
development projects such as road construction.     
 
1.3 Conceptual Issues of Agrarianism in Tanzania 
 Agrarian sector in Tanzania, like many other developing countries, does mean a 
country where the majority of population depends entirely on land for their livehoods 
but when this dependency is in crisis, the term Agrarian question is the proper term 
to apply (A Dictionary of Political Economy 1984). Primarily agrarianism in 
Tanzania has been instigated by the colonial and Neoliberal economic reforms in the 
past decades and has been intensified through the continuing forms of accumulation 
of capital, leaving the most of local communities in a state of destitution and 
impoverishment, while exposing the majority of the people to what can be termed as 
massive exploitation and marginalization. This state of affairs indicates a pervasive 
agrarian crisis (Maghimbi, Lokina and Senga, 2011). 
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After the coming of colonialism – the colonial land tenure Institutional arrangements 
changed almost everything in favour of the colonialists and   chain immigrants 
(Shivji 2009). It was the poor small holder – producers, after the coming of 
colonialism, who were the majority in the country side but not the people who 
advocated distribution of landed property. Infact, due to the semi finished process of 
divorcing the small-holder producers from their means of production which is 
essentially land, through the shocking process of forcing people to move from one 
place to another to seek work to do. The process mentioned here, formed a system 
whereby poor small holder producers sold their labour power in order to sustain as 
well as their families needs during the colonial period. Over and above, people were 
indulged in other activities where they were also paid allowances, in other words 
people call it bachelor wage system that helped them to survive on.  
 
These activities were like, working in plantations, working in mines and road 
building.It was argued by Shivji (2009) that the totality of these types of exploitative 
relationships, the colonial masters had superimposed on their subjects, enabled the 
imperialists to survive and this created a mechanism of super exploitation. Along 
such a system of exploitation through commodity-exchange, there was also a system 
of land alienation by the colonial masters that extended their colonial exploitation, 
which could be compared to that exploitation extended to developing states during 
the emerging of capitalism as a mode of production; this could be referred to what 
was elaborated by Marx (1860). 
 
Various forms of exploitation have sustained even to post-colonial period even today 
during the neoliberal era as elaborated by Shivji (2009). These exploitative tentacles 
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have assumed different trends where we see the poor small holder-producers, who 
were turned into an artificial source of exploitation through infamous works ranging 
from forced labour to child labour. These poor small holder producers have sincerely 
failed to sustain under such circumstances, in being supported by land alone. Thus    
small    landholders / farmers have decided to look for other activities to survive on 
such as trivial or minor trading activities, involving in skill making activities;   
extracting from quarries and making of gold articles.  
 
All these activities noted above, were referred to as ‘multi-occupations a 
diversifications of income and marked an end of peasantry. To this point Shivji 
(2009) responded by saying that those were views given by foreign researchers in 
their documents to glorify those infamous, exploitative activities. Infact, those were 
survival strategies meaning that peasant labour super-exploits itself via 
intensification of labour. Secondly these are survival techniques designed to struggle 
against super exploitation of super-exploitation of capitalism. The outcomes of labor 
intensification plus capital accumulation have resulted into differentiation in our 
community.  
 
This was seriously clarified by Lenin (1899) (drawing on Marx, 1860) in the entire 
explanation of peasantry and peasant economy. On the same line of thinking, (Peters, 
2013)  clarified more on peasantry, by saying that, when capitalist ways of 
production are linked to agriculture the peasantry - branches or divides into rich, 
middle and poor classes. The rich small holder producers are peasant-capitalists. 
These rich small –producers are able to hire labor plus machinery and finally 
enhance good production. Then the poor small-holder producers are those who have 
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been divorced from their means of production essentially ‘’land’’. Their land was 
alienated by the colonial – capitalists and henceforth, they cannot survive on land 
alone; but combine farming and selling their labor power. In the country side, poor 
small landholders/producers become laborers for the progressive small land 
holders/producers and other capitalists. The poor small land holders/producers move 
to urban areas to seek for work, the Middle small producers are the rural people 
involving in minor or trivial commercial undertaking who may later on join or get 
linked to commercial class. 
The arguments used to justify government action to tightly control derived rights 
arrangements have, however, been invalidated by recent studies. Moreover, when 
government policy measures seek to suppress such forms of local traditional 
Institutional arrangements, without simultaneously solving the problem to which 
they are a response, imperfection of certain markets, uncertainty, limited access to 
credit etc, there is a great risk of generating counter productive results in terms of 
both efficiency and equity. 
Consequences may include blocking opportunities for farm size to adjust to the 
availability of other factors. Insecurity or land owners leading to less land being 
available for farming and resort to less efficient- alternatives and unable farming to 
recognize that small  land holders  / farmers will always need to adjust their access to 
land according to the availability of labor and other factors which are bound to vary 
during the lifecycle of farm household. 
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1.4  Statement of the Problem 
Land has become a very high profile issue in Tanzania and there is an often 
desperate scramble for land in the context of privatization and the search for foreign 
investments. In particular, farming and grazing lands in the study areas held under 
various forms of communal tenure have come under serious threat (Oxfam, 1997). It 
appears as if there is weak Institutional setting in Tanzania that can ensure equitable 
use of land resources, people’s participation and security for livehood of the majority 
(Moyo, 2008 shivji 2009). The implication of this, there is continuous contradiction 
in resolving land use disputes and conflicts. The study therefore attempts to analyze 
the institutional arrangements and governance of agrarian system in the selected area 
with a view to improve farmers and pastoralists’ rights.  
 
1.5 Objectives of the Study 
1.5.1  General Objective 
The general objective of the study was to determine the types and roles of institutions 
that govern the agrarian system in Muleba and Missenyi district in view of 
recommending on sustainable institutional setting that can ensure equitable and 
sustainable use of land resources. 
 
1.5.2  Specific Objectives of the Study 
The specific objectives of this study were:  
(i) To determine the main land uses and farm hold-characteristics in the study area 
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(ii) To establish the main land tenure system and mode of access to land resources 
in the Study area. 
(iii) To examine the types and causes of land use conflicts and their mitigation 
pathway in the study area. 
(iv) To evaluate the evolution of customary institutions in the land resource -
management in the study area. 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
The study address the following questions 
(i) What are the main lands uses in the area under study? This question attempts to 
capture the main types of land uses in Muleba and Missenyi district. 
(ii) What are the existing land tenure systems that influence the day-to-day 
management of land resources by users? This question looks at the nature, 
types and effect of the existing legislature, customary law or informal 
arrangements and how they affect land allocation and ownership among users. 
(iii) Which are the strategies of existing formal arrangements in the administration 
of land resources from the study area? 
(iv) What is the evolution of customary arrangements in the land resource-
management in the study area? 
 
1.7   The Conceptual Framework   
Figure 1 presents   the conceptual framework of this study. In describing the major 
transformations in land use pattern and farming systems we need to periodize the 
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historical epochs so that we may situate specific occurrences accordingly. During the 
pre capitalist period, the dominant customary arrangements were to control or guide 
the production relations which were basically communal in nature, and by then land 
was owned communally by the clan or   kinship-lineage.  Land was to serve all 
people in the society. In fact, customary arrangements encouraged adherence to 
social norms, taboos, labour, services, respect and support. Tenants could consume 
but could not sell other crop growing on the farms. Institutions were seen from the 
level of the family, clan and village.  These institutions controlled land in every 
aspect so that land could help people to satisfy their basic needs through production 
on mutual basis (Polanyi, 1976). 
 
These indigenous/ traditional communities witnessed drastic changes due to sporadic 
evolution of arrangements as result of the capitalist penetration into pre capitalist 
societies. This contact necessitated the speed of transformation of the traditional 
institutional arrangements. Changes ranged from political, economic to social 
conditions; all these formulated new relations of production to new capitalist 
relations of production. Major changes were noted along land (Kenpost, 1972).  
 
Given an increasing scarcity of land, the land resource was increasingly accessed 
through sale. However sale has also now become less frequent since only small areas 
of land are still available. Basically, land had turned into a commodity, through 
commoditization.  The trend of the political situation also changed very substantially 
by bringing about a major shift in the land rights whereby intruders, migrants, 
businessmen/ merchants were able to secure their claims to land, formerly claimed 
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by indigenous communities. The principle underlying land - rights made land belong 
to the one who cultivates it or who has secured title or one who has paid fees for that 
piece of land. This situation changed drastically and indigenous people ended in 
having a lot of disputes with intruders/ migrants and rich people who  were  able  to  
secure  their  claims  to  land,formerly  claimed  by  indigenous  communities. This 
was an   emergency of    disputes between people and their elders. In many areas 
local people came to resent their effective dispossession of land, given the high level 
of    in migration. 
 
It is argued by Place and Hazell (1993) that productivity effects of indigenous land  
tenure  systems  was  caused  by the growth of population  which  was an 
autonomous factor, making for a steady intensification in agriculture, which in turn 
brings a whole host of economic and sociological changes on its train. Thus Place 
and Hazell’s main impression however, was that primitive agricultural communities 
(like those from the study area) were dynamic. These primitive agricultural 
communities were subject to changes in agriculture – technology, induced by 
population pressure. In, fact population growth had created the main stimulus to 
agrarian change (Kaldor, 1986). 
 
The economic down turn for the time being which continues today by increased 
demand of land brought by young population who could not be absorbed in the 
formal sector in town. They now seek to farm but land is no longer in such abundant 
supply, given the extensive areas transferred earlier by their father’s to people who 
were capable of buying those area.  
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This has created another inter generational tension between the young men and 
lineage elders, within the local population. There has been a gradual shift in social 
relations from those based on kinship and alliance, to those of patron and client. 
Family heads can no longer rely on their sons providing free labour and they must 
pay for this service. Access to land is much more commodified with cash payment 
proportional to the size and quality of the land. 
      
    
   
                    -  Communal Land Rights                   - Norms 
-  Use Right                                         -   Customs 
-   Right to Land                                  - Behavior 
-    Importance of the Village                 - Taboos    
                                                                                    -  Ideology       
Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic Representation of Conceptual Framework 
Source: Modified from William and Robert model (1984)   
 
1.8  Theoretical Framework 
Peasantry and agrarian theories, whether classical or contemporary can be 
categorized as critical and practical theories. Critical theories attempt to study and 
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understand the world and its inner process of development, while practical theories 
involve studying how to change the world and they entail the relationship of theory 
to practice. This study extensively covers range of theories on the peasantry and the 
agrarian issues or question. Detailed examination of theories will be informed by the 
validity or invalidity of these theories in explaining the agrarian issue as related to 
the level of production relations. The rationale for doing this derives from the 
expectation that theories should serve as illuminator of social problems, phenomena 
or events. 
Many theories have been developed on issues related to institutional change with 
regard to the institutional arrangements in governance of agrarian systems. While I 
am not ignoring the contribution made by all these theories in my study, I intended to 
use the theory adapted by (Robert and William, 1984). The theory that adheres to      
economy approach which is indeed providing the practical approach to the analysis 
of agrarian society, In view of (Robert and William, 1984), peasant economy system 
is the one that has superimposed on natural economy or traditional economy and 
hence forth the production relations have in fact changed drastically to satisfy the 
inclinations or needs of the colonial, neocolonial hegemonies at all times and the 
people are practically placed under the yoke of perpetual exploitation through 
capitalist relations of production.  
 
These indigenous or traditional communities witnessed drastic changes due to 
sporadic evolution of Institutional arrangements as the results of the capitalist 
penetration into our societies. This contact necessitated the speed of transformation 
of these traditional Institutional arrangements. The changes were ranging from 
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political economic and social conditions. All these formulated new relations of 
production, noted/known as peasant economy relations of production: - that were 
mixed with new capitalist relations of production. Many changes were marked along 
land (Kenpost, 1972). Owing to increasing scarcity of land, land resources were 
increasingly accessed through sales. 
 
Land had been turned into a commodity along commodization. The trend of political 
situation also changed very substantially, bringing about major changes in land rights 
whereby, intruders, migrants, merchants were able to secure claims to land. Formally 
land was claimed by indigenous communities. Now land rights made land to belong 
to one who cultivates it or who has secured title or who has paid fees for the piece of 
land. These changes caused local – indigenous people to have a lot of disputes with 
intruders, migrants, rich people who owned land through buying the traditional land. 
There arose disputes with elders. This trend has marked the beginning of an 
exceptional phase where a series of changes were made by the ruling hegemonies in 
power just to handle the changes, attempts of reviewing rules, regulations or law 
were often embarked, reforms, and all types of adjustments are being attempted by 
Independent governments. It is along, such a duration that the land users/ land 
occupies have fallen victims of these changes. 
 
This theory of (William and Robert, 1984) has exposed the origins of all these 
controversial issues that have affected these land users negatively to have been 
linked to capitalistic – penetration. This is a result of colonial as well as neocolonial 
legacy, (Moyo, 2008). The theory suggests for a solution of all these anomalies that 
could be rectified by adopting techniques of the Cultural Revolution. It is under such 
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guidelines we need to learn from successful revolutions ever carried out in particular 
countries such as Southern Korea, China, Russia and Iran. We are therefore bound to 
learn from those victorious agrarian transformations – mentioned in the following 
sections. 
 
1.8.1  Evolutionary Theory 
Evolutionary theory of land rights (ELTR) is that under joint impact of increasing 
population and market integration, land rights spontaneously evolve towards rising 
individualization and that this evolution eventually leads rights holders to press for 
creation of formalized private property rights (Platteau, 2000). The policy 
implication is that states need to implement, ELTR, when land so scarce as to make 
it source of acute competition. It is argued by Platteau, opcit, that most of beneficial 
effects usually ascribed to this (for example greater security) are grossly over – 
estimated and that, given its high cost, generally advisable to look for more 
appropriate solutions that rely on existing informal mechanisms at community level. 
This was accepted by Bruce, at land Tenure centre (1993): he contended that 
indigenous land tenure arrangements still have a dominant role to play. ELTR makes 
two essential points: - Land Arrangements and practices are evolving autonomously 
under pressure of growing land scarcity and significant shifts which take place and 
geared towards individualization of tenure rights and transferability of land.  
 
On performing land rights in sub- Saharan Africa, where Tanzania is inclusive, in 
relation to efficiency and equity, (Platteau, 2000) argued that privatization provides 
incentives for Agricultural investment, given farmers access to credit, reduce 
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fragmentation of land holding and reduces conflict over land. In fact, such benefits 
rarely realized (Senga, Maghimbi, Lokina, 2011). They have clarified that land 
registration commonly increases uncertainty and conflict over land rights especially 
for groups that had non- formal access to natural resources, elites are able to benefit 
disproportionately and credit generated is seldom used for productive investment 
(Adebayor, 1997).  
 
On the reverse, land laws passed by many African countries and Tanzania inclusive, 
are said to have been influenced by ELTR; as a result, these countries are also said to 
be on contrary, ambivalent, inconsistent, confusing and in applicable and being badly 
implemented due to bureaucratic complexity of transaction – costs and efficiency 
losses, which have controlled land market transactions likely to have detrimental 
effects on equity and efficiency as far as land users are concerned (Kauzen, 1995). 
 
It is also argued by Kauzen, opcit, that land resources management in Tanzania are 
controlled by the state where land resources policies and laws pose a problem in 
ensuring equitable access to land users.( Kauzen,1995).  It  can  be argued that some 
policies or Acts could be referred as a case in point to clarify this controversial 
circumstances due to the influence of ELTR or controversial laws or Acts:- 
 
The first case could be identified as that Agricultural sector Development strategy of 
2001. It recognizes the need to institutionalize community participation rather than 
one of event; Further more this strategy recommends streamlining procedures for 
gaining legal access to land in order to make it possible to use land titles as to 
collateral for loans. The implication of this strategy is the increase of use of land 
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alienation from local communities and this has increased potential disputes / 
conflicts among various resources users including pastoralists and farmers (Oxfam, 
2008). 
 
In a series controversial circumstances caused by the declared policies/Acts./ Laws, 
the second case is, the environmental management Act of 2004. The objective of 
environmental management Act of 2004 is to promote the enhancement protection 
conservation and management of environment. It has identified a number of areas as 
sensitive and closed for livestock- keeping, occupation and cultivation. The Act is 
not clear on measures to be taken in supporting and preserving mobile pastured 
system to help in conservation of land resources and particularly natural resources 
and cultural heritage. 
The wildlife conservation Act of number 12 of 1974 (amended in 1978) grants power 
to government to dispose pastoralists those who had traditionally relied on such 
lands, either by way of compensation or otherwise. Furthermore the Act places 
severe restrictions on accessing land declared a game reserves or game controlled 
area. Most of the protected areas in the country are either pastured lands or were used 
by pastoralists in the past. 
 
The wild life management policy of 1998, while promoting local community 
participation, conserving and exploiting wild life resources also facilitates the 
marginalization of pastoralists by encouraging more land to be brought under wild 
life conservation at the expenses of the pastoral activities (Bernstein, 2005). Another 
Act of 1997, namely Tanzania investment Act, (URT, 1997) does allow non citizens 
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to own land for the purpose of investment. Its enactment was followed by setting 
aside land bank under TIC. This in effect will take away land already occupied by 
people such as nomadic – pastoralists and other vulnerable communities. 
 
As a clear observation here it has been stressed that the contemporary Institutional 
arrangements governing land resources have come with challenges as well as 
opportunities for a few or limited number of land users and limited number of 
pastoralists as related to sustainable production system. The results of all these, it has 
ended up in increased commodization of land that led to expropriation of the 
commercial grazing land and agricultural land to individuals with the subsequent 
partitioning of range lands. The most vulnerable and poor members of the 
communities are losing access of livehood support system, which were owned 
communally. Again the pastoral systems are increasing getting commercialized. In 
fact, immerging opportunities are upon the changing tenure system. The previously 
communally owned range land are now willing to be influenced by intensification 
through introduction of technologies for increased range and animal productivity, 
while sustaining the environmental health. 
 
1.9  Significance of the Study   
(i) The study is very significant because the findings will benefit to the advocacy 
groups. 
(ii)  The findings will provide baseline information needed for awareness rising on 
influencing the change of policy that will be suppressing the small holder 
peasants / farmers. 
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(iii) To policy makers, the findings will enable easy identification of priority areas 
in designing programme and policies that address the problem of land use 
issues in the country. The study findings will also be useful to students, 
researchers, professionals and other people who will be interested in the area of 
study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Overview 
 In this chapter, reviews on the existing literature on institutional arrangements 
governing agrarian systems was presented. The goals is to understand what others 
have done on this study, as well as an examination of similar experiences that policy 
makers and other stakeholders can learn from. The literature review covers both a 
theoretical and empirical perspectives. A theoretical synopsis included the theory 
behind the concepts on institutions, land tenure, agrarian systems, land governance 
and administration was presented. The review included a section on empirical 
literature; it combined all similar researchers done in the field of land administration; 
particularly from practical experiences of other regions in this world. Finally, policy 
review was given   ending with knowledge gap. 
 
2.2 Concepts and Definitions  
2.2.1  The Definition and Nature of Institutions 
While Institutions tend to appear to people in society as part of the natural, 
unchanging landscape of their lives, study of institutions by the social science tends 
to reveal the nature of institutions as social construction, artifacts of a particular time, 
culture and society, produced by collective human choice, though not directly by 
individual intention, (Jepperson, 1991). Institutions can be seen as “naturally” arising 
from, and conforming to, human nature a fundamentally conservative view as 
institutions can be seen as artificial, almost accidental, and in need of architectural 
redesign, informed by expert social analysis to better serve human need (Avner, 
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1993).  The Marxist view does see human nature as historically evolving towards 
voluntary social cooperation, shared by some anarchists, is that supra- individual 
institutions such as the market and the state are in compatible with individual liberty 
which would obtain in a truly free society, (Chang, 2007). Economics, in recent 
years, has used game theory to study institutions from two perspectives. Firstly, how 
do institutions survive and evolve?  
 
In this perspective, institutions arise form nash equilibria off games, for example 
whenever people pass each other in a corridor or thorough fare, there is need for 
customs which avoid collisions. Such a custom might call for each party to keep to 
their own right (or left) such a choice is arbitrary, it is only necessary that the choice 
be uniform and consistent. Such customs may be supposed to be origin of rules, such 
as to rule, adopted in many countries which require driving automobiles on the right 
side of road (North, 1995). 
 
2.2.2 Enforcement as Critical Aspects of Institutions 
In the absence of enforcement rules the institutions are senile and redundant. 
Enforcement simply means putting the constraints into operation, or dealing with 
deviations from the constraints. Creating an institutional environment that induced 
credible commitment entails the complex institutional framework of formal rules, 
informal constraints and enforcement that together make possible low cost 
transacting. Formal enforcement is normally expressive venture and may be 
uneconomical altogether for instance, if the cost of enforcing a given by laws is 
higher than the cost of expected loss. Therefore, enforcement remains a costly 
venture. North (1990) argues that in developed world, the effective, judicial system 
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which includes well specified body of law and agents such as lawyers, arbitrators, 
mediators would play the role with some confidence, that the merit of a case rather 
than private pay- off will influence outcomes. 
 
Formal and informal institution can contribute/ complement one another in their 
enforcement. North (1990) and Wilson (2003) argue that formal rules can 
complement and increase the effectiveness of informal constraints more efficient. 
While coexistence of formal and informal institutions is inevitable; situation where 
informal rules tend to contradict formal rules is dysfunctional. Here it is possible that 
due to lack of proper enforcement or due to disregard towards the spirit of the written 
laws; they become ineffective and are replaced by a set of practices that show a 
divergence form the declared laws; rules and regulations. These are what both North 
(1986, 2000) and Ostrom (1992) refer to as rule in use. 
 
2.2.3  Concept of Agrarian System  
An agrarian system is the dynamic set of economic and technological factors that 
affect agricultural practices. It is premised on the idea that different systems have 
developed depending on the natural and social conditions specific to a particular 
region. The term agrarian structure denotes all of the existing and lasting production 
and living conditions found in a rural region. The agrarian structure includes the 
system of land tenure and the system of land management (technical and economic 
agrarian structure). (http://www.professor-frithjof-kuhnen, 2018). 
 
An agrarian society, or agricultural society, is any community whose economy is 
based on producing and maintaining crops and farmland. Its key characteristic is that 
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the economy, wealth and society in general is centered primarily on agriculture. 
Human and animal labor is the primary tools employed for agricultural production. 
Agrarian societies employ a division of labor with members specializing in specific 
tasks (http://www.professor-frithjof-kuhnen, 2018). 
 
2.2.3  Concept and Practice of Governance 
Governance in the development area is a key pillar for programs seeking to promote 
economic and social development (World Bank 2000). Governance is a procedure 
through which decision is made and it is also a procedure through which decision is 
implemented (UNESCAP, 2007). The implementation of governance as a concept 
could be understood by underscoring the theoretical treatment of the term 
governance (Haki-elimu, 2004). 
 
FAO (2007) elaborates governance as the traditions which cause power to occur in a 
particular way in which it is practiced where citizens are allowed to say or to speak 
their feelings and finally the making of decisions on aspects related to the entire 
community. It refers to rules, processes and behavior whereby interests could exist.  
On the same line of thinking, Hyden (2003) speaks confidently that the concept of 
governance captures this multi dimensional understanding and the realms, which it 
should be measured by civil and political society, executive, bureaucracy, economic 
society and judiciary. Practically, achieving good governance fosters the idea that a 
higher the quality of Institutions the better the results and the more sustained the 
progress. Infact governance refers to institutions and relations to do with political 
power, the way power is exercised and legitimized.  
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In other words governance is constructed primarily on the terrain of power. This 
articulated the values and principles by which governance would be judged and 
characterized, relate the forms of governance such as democratic governance 
authoritarian governance or dictatorial governance (Nyongo, 1998; Shivji, 2004). 
 
Institutions, companies and state administrations have advanced indicators. Many of 
them have developed gradually from macro indicators of governance earmarked by 
the World Bank institute “governance matters” (Kaufman, Kraay et al 2003). The 
key macro governance indicators were developed as a “whole of country “context 
and strongly reflect measures within countries’ institutional frameworks and 
includes: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. 
 
These indicators set benchmark aggregate indicators for governance and helped to 
put governance on the development agenda. However, this set has been examined 
over the years of its inability to accurately clarify variations within countries and the 
have been concerns about the large margin of error associated with the governance 
estimates. Another crucial issue has been the way of governance has been aggregated 
into a single indicator (UNDP, 2004). Based on the above mentioned short comings 
UNDP (2006) noted that some governance indicators are almost marked 40 years old 
mean while several others are part of more recent collection effort.  
 
There are several governance indicators such as Weberian corporate state project 
(1970, 1990), local competitive index (1979-2005), corruption perception Index 
(transparency International 1995 present); world governance assessment (1996-2000, 
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2001-2006; Freedom House (1972-present) Afro barometer (1999-2003) Global 
Corruption Barometer (Transparency International 2003 present) Global integrity 
index (2003-2004, 2006). Bertelsmann Transformation (index 2003-2006) (UNDP 
2007), these indicators, intend to have regional or global representation and primarily 
cover country atmosphere of beaurocratic quality and corruption, democracy, 
Political freedoms, Government effectiveness and civil liberties. The use of real 
fundamental truth, good governance can be employed to elaborate an ideal or set of 
moral obligations. Governance fundamentals, some with particular linkages to land 
have shown difference slightly in their application across their organizations 
 
2.3  Property Rights and Regimes 
2.3.1  Property Rights 
This refers to the structure of rights to resources and the rules under which those 
rights are exercised. Sometimes the word property rights and rules are used 
interchangeably in referring to utilization of natural resources (Ostrom, 1996), 
however it should be noted that rights are products of rules. 
 
Property rights systems are part of society’s institutions. Important operational level 
property rights are access and withdrawal rights. Access refer to the right to enter a 
defined physical area and enjoy non- subtractive benefit while withdrawal refer to 
the rights to obtain resources units or products of a resources and in some cases 
relate to what will be done with the product harvested e.g. subsistence harvesting is 
allowed in many cases against commercial extraction. With regards to CPR 
collective choice property rights include management, exclusion and alienation. 
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Management refers to the rights to regulate internal use pattern and transform the 
resource by making improvement. Exclusion refers to the rights to determine who 
will have access rights and how the rights may be transferred.  Alienation refers to 
the right to sell or lease. 
 
To be effective, property rights must be enforced by the state or other governing 
body NRC, 2002, (Ostrom and Schlager, 1996). The significance of well established 
property rights system is the security that enforced property rights given to 
individuals and groups. With such assurance, individuals can make credible 
commitment to one another to develop long – term plans for investing in and 
harvesting from CPR in a sustainable manner. 
 
2.3.2 Common Property Regime 
The common property regime refers to particular social arrangements regulating the 
preservation; maintenance and consumption of a common pool resource (Ostrom, 
2002). Common property regime typically protects the core resource and allocate the 
fringe benefits through complex community norms of consensus decision making, 
(Schulze, 2000). Open access resource is considered by Bromley (1991) as a 
situation of resource regime. It is logically inconsistent to assert as many often do 
“Every day’s property is nobody’s property” Bromley, 1991).  
 
This is a situation of mutual privilege and no right; no user has the right to preclude 
use by any other party. The open access regime can be divided into categories 
namely symmetric externality, it is where use of resource by one party impacts a 
negative externality to all other producers, example included fishers, wildlife, open 
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grazing land, ground water, unregulated wood land, forest, common oil and gas pools 
(Ebbin 2004). In case of asymmetric externality occurs when production or 
consumption decision of economic actor enter the production or utility function of 
others. While the recipients of the externality do not cause any reciprocal effects 
(Stevenson, 1991).  
 
2.3.3 Land Tenure  
Land tenure can be defined as the mode which land is held or owned or set of 
relationship among people concerning the use of land and its product. Property rights 
can similarly be defined as a recognized interest. In land or property vested in an 
individual or group and can apply separately to land or development or transfer and, 
as such exist in parallel with ownership (Mabogunje, 1990). 
 
Rights to land property exist within a regime of rights in general. The key factor in 
any system of land tenure and property rights is therefore the relationship of an 
individual to the group; and their impact on land from this, it follows that concepts of 
land tenure are an expression of the values to which a society adheres or aspires. As 
such they vary enormously from those at one end of the spectrum, which regard land 
as a sacred trust to be protected for future generation to those at other end, which 
regard it as commodity to be enjoyed or exploited like any other. Tribal, feudal, 
colonial, capitalist, socialist and religious societies have all evolved distinctive 
concepts concerning the ownership and use of land. Countries, which have been 
subjected to colonialism like Tanzania, have particularly complex tenure 
arrangements since indigenous and imposed tenure patterns may exist at the same 
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time in the same area. Given this variety it is important to review the main concepts 
and systems, which exist in developing countries, like Tanzania and their operation 
2.3.4 Land Tenure Institutions 
In the period of neo liberalism, Tanzania has witnessed more changes (Harvey 2003). 
Thus the pattern of transactions in land and labor needs was understood in the light 
of strategies being pursued by different actors and various options open to them. For 
example the lack of easy means to attain credit has engendered the gradual 
development of a set of relationships between people with different needs and 
resources at their disposal.  
 
These with ready access to cash can overtime gradually increase a substantial 
holding in land (ibid). This process of acquiring land through money transactions at 
this material time was referred to by Harvey (op. cit., 2003) as gradually increase by 
depriving land or property. It was done by involving violence in the process of 
seeking to exploit others where by the investors were supported by rich states. They 
spread their influence and their strategies of depriving land or property from the 
original people, essentially farmers and livestock keepers. 
 
Under such circumstances people subjected to such infamous treatment were forced 
to turn to the selling of their labour power, in order to sustain. They form an army of 
unemployed people, who are selling their labour very cheaply to the organized rich 
people and on the other hand the rich people got / obtained cheap labour and 
acquisition of land (Kombe and Wilbard, 2010). Accordingly Harvey, (2005) has 
compared the former capital maximization ever explained by Lenin’ thesis over 
capital maximization which was elaborated by Luxemburg (1951 – 1973). Here are 
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two types of capital maximization: One type of maximization is seen along primitive 
accumulation, which was carried out during emerging of capitalism as a mode of 
production. Then we see capital maximization in our modern time that is capital 
maximization along the building up capital by depriving the land of indigenous 
people as well as their property continued to operate throughout the history capitalist 
accumulation on world scale. Along the building up of capital by depriving the land 
of indigenous people as well as their properties continued to operate throughout the 
history of capitalist accumulation on a world scale. At this point, shivji states that 
Harvey examines how organic relations between expanded reproduction on one hand 
and the often violent processes of the dispossession on other land, have shaped the 
historical geography of capitalism (Shivji, 2009). 
 
2.3.4.1 Customary Land Tenure  
According to Fisher (1993), customary tenure system have been defined by the 
united nations as the rights to use or to dispose of use rights over land which rest 
neither on the exercise by brute force nor on the evidence of rights guaranteed by the 
government statute but on the fact that those rights are recognized as legitimate by 
the community, the rules governing the acquisition and transmission of these rights 
being usually explicit and generally known though not normal recorded in writing.  
 
As Fisher has noted, the major characteristic of customary tenure is that the land is 
regarded as belonging not to the individual but to the whole social group. Customary 
land is not subject to personal ownership, although use-rights are alienable within 
and between members of the community. There is a birth right no subsistence 
opportunity for each family head; each family is granted use-rights of habitation and 
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cultivation according to their need. He continues, these characteristics shape not only 
the relationship between  the community  and  its  land  but  also  between  the  
individual  members  of  the  community. Security of tenure and of subsistence 
opportunity arises out of kinship with and members of the community group. Land is 
a societal resource, it is through his/her relationship with the land that the individual 
perceive a sense of place and of personality, Mabogunje (1990). A late Ghanaian 
Chief encapsulated the essence of customary tenure by claiming that “I conceive that 
land belongs to a vat family of whom are dead, few are living and countless hosts are 
still unborn” (Ollennu, 1961) under customary land system, there is an individual 
right of occupation and use, but only a communal right of alienation. Several groups 
could enjoy different rights to the same land, such as rights of occupation, grazing or 
passage in addition to the group claiming primary rights. The extensive nature of 
customary system did not prevent individual allocation of customary. 
 
Customary tenure concepts have evolved from the needs of agricultural societies and 
are generally, based on the notion that land initially, belonged to the person who 
cleared it. Given its relative abundance and the practice of shifting cultivation, land 
had virtually to no economic value, so the need to retain or develop any system of 
rights to a particular area of land that could not be protected was both unnecessary 
and illogical, when land was abundant (Cotula, 2007) Customary right derived from 
membership in the political community and traditionally, no cash payment was made 
for the land.  
 
Instead a token payment, sometimes referred to as “Cattle, money” was expected for 
the services rendered. These customary systems fuse the right of the individual with 
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those of the group and individuals possess extensive rights, but land as such (Kludze 
1983). Ownership in these cases is therefore corporate rather that proprietary. To 
some extent, this acts as a constraint to these desiring social mobility (UN 1973, 
VOL. VII) by making more difficult for individuals to obtain, loans for economic 
development since they are generally unable to use land as collateral for such loans. 
In fact customary system have been successful in ensuring the equitable distribution 
of land and reasonably efficient in stimulating productivity it is evidenced by social 
change and demand for land (Feder, and Noronha, 1987). In many cases, under other 
tenure system, such as private  freehold,  legal  status  of  the  customary  holdings 
may also become  ambiguous  or  even  subordinate, reflecting changes of influence 
in the wider legal and institutional environment. 
  
2.3.4.2 Private Land Tenure  
The concept of private property rights is an integral part of the legal structure of 
European society (United Nations 1973). It is held to have arisen in opposition to the 
rules of feudal society, where a local lord had superior rights of ownership, 
especially land ownership and all tenants in the area paid him “feuds” or fees. 
 
The concept of private ownership is embodied in English common law, but is 
expressed in its purist form in the French civil code of 1804-8, which was drafted 
after the revolution of 1789, finally overthrew feudalism. It is commonly known as 
the Napoleonic code, since it was imposed on countries which Napoleon’s and later 
French Government colonized or influenced. The code defines ownership as the 
rights to absolutely free enjoyment and disposal of objects, provided that they are not 
in any way contrary to the laws or regulations. Private ownership may be in 
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perpetuity. In the latter case, terms and conditions of renewal may be based on either 
statutory or contractual considerations. 
Within developing countries like Tanzania, Private land ownership and the 
registration of individual property rights is largely an imported concept and was 
introduced or strengthened by colonial administrations for the benefit of European 
settlers (Mabogunje 1990). It may therefore co-exist with other concepts such as 
customary tenure. Private land ownership permits the unrestricted exchange of land 
and property and the development of land and property markets in which the balance 
between supply and demand is achieved through the pricing mechanism; however, a 
common issue of concern, with this concept is its inability to ensure equitable access 
to land or property by lower income groups.    
 
2.3.5 Evolution of Land Tenure Regimes in Tanzania 
Tanzania has witnessed the four types of land tenure namely clan and lineage land 
tenure whereby the land allocation and control were handled by family or lineage; 
the centralized and hierarchical type of control of land allocation, the quasi type of 
land tenure where the land lord clans and the lineage controlled land. Lastly, the 
slave plantation that existed in Zanzibar and on scattered places located on mainland 
(Maghimbi, 1990) this has been marked to be the Tanzanians precolonial Land 
Tenure Systems.    
 
The conceptual base of the tenure system in Tanzania was laid down by the British in 
their Land Ordinance, (1923) as mentioned in chapter one. During the British period, 
the land tenure policy was influenced by two major factors. First, that Tanganyika 
was a Mandate and then a Trust Territory. The other factor was the colonial policy of 
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developing Tanganyika as a plantation / peasant economy rather than a settler 
colony. Under the terms of the trusteeship, the interests of the “natives’ were 
paramount and the administering authority was required to pay special regard to 
native laws and customs with respect to the occupation and use of land (Coulson, 
1996; URT, 1989). 
 
The Land Ordinance declared all lands, occupied or unoccupied to be “public lands” 
under the control and subject to the disposition of the governor. The governor was 
empowered to grant rights of occupancy of up to 99 years. The right of occupancy 
was defined as the right to use, occupy land including the title of a nature or a native 
community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with native law and 
custom. The legal regime thus established gave the colonial state considerable 
flexibility in their administration of land. Land alienated to foreigners for various 
reasons was under the granted rights of occupancy. Indigeneous peasants and 
pastoral communities held their land under customary laws; which were recognized 
by law but not secured in law. Their security depended on the prevailing policy of 
the state at the particular time. As a matter of fact, judicial interpretation classified 
customary occupation by “natives” as merely “permissive” which did not establish 
any rights against the government (Juma, 2000). 
 
The corpus of land tenure regime developed during the colonial period continued to 
apply fully after independence with only one change; the president replaced the 
“Governor” All lands were vested in the president as the head of executive under the 
control and administration of the state bureaucracy (Shivji and Tenga, 1985). It can 
be argued now that non of the four earlier mentioned tenure system could be 
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compared to the contemporary land tenure whereby land users are owning small 
portions of farms basically earmarked in the late 1960’s and as early as 1970’s when 
the policy of ujamaa and self reliance was at its peak under the cover of socialism. 
There is a remarkable parceling of farmland as opposed in the four tenure systems 
described above. The actual agriculture regained, marked as customary or traditional 
(Plateau 1998). 
 
It has been concluded that the source of poverty margins and shortage of capital 
among farmers in Tanzanioa is caused by land ownership system which has pushed 
farmers to have small but less economical plots of lands. This status of farmers in 
Tanzania cannot qualify to opt for opportunities offered by the banks, farmers to 
secure development loans from those institutions. Over and above, these land users 
especially farmers and pastoralists face an aspect of land shortage and the habit of 
land destruction which belonged to the society. The steps to rectify the situation that 
faced land users in Tanzania is centred ongoing reforms linked to land. Infact 
aknowgement of taking land so as to alleviate these farmers, a land cannot be 
pledged as security for payment of loans. Infact the sale of land by these land users 
does not help either   to bring up reasonable capital. Practically these farmers are 
unmotivated by two factors namely, to raise capital at family level and artificial land 
shortage plus unpromicing land laws that encourage the destruction of resources that 
belong to the society. 
 
The ongoing campaign is centred on concept of promoting land as something to be 
pledged as security for the payment of loan. An appreciating land as something to be 
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pledged as security for payment of loan has been noted as a technique in the 
Tanzanian National Program for Economic Growth and Eradication of Poverty 
(MKUKUTA). The origin of this idea is from Hernando De Soto, in his famous 
book, which for the time serves as the country’s economic manifesto. Desoto asks 
why capitalism triumphs in the west and fails everywhere (Soto, 2000). 
 
The above mentioned program was to carry out legally appreciated and operating 
entities within the formal economy in the country. The ammendments have set on 
gradual development in existing land tenure and its framework. These changes were 
earmarked in the land law 1989 by 2001 and 2002 that re activated the market in land 
so that citizens were free to sell land that they can not develop to those with ready 
requisite capacities (Kamata, 2003; Shivji, 2003). Poor farmers were encouraged to 
capitalize their assets and hence to do away with poverty. It is from the philosophy of 
the program of formalization of the property rights, which was geared at making 
farmers usefully in securing the needed loans in their aspiration to generate capital. 
On the contrary it was argued negatively by Olenesha (2006) that if one defaults a 
loan payment the consequent prospect of merciless and irrevocable for the clousure, 
instead formalization of property can also mean as to lead to formalization for 
dispossession and its concomintent to destitution and marginalization of these land 
users or farmers. 
 
The contention from Desoto’s philosophical logic stressed on saying that land and 
other property owned and held under customary law do not belong to anyone and 
therefore those items are not property in the strict sense. Thus they cannot be used 
productively to generate extra capital. Infact Desoto overlooked this basic factor 
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where there is possibility that a household could use land more efficiently for 
farming and livestock and hencefourth be able to create even more capital without 
risking or loosing the land through defaulting. It is hereby noted that small producers 
need security of their land and not alien capital what is created from it. To these 
small holder producers, land is the basic and reliable asset they need for their 
livelihood and henceforth need protection for their survival (Adebayor, 1997). 
 
2.3  Indigenous Land Tenure systems in Muleba and Missenyi Districts 
The term ownership is used; it implies “Usufructory title nearly amounting to full 
ownership”.  There were several land tenures; a scholarly clarification has been done 
by (Cory and Hartnoll, 1945). The major land patterns have been elaborated as 
follows: 
Public Tenure, (Irungu) this name is given to that part of public land, which is 
unoccupied. Whenever anybody wants land from the public land / forest was 
required to pay the fee, amounting to shs. 5/=. The fee is paid to the native authority. 
The institution of the payment of that part of public Tenure (Kishembe) is very old. 
In former times, it was paid in kind. 
 
Individual Tenure, (A Kisi) this name is given to such arable land as is capable of 
bearing a perennial crop. Same as above this individual tenure was acquired only on 
payment of shs. 5/= to the native authority. The procedure for allocation, a 
prospective settler who is a stranger, has first to find the sponsor, called “Muhikya” 
who collects as much information as possible about the new comer. The sponsor 
must be a man of outstanding status in the village the prospective settler may be 
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introduced to his sponsor by another villager to whom he is known. While the 
sponsor is collecting his information, which takes time, the settler chooses the plot, 
he will apply for. When the sponsor is satisfied, he introduces the new comer to the 
village headman, with a request that he will inform the sub – chief (Mwami) of the 
application for land. If the sub – chief approves, he appoints an elder, who is known 
to go to the village.  
 
On the appointed day, the ward leader (Mkungu), then the applicant for land and 
neighbors assembles at the chosen plot. It is customary also to call the clan – head of 
the leading clan and the man responsible for setting boundaries “Muharambwa” as 
witnesses. The boundaries are fixed by planting a tree every twenty five feet along 
the plot. Mulinzi or Muvumbo tree may be used.  
 
Finally the applicant goes to the primary court (Gombolola) to pay his fee for that 
allocated plot. Besides this form of boundary/ demarcation, another method was used 
in former times where land was abundant. The plot was allocated not by marking out 
definite boundaries but by pointing out prominent land – marks. Thus a man was told 
that his plot extended as for as the river or as far as the forest. 
 
The owner’s rights and duties were (1) the applicant becomes the owner so long as 
he complies with the rules of his tenure as guided by the Bahaya customary land law. 
(2) On applying for allocation of arable land, applicant is asked what he intends to do 
with that plot. If he states that he intends to cultivate it, he is bound to do so. (3) 
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Should he not cultivate it within two years and if he has no reasonable excuse for not 
having done so he may be deprived of sit. 
 
Within individual Tenure: There were open lands for this individual farmer/ 
householder. This particular open land was known as “Rweya Rwa Nanka”. This 
name is given to open – land, away from cultivated areas, which is unsuitable for 
perennial crops e.g. coffee, banana. Along this holding (Kibanja), There could be a 
land known as “Mwate”. This Mwate is a piece of land, which is normally acquired 
by anybody after being allocated from the chief on payment to Native Authority of 
shs. 5/= for a plantation. This “Mwate” is acquired through purchase or by 
inheritance. 
 
Kikamba: This is also a piece of land, which had been under perennial crop but it has 
allowed going back to grass. 
The third Tenure is known as Nyarubanja- Tenure. This name is given to a group of 
plantations, owned by one individual/ Landlord who is known as Mtwazi, The 
tenants is known as “Mtwarwa”.  
The fourth Tenure is called Family Tenure, “Kibanja kio ruganda”. This is plantation 
under family tenure. It is always acquired by inheritance only. 
The fifth tenure is called Communal Tenure “Rweya Rwaluganda”. This name is 
given to open land owned by the community under the clan, where people do plant 
seasonal crops. 
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Besides the above mentioned tenures there land was also divided to others sections 
such as; Public forests (Kibira kya Nanka). Clan owned forests (Kibire kio Luganda). 
From the above categories into how land was divided as guided by the customary 
land law of the Bahaya people, it is clearly shown that local and indigenous 
institutional arrangements provided chance for every member of the community to 
acquire land for cultivation and very strict procedures were adhered whenever a new 
settler wanted land. The clan administration was very keen in providing land to such 
new comer.  The official system of giving land to any member was through official 
allocation – procedures. This helped to monitor land utility and to see to it that 
working on land was very necessary and any failure to comply to community land 
rights and rules was accordingly punished. Nobody was spared unless ones give 
sound reasons for not working on his plot. 
 
It was through, this practical and clear institutional arrangements the land 
governance was highly practiced. The customary land law articulated – community 
land rights and regulations in handling land use ownership and land transfer just 
accordingly. The people in power translated that customary land law accordingly by 
following official allocation procedure of giving applied plot. Then the applicant was 
to work on that plot as he has declared to do with that plot. Therefore, the aspect of 
every member in the community was accountable to handle is plot as how he has 
declared to do with his plot. The applicant is in state of secure with his plot, provide 
he observes given land rights as well as regulation. The total of all these activities 
mobilized entire community members to make use of land hence forth realization of 
worthwhile products.  
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Finally the Bahaya customary land law has provided a chance even to the lowest 
cadre to make use of land, for example the squatters and tenants. The tenant is a man 
who is under the householder. He is given land by owner of the holder. He is 
requested to observe the community’s rules and regulation as given by the customary 
land law. 
 
The squatter is known as “Biteme” squatter. The origin of Biteme squatter is said to 
be as follows:- About 50 years ago when coffee and banana recognized as economic 
crop, the chiefs took over large area of land capable of coffee bearing or deserted 
banana plantations and put them under coffee. The work of preparing and plantations 
these areas, was done as “Nzika” forced labor by the chiefs subjects.  
 
Owing to the belief that a plantation must inhabited to prosper squatters were 
encouraged to live in these plantations which were known as “Biteme”. The terms of 
squatter varied but in the main followed the ordinary squatter rules. Thus the only 
real difference lies in the origin of the holding. The “Biteme squatters” originally had 
the use of banana or seasonal crop in their holding but received none or only a very 
small share in the coffee harvest. 
 
The entire account has exposed an expression of the general regard to human being, I 
just mean that the Agrarian system in the study area used to be too humanistic by 
giving reasonable opportunity for every member of the community to survive on land 
/ make use of land through land use – land ownership, land transfer, through the 
Administration style that was really hierarchical in terms. Today we find much 
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difference as to how land is being controlled owned, and the dynamics of land use 
are totally different. We can deliberately ask our self why those indigenous 
institutional arrangements have changed. 
 
2.4  Agrarian Systems 
Agrarian sytems are societies that are organized on the basis of segmentary lineages 
which were found mainly in areas of land shortages; where as agrarian systems 
organized on the basis of territoriarity, define chiefdoms and the communities with 
political hierarchies were found where land was relatively abundant (Shipton 1984). 
Since the publication of Fortes and Evans Pritchard’s African political systems the 
anthropological and sociological literature on sub Saharan Africa has become well 
supplied with comparative typologies of indigenous forms of agrarian, social and 
political organization as elaborated by Middleton and Tait (1958), Fried (1967), 
Colson (1969), Horton (1971) and Sanson (1974) are only few examples. 
 
Inspite of this valuable work, relatively little has been done to account for the 
distribution of the type of agrarian systems that are now very familiar. Part of the 
problem has been the difficulty of translating statistics on absolute population 
densities and distribution along with findings on agricultural techniques and the 
carrying capacities of lands into information about population pressure. Agrarian 
systems inEast Africa, it is argued that segmentary lineage systems of political 
organisations and land tenure were mostly commonly found in areas with relatively 
high population pressure, in this case, the term pressure is used in the sense of land 
scarcity as reflected in the difficulty of obtaining new land for an expanding farm or 
new homestead. 
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Agrarian system in Africa have been grouped under two patterns namely strong and 
localized based chiefdoms and village systems of land rights and related aspects in 
the case of Tanzanian Sukuma and Nyamwezi as example and strongly descent based 
segmented lineage systems using the case of Kenyan Luo, (Shipton 1994). The forms 
of land rights and related beliefs found among the sukuma, Nyamwezi were in the 
most respect the same as those found among the Ha and He and several smaller 
societies such as Kimbu, Nyiha. The Gogo also had locally based agrarian systems of 
access to agricultural land that bore strong resemblenses like that of Sukuma, 
Nyamwezi as Dobson has observed 1984 and Rigby 1969.  
In the task of accounting for the distribution of the locality based and descent based 
systems of political organization and land rights has found among many farming 
people of east Africa. These people leave in Savana or lightly wooded hills eco- 
systems. Under the German and the British rule in Tanganyika many changes were 
imposed on these systems from outside as well as from within. These variably 
included redefinition of some ethnic groups in the invenstiture of chiefs in places 
where there had been none before the codification of customary laws, registration of 
private land tittles. 
 
The dinstictive features of the peasant economy model are understood within the 
framework or the penetration of capitalism into precapitalist social formation. Within 
such a framework the state especially the colonial state is not a neutral agency. 
Indeed   as Halfan and Baker, (1984) have remarked the role of the colonial state was 
to   reconcile the indigenous people of sub Saharan Africa to the interest of 
metropolitan companies and with regard to indignious people themselves.  
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This process created some basic changes such as the pattern of Agrarian response 
was thus reinforced by the state action through enactiment of rules, policies and 
related institutions. Yet the outcome of rules and policies and other legal institutions 
create emergency of individualization and communization of land holding with 
consequent potential for alienations. The peasants found themselves disproportionate 
share of various amenities Oya, (2013). Peasants found themselves with diminishing 
access to resources and income, land expropriation and reduction to the status of 
landless peasants. At the end emergency of rich peasants who were characterized as 
(progressive farmers) a class system of capitalist farmers and semi proletarianzed 
peasants. The issue of land ownership differences are established into various ways, 
for example, officials take advantage of their position or where individuals gain 
control over larger amount of more fertile land due to the history of their kin group’s 
land occupation. Owing to that trend, the land differential emerges, then demand for 
availability of financial capital influences and private class formation. Farms based 
on wage labour rapidly ermerge (Ibid 2013). The change in production technique in 
most communities are laying of foundation for class antagonism and rewarding 
production from the agrarian rural areas Mafeje, (2003). 
2.4.1 Agrarian Transformation 
Agrarian transformation or agrarian reforms are measures introduced by the state to 
change Agrarian relations and forms of land ownership. The class content of agrarian 
reforms is totally determined by the Country’s social system and its form of 
Government. In capitalist countries the reforms are turned against the remnants of 
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feudalism, which obstruct the advance of capitalism in Agriculture. The agrarian 
reforms introduced in the socialist- Countries were part of the revolutionary 
transformation of the society (Dictionary of Political economy, 1985:13) Callaghy 
(1993) has viewed the aspects of peasantry and agrarian theories under two 
dimensions namely critical and practical theories. He argued that, critical theories try 
to underscore the world and its inner process of development where as practical 
theories indulge in learning how to change the world and it involves the relationship 
of the theory to practice. 
While debating on capitalist development, these Marxist   theorists stressed most on 
the agrarian question. Under this discussion these Marxists central issue is on a 
political question of economic aspects; where from it was formulated a question as to 
whether peasants were posing as allies of the societies adherents in the struggle to 
build a socialist state or were these peasants semi revolutionalists or concrete 
revolutionary force? (Stalin, 1954) Having learnt from (Stalin 1954) in view of Karl 
Marx’s theory (1860) deliberations on the growing of capitalist mode of production 
`that depended on the deprivation of land as well as property of the feudal lords that 
subjected producers to pro letarianization.  
 
Both Marx andLenin had earlier spoken that these peasant- producers might also 
sustain the continued dominance of land lord-classes. It remains true that Marx did 
not think peasant farming could survive in the long term. He assumed that as 
commodity production and merchant user’s capital tightened its grip on the country 
side the peasantry would be regressively squeezed until they were forced into the 
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ranks of proletariats (Stalin, 1954) Karl Kausky (1899-1956) concluded that what 
was rather important in the whole analysis of peasantry and peasantry economy was 
basically differentiation centred on capital accumulation.  
 
Practically there were no intensification of differentiation in Tanzania within the 
Peasantry section and therefore  peasantry formed a highly  exploited class whose 
status  quo confirmed on what Luxemburg claimed (1913-1951)  and she argued that 
apart from the profits earned on capital, actually invested in the new territories, great 
capital  gains were  accrued by  acquiring land  and other natural resources. 
 
The fundamental challenge to Lenin was given by chayanov (1818-1939) on issues 
pertaining to the peasants and agrarian questions. Chayanov (1966) showed that the 
agricultural statistics used by Lenin did not verify irreversible capitalist class 
polarization and he added up that the peasantry could play a significant part in the 
future socialist society supposedly being built in the Soviet Union; his disagreement 
with Lenin created an important political complications precisely because he spoke 
that peasants should be helped to proper and modernize them as individual family 
farmers through the establishment of cooperative and should not be seen as the class 
enemies of the Russian  proletariats. 
 
In view of the fundamental principle of Chayanov’s understanding, the peasant 
economy was the balance between the household member as a laborer and as a 
customer, Peasant households and their member could either increase the number of 
households, they worked or work more intensively or sometimes both. The 
calculation made by households whether to work more or not was subjective and 
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how much was desired for investment to increase the family’s production was 
potential. 
 
Chayanor through his ideas gave rise to what can be termed ‘’a theory demographic 
differentiation’’ (1966:100-125) Analyzing, chayanor’s arguments, one can notice 
his position that small scale production in household units can survive under 
capitalist development and this it is also possible to integrate household producers 
into economic structures other than capitalist ones, for example cooperative. In same 
ways Chayanor’s views can be applied to Tanzania, although one needs to be careful 
with the way he differentiates economic structures from capitalist one. Several 
academicians in Tanzania, based on the Marxian tradition, on the agrarian question 
and peasantry (including Shivji), have reiterated that following the colonial heritage, 
the drawing off the surplus from peasantry will have an effect of preventing agrarian 
capitalist from developing. Thus the upper levels of the peasantry could be expected 
to move into commercial and merchant activities rather than became capitalist 
farmers. They see recent ‘’economic’’ changes as leading to a classical, colonial 
agrarian economy rather than agrarian capitalism. And therefore advocate a 
nationally integrated economy with an emphasis on internal consumption and on 
democratic cooperative peasant organization that control both production and 
marketing (Shivji, 1985). 
 
Shanin (1971) is another theorist who put forth an argument that the pre and post 
revolutionary Russian – peasants households typically had very limited resources of 
land, labor and form equipments and even more limited money savings and access to 
credit. According to Shanin (1971), Russian climatic conditions made harvests very 
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variable from year to year and market prices for peasants’ grain fluctuated widely; 
for him, various policies that Tsarist and the early Bolshovik state adopted to 
promote Russian industrialization had a very damaging effect on peasant incomes, 
because they led to price rises for commodities of the Russian peasants. 
Commodities were bought on the market without a corresponding increase in the 
price of grain; they sold to raise cash (ibid).   
 
Shanin, deliberate that the effect of all the problems facing peasant farmers was to 
make individual family farms very vulnerable to crisis. It was largely a matter of link 
if an individual middle peasant family prospered and become a Kulak household or a 
poor family made it into the middle peasantry. Furthermore a family’s luck might 
change and even rich-peasant household would have large number of children so that 
the family capital would have to be divided among the next generation. Rich families 
tended to more downwards too (Shanin, 1971). So tendencies towards class 
polarization were offset by these multi-directional cyclical tendencies, these 
movements were up and down. In the end-class polarization was limited by the 
fragility of the Russian peasant-economy that is the unfavorable conditions facing all 
peasant- producers (ibid). 
 
Thus, Shanin arguments rest on his belief that it was most really possible for 
peasants to succeed in sustaining accumulation of capital in the long term. 
Nevertheless, he does not reject the idea that Kulaks were trying to accumulate 
wealth. He contended that in Russia, it was certainly true that there were rich 
peasants and poor peasants: The controversy was simply about whether the existence 
of difference in wealth within peasants-communities was the inevitable basis for a 
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longer term emergency of middle peasants. Shanin (1971) concluded that, most of 
rich peasant families tended to suffer a decline in economic fortunes in the fullness 
of time, while the poor peasant-households tended to recover the position and 
become middle peasant again (op. cit.). 
 
2.5 Experiences of Agrarian Transformation 
The mechanism through which agriculture development contributes to 
industrialization formulates appropriate linkage between the transition to capitalism 
and agriculture. The transition to capitalist agriculture and industry are completed 
when agrarian transformation of capital is resolved, (Bernstein 1996). Infact as 
provided by historical records of the world the process through which transition takes 
place, we were informed that there is no just one pathways underwhich transition 
takes place, ranging from its character, outcomes where the class relations and the 
struggle rely on; the strength of competing interests of landed property plus agrarian 
capital; agricultural labor appear in a variety of forms including tenants and peasants 
as well as ermerging industrial capital. 
 
Over and above, the responsible Government policies and process of interferences 
again have an influence on agrarian transformation. In review of the above 
explanation and modalities the two broad alternatives-pathways are deliberated as 
follows:- “The Prussian or Junker” path in which pre capitalist land owners are 
transformed into agrarian capitalists. This took place in areas of Latin America, 
Nothern India and South Africa; by 19th century the same path was adhered to by 
Germany. This is explained as accumulation from above category. Then the 
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American path, it is here with where the conditions for petty commodity- production 
are well established and fully capitalist agriculture grew upthrough class 
differenciation of peasants and other kind of small producers (Byres, 1891). 
 
Several scholars have documented at length on African agrarian transformation 
(Mafeje, 2003; AGRA, 2007). The centrality of debate on the issue of transition in 
Africa is combined with feudal or other types of Agrarian society to capitalist or 
industrial society, through the transformation and role of various classes, for 
example, (different peasants’ class’s agricultural workers and land owners) in their 
struggle for democracy and socialism. These perspectives went hand in hand with 
transformation of socio, economic relations of production as well as productive 
forces in agriculture, the contribution of agriculture to the level of capital resource in 
strengthening classic transition to the growth of capitalist mode of production. 
In the context of globalization and global demand for alternative and clean energy 
source, Agrarian transformation in Africa still remains unresolved issue. A 
substantial number of scholars have doubts on trustworthiness of African petty 
bourgeois ruling class have viewed this stratum of ruling class as an obstacle to 
reform (Fanon, 1979 and Shivji, 1976). At the moment the problem of structural 
adjustment to African states has provoked an expected results on agrarian 
transformation in African communities whereby a gradual pseudo retreat from 
agrarian interventions, allowing leadership to markets which were not well set as it 
has been expected by people and whose “informality” flourish further (Mkandawile 
and Seludo, 2001). The outcome was the same, a failed Agrarian transition. 
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2.5.1  Regional Overview on Agrarian Reforms and Experiences 
Agrarian reforms are measures introduced by the state to change agrarian reforms of 
land ownership. The class content of agrarian reforms is totally determined by the 
country social system and its form of government. In capitalist countries agrarian 
reforms are turned against the remnants of feudalism, which obstruct the advance of 
capitalism in agriculture. The agrarian reforms introduced in the socialist countries 
were part of the revolutionary reforms of the society (Dictionary of Politic Economy, 
1985). 
 
Currently, Agrarian reforms are defined as the need of the day to make agriculture a 
dynamic sector of the economy. Thus Agrarian reforms are meant to transform entire 
economic landscape of rural landscape with an objective of increasing productivity 
of farm and nonfarm operations in the rural areas, reducing their poverty levels and 
thus improving the quality of life of people living in the villages (Woodhouse, 2010) 
over and above, Woodhouse argues that agrarian reforms should bring about changes 
which should entail fundamental structural as well as institutional changes in the 
political economy particularly in agricultural sector. Finally Woodhouse’s definition 
of Agrarian reform accepts the World Bank evaluation of agrarian reforms where 
from the World Bank completes her evaluation of Agrarian reforms by using five 
dimensions namely. 
 
Stock and market liberalization, Land reforms (including, the development of land 
market), Agro processing and input supply channels, rural finance and Market 
institutions, But the global conference on Agrarian reforms and rural development 
held in South America Agrarian 2003, worked upon the evaluation given by the 
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World Bank 1979 report and ended up in using eight dimensions as given below in 
assessing agrarian reforms in developing countries: Formulation of comprehensive 
land use policyImproving of rural infrastructureImprove rural governance Ensure 
environmental sustainability, Creating linkages and promoting investment, Gender 
mainstreaming, Changing production relationImprovising agricultural terms to trade. 
 
The consensus was reached by that international conference on Agrarian reforms and 
rural development (I.C.A.R.R.D) .It was collectively agreed upon that the success of 
agrarian reforms will depend on the political will of the government concerned, 
active participation of the citizens of the concerned country. A vibrant and proactive 
civil society that can express the will of the people and need to translate those 
objectives of the aspired agrarian reforms into constructive and meaningful dialogue 
and proposals, finally policy makers of that concerned country should come together 
with civil society and formulate practical policies.  
The above principles for a successful agrarian reforms were accepted collectively by 
the conference members because of having a common stand on fundamental belief 
that there is great diversity in agrarian structures across regions and countries, then 
social cultural and economic context as well as rules, customs and procedures for 
getting across to land and other natural resources vary from country to country. 
 
In the same vein of giving a more precise and belief definition of agrarian reforms, 
the international conference on agrarian reforms and rural development that was held 
in Brazil, 2006, has defined agrarian reforms as a rectification   of agriculture by the 
government. It is normally done by the government where they distribute the 
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agriculture land among the farmers of the country. The members of the conference 
held in Brazil in 2006, they earlier on looked at land by concluding that agrarian 
reform is concerned with relations between products and distribution of land among 
the farmers.  
 
It also noted that the processing of raw materials that are produced by farming land 
from respective industries. They deliberated that there can be different types of 
agrarian reforms such as credit measures; integration of land and training of the   
farmers. The rights of the peasants working on leased land and aiding them in 
availing loans from private sectors; Along those reforms the government must also 
offer support services to the farmers, which complements the other measures. They 
also run campaign to increase friendship and mutual trust between the farmers. 
 
It was resolved that the Agrarian reform is very important or significant for the 
economy of any country because more than half of the population in developing 
countries is employed in agricultural sector. Agriculture is the main source of 
livelihood especially for developing countries. Reforms are important because they 
protect the rights of the farmers. This has been verified by what has taken place in 
following countries as elaborated here below: 
 
2.5.2  Agrarian Reforms in the Republic of Southern Korea 
An experience from the southern Republic of Korea recorded successful cases of 
agrarian reforms that have been shown in practical  manner for  example the creation 
of an enabling environment for farmers and the private sector has  managed  to invest 
in agriculture as its fundamental  priority  (choe, 2012) such an enabling environment 
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encouraged farmers to invest in their agricultural land especially that protect the land 
from soil erosion such as terracing, mulching and enhanced productivity.  
 
The ownership of land and the capacity for them to fully utilize the benefit of their 
labour based on two- principle conditions for farmers to invest in land. The southern 
Korea farm land revolution of 1950 provided this foundation by creating an 
incentives structure for farmers-to raise agricultural productivity. Korea abolished 
the land tenant system along with the usurious loan system that prevailed at the time 
revitalized financial institutions in rural areas to provide investment funds at low 
rates of interest. (ibid). 
 
All this contributed to establishing self owned farming community (Bonine, 1980). 
The “seamaul”, movement, a national movement to improve a rural environment 
based on mutual help and self-reliance implemented in the 1970’s, promoted 
agricultural modernization.  It created positive image of agriculture as a vocation 
thus attracting and keeping young people in the sector. This means that Korea relied 
more on policy changes and creating an enabling environment, conducive for farmers 
to apply advanced technologies and production including mechanization. This 
involved investing in public good such as construction of reservoirs, water tanks, 
pumping stations, irrigation facilities, land and the diffusion of agricultural 
technology, public investment covered many areas that normally considered the 
domain of private sector. 
 
Several factors have influenced the southern Korea Agrarian reforms success were 
like, flexible policy regime that the policies formulated just to change, farmer socio 
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economic political conditions. The changes of policies created changes with regard 
to rural extension services, risk insurance and credit services- agricultural policy 
have emphasized rural extension services through its history and those services were 
supported by advanced technologies and science; changes also were seen along, 
agricultural insurance schemes that covered the entire country, that  all those were to 
ensure a farmer compliance whereby the government established a climate-risk-
zoning-system together with approved cultivation.Finally the government established 
an income support to farmers policies that were aimed at stabilizing farm income 
from world fluctuations over global market prices; all this was ensuring 
environmental sustainability (Kelly  2011).  
 
Based on successful results of agrarian reforms in southern Korea, agriculture played 
distinctive roles during its agricultural transition basically for subsistence farming to 
modernity. Agriculture played the role of food producer and supplier in various 
forms, firstly, agriculture transformed into a provider of industrial raw materials. 
This first role contributed to the expansion of down streams industries such as 
fertilizer, chemicals pesticides; fungicides as well as machinery. On overall 
assessment agriculture helped to rise individual wealth in the bio diversity, 
preservation and environment protection-including clean- air, green space food 
control, water source development; natural belfry and factor of soil stabilization 
(FAO 2012; choi 2012). A straight forward contribution of this case-study to 
Tanzanians we can denote on how the government of southern Korea was committed 
practically to raise the liveli hood of a poor small land holder/farmer to lead a 
prosperous life style through revolutionizing agriculture by protecting this poor small 
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land holder against exploitative relations of production. The fundamental rights of a 
farmer are taken care   of  all along by the  well established land policies. 
  
2.5.3  Agrarian Reforms in China 
China is basically an agrarian economy and her agricultural sector supports huge 
percentage of the population, mostly the major part of her population depends on 
land thus the country has huge agricultural sector (Bardhan 2010). The Chinese 
Agrarian reform   is marked by the shift from   feudal farms to commercial farms 
then towards small plot and land farmed individually by farming families. The actual 
land ownership is retained by the village collective authority.  
 
The individual rural households were allocated land usage rights and given the right 
for the decades to make all major farming decisions. The state supports the system 
by subsidizing inputs and other forms of support. In fact, the Chinese government 
has increased production and enhances rural income (Zhang, 2015). The farm land in 
China is controlled by the farmers but not owned by them .The rural farm land 
allocated to rural household can be rented but not sold. The government of China 
does provide incentives for agriculture by employing a great number of the Chinese 
people what can be seen as an intensive productivity in 1980s. By 1987-2004 periods, 
China has marked total factor productivity in agriculture, of almost double 
investments. Thus China, invested in agriculture, education spread; equitable 
distribution of land and successful rural industrialization and finally pressure on land 
decreased whose outcome helped productivity (Oya, Ye, Zhang, 2015). 
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By 1990, the Chinese supreme leader Deng Xia Oping articulated a vision of modern 
agriculture sector. This opens way to an increased involvement of agribusiness and 
entrepreneur farmers. This vision comes to reality in some rural areas. The house 
hold based small farm- holdings and agricultural production system has in some 
areas been transformed into specialized, commercialized, vertically, integrated into 
larger scale farms of agriculture-production for example the shouguang county in 
Shandong green- houses for growing vegetable and different agribusiness (Lin 1992; 
and Donaldson, 2010).  
 
The most outstanding more, China embarked on was that where the country moved 
away from substitution and taxes to open up their market and make use of global 
economy and new green technology for suitable growth (Bradhan, 2012). The 
opening   up of her market and growing economy, China stimulated the rural 
infrastructure due to inter regional competition (World Bank, 2012). At this moment, 
China moved from centrally “planed economy “Just become market oriented and a 
world leading economy in just a few decades. The globalization of China and 
intensive economic reforms could be the reason that eliminated the once substantial 
extreme poverty in China (Bardhan, 2007). 
Fundamentally, the Chinese policies were formed to keep social stability during 
times of structural change, which mobilized different parts of the society and created 
interregional competition for investment, infrastructure and business (World Bank, 
2012). This meant that China government maintained a sustainable growth as the 
government implicated policies and institutions into World market with policies and 
Institutions supporting international cooperation (Tao, 1998). All those practical 
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changes marked a successful agrarian reform that has managed to withstand the 
shocks of globalization process (Yan, Chen, 2015). 
 
A practical note from the Chinese agrarian reform Tanzanians should learn how 
problematic issues related to land have been handled as well as an issue of poor 
small  land  holder  has been liberated and enabled to lead a happy life which is 
sustainable one. In short, the fundamental principles related to farmers’ rights has 
been honored all along production process. The Chinese experiences are an eye 
opener to our national most problematic issues, with regard to land, poor small 
farmer; policy aspect and national move to fight poverty, realistically. We can now 
liberate our poor small land holder, if we can accept to learn from the Chinese 
experience on their agrarian reform. 
 
2.5.4  Agrarian Reforms in Iran  
Iran had experiences exploitation, oppression and forced labour of the landlords, 
Peasant system was common, across Iran’s villages before the Agrarian reform 
(Nadery, Pouya 2012). This was the shah’s political stability. Shah decides to 
commence on governmental revolution, which was called “white revolution”, 
(Tajbakhsh, 2000). Agrarian reform during Pahlavi period contributed to many 
changes in the system of the agricultural production, occupational structure, social 
stratification reflects the extent of the village’s transition to capitalist agriculture 
(Irfani, 1996)). Agrarian reform in Iran led to sweeping changes in rural landscape 
and affected rural environments and settlements from the landscape architectural 
point of view as well.  
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Before Agrarian reform in Iran, just 29% of the agricultural lands were a peasant 
production system 59% and 12% were under land lord share cropping and tenant 
farmer’s system respectively (Iran   Ministry of agriculture 1961). The villages social 
structure was   rearly homogeneous largely dominated by absentee land ownership 
and share cropping arrangements. Most households   were share croppers at the same 
level in the village social hierarchy, lacking any appreciable internal social economic 
differentiation. 
 
Fundamentally,  Iran  agrarian  reforms  contributed  to  the  development  of  both  
peasant-  capitalist  farming  and  large  scale  agricultural  enterprises,  representing  
6.5 percent and 15 percent arable land in Iran respectively (Alamdari, 2005)                      
Iran agrarian  reform  in  1962,  implemented  in  three  phases  over  a  decade,under  
Shah’s  White  Revolution  work,  which  was  done  and  geared  at:  Dismantling  
the  powers ‘base of the land owning class then dismantling of the share-cropping  
system; Finally  established peasants’ proprietorship(Vineze and  Elemer, 2011). 
 
Generally, Iran Agrarian reforms was classified as anti- feudal plan to eradicate 
feudalism to establish capitalism in the non- reform sector and promote political 
stability (Sariolghalam, 2003) agricultural system production included the   
coexistence of four different types of agricultural production system in villages:   
peasant production system, pump owner tenant farmers, large private capitalist farms 
and the remnants of land lord share cropping system (Hojat and Malik, 2000). 
 
Agrarian reform and its relationship with rural landscapes after the agrarian reform 
there were changes. The immediate change was the decaying rural community. After 
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the agrarian reform the lords and land lords transformed their investments into the 
cities and established the financial, industrial and services institutes in the cities. On 
the other hand, peasants and farmers migrated to cities for well paid jobs (Hojjat 
2005). Villages were abandoned. This increased urban population and decreasing 
rural population cause unequal population growth urban and rural settlement. This 
caused unorganized development in both Iran cities and land reform rural landscapes 
have been affected by the technology and accessibility to urban area. 
 
An experience of Iran agrarian reforms are essential for us Tanzanians whereby we 
need to be aware of ourselves, that it will be our duty to see to it that the process of 
reforms should be controlled by the nationals not anybody else. It is also our duty to 
cross examine the agrarian reform process from the beginning to the last point, 
otherwise the process can be out of control and get disorganized like agrarian reform 
in Iran during the first phase. 
 
2.5.5  Agrarian Reform in Russia 
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century was times of crisis for Russia. Not 
only did technology and industry continue to develop more rapidly in the west, but 
also new dynamic competitive great power appeared on the world scene (Dennisson 
and Tracy 2006). At particular time as noted above, Russia was an expanding 
regional giant in central Asia, bordering the Ottoman, Persian, British, India and 
Chinese empire; in fact it could not generate enough capital to support rapid 
industrial development or to compete with advanced countries in a commercial basis 
(Eline, 2002). Russian fundamental dilemma was that accelerated domestic 
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development risked upheeval at home but slower progress risked full economic 
dependency on faster advancing countries to the east and west (Eline, 2002). 
 
The regime of Alexander II and Alexander III initiated the political reaction; their 
reform necessitated the lifting of state censorship. Thus the liberal, nationalist and 
radical writers also helped to mold public opinion that was opposed to Tsarism, 
private property and the imperial state. In fact, many intellectuals, professionals, 
peasants and workers share those opposition sentiments. The regime regarded the 
publications and radical organizations as dangerous. By 1860-1880’s, Russian 
radicals collectively were known as populists (Narodnik) focused chiefly on the 
peasants   whom they identified as the “people” (norad) (Nafziger, 2011). The 
radicals formed the propagandist organization called land and liberty (zemlay I 
volva). This group renamed itself the people’s will under the leadership of Gregory 
Plekhanov or this group was later called black   Repartition, which advocate 
redistribution of land to the peasants. This group of people’s will be joined by 
Vladmir and inspired by Plekhanov.  Vladmir later changed his name to Nafziger, 
Steven, 2011).  
 
Vladmir was the most politically talented of the revolutionary socialist. In 1890’s, he 
labored to wean young radicals away from populism to Marxism, exiled from 1895 
to 1899 in Siberia, where he took the name from mighty Siberian Lena. River or he 
was the master tactician among the organizers of the Russian social democratic labor 
party. In December 1860, he found a newspaper “Iskar” ‘ spark’ in his book ‘ what to 
be done’ (1902) Lenin developed the theory that newspaper published abroad could 
aid in organizing a centralized revolutionary party to direct overthrow of an 
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autocratic government. He then worked out to establish a tightly organized, highly 
disciplined   party to do so in Russia (Nafziger, Steven and Peter 2012).  
 
At the second party congress of Russian social democratic labour party in 1903, he 
forced the bund to walk out and induced a split between his majority Bolshevik 
faction and the minority Menshevik faction which believed more in worker 
spontaneity than in strict organizational to Lenin’s concept of a revolutionary party 
and a worker peasant alliance owed more to the peoples’ Will than to Karl Marx and 
Friedrich Engels, the developers of Marxism. Young Bolshevik such as Joseph v 
Stalin and Nikolay Blukharim looked to Lenin as their leader (Mikhanionvna, 2000). 
 
Russian specific agrarian reforms-process: Russian government had initiated the 
political reaction  reforms that changed the political economy of Russia (Markerich 
2012).The  agrarian problem provoked changes every  yearthousands  of  nobles  
who  found  themselves  in  debts   either mortgaged their estates to the noble-land 
bank or sold their land to municipalities, merchants or peasants (Markevich, Andrei, 
and Harrison, 2011. The nobility had sold one third of its land holding and 
mortgaged the third that remained. The peasants had become emancipated from 
selfdom. The government had hoped to make them a politically conservative land 
holding class. The government issued laws providing the peasants would purchase 
certain land owned by nobility and would pay for it through redemption dues over 
decade land known as “ allotment” would not be owned by individual peasant but  
owned  by  the  community  of  peasants,individual  peasant   would have rights to 
strips of land that were assigned to them under the open field system (Milanovic, 
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Branko, Williamson, 2011). Unfortunately a peasant was unable to sell or mortgage 
his piece of land and thus he would be required to pay his share of redemption dues 
to the village commune. 
 
The government had created this plan to ensure that proletarization of the peasant 
would ever happen but peasants were not given enough land to provide for their need 
(Darius, 2007) Their earning were often so small that they could neither buy the food 
they needed, nor keep up the payment of taxes and redemptions dues they owed the 
government for their land allotment. By the tenth year of Nicholos 11’s reign, their 
total areas in payment of taxes and dues was 118 million rubles. As time went on, 
this situation grew worse. Masses of hungry peasants roamed the countryside looking 
for work and sometime walk hundreds of miles to find it. Despite peasant proved 
capable of violence, example in the province Kharkov and Poltra in 1902 thousands 
of peasant ignoring restraints and authority, burst out rebellious fury that led to 
extensive destruction of property and looting of noble-homes (Ascher 1994). 
 
The necessity for agrarian reform is dedicated by the demand of economic and 
political development of the country and by the peasant powerful movement for land.  
The degree of radicalism of the reforms is determined by combination of social and 
economic conditions in the given country, the V.I Lenin emphasized the direct 
connection between agrarian reforms and the struggle for political power “agrarian 
reforms/ trans formation is an empty phase, power by the revolutionary people 
without this conditions, it would not be an agrarian revolution (or transformation) but 
rather a peasant rebellion or a ‘cadet agrarian reform” Lenin 5th ed volume 12: p366). 
Agrarian reform was carried out in Tsarist Russia under the pressure of the peasant 
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revolutionary actions (Harcave 1990:21). The reform in central and southern Europe 
after World War I in (Rumania 1919-1921) (zechoslora 19199, yugo, slavia 1919, 
Hungary 1922-24) after fall of soviet republic Poland 1920 and Bulgaria 1920; were 
halfway measures which brought no fundamental changed to agrarian system of 
these states (Nafziger 2011:15) 
 
Landlord estates were limited somewhat and the lands alienated for a high 
redemption fee become concentrated on kulak forms. The bulk of the peasants could 
not obtain the land because of its high price (Allen 2013). The stolypin agrarian 
reforms in Russia aided the development of agricultural capitalism. The legislative 
measure adopted in this period were intended to aquidate communal peasant and 
ownership to strengthen the kulak sector as a support for autocracy while preserving 
the gentry’s latifundiac (Ascher 1994:202) 
 
The great October 1917, socialist revolution in Russia resolved the agrarian question 
in the fullest and most consistent manner by the degree on land adopted by the 2nd all 
Russian congress of soviet October socialist revolution, October 26, (Nov 8) 1917.  
 
Land lord was liquidated without and redemption and land was declared the property 
of the whole nation. The system of land was tenure was established by the decree of 
the all Russian’s central executive committee of February 1981, on the socialization 
of land. The victory of the people’s democratic revolutions in countries of European 
and Asian after World War II was the most prerequisite for the implementation of 
agrarian reforms in the interest of the toiling peasants. (Dennison, Tracy, 2006)         
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As a conclusion all agrarian reforms in different countries and their experiences have 
shown practically that sustainable institutional arrangements related to land or 
agrarian system shall only be victorious by being practical in their respective 
countries. Any country must be led by a committed, victorious class that struggles at 
all times being spearheaed by revolutionary classes. It goes without saying that a 
country like Tanzania, all institutions, rules/ regulations/policies will only liberate a 
poor small land holder when and once a revolutionary party will be led by a 
revolutionary class.  Infact this revolutionary class should lead the process of 
Agrarian reforms.   It is under such circumstances, we can   judge transparently   the 
class that controls the top hegemony of the state as to whether it does control the 
state according to the needs of the poor small land holders or not.  
 
2.7 Agrarian Transformation in Africa 
The purpose of land and agrarian reforms have turned to more complex and awkward 
in terms of their pattern this is due to the inherent features of the civil governments 
of countries plus uncompromising adherents of particular ideology of the people 
exercising authoritative decisions, over the natural development long-term plans, 
aiming to achieve a specific purpose. The current debates perform their part in a 
restrained way, in clarifying the essence and trend of agrarian transformation in 
Africa, (Ferdinardes 2001), where from, Agrarian reform was thought to bring about 
changes in the national prosperity on the manufacturing process of products plus 
human progress in general, sincerely this has been the basis of agrarian reform. 
In fact Moyo (2003) has deliberated three opinions on the aim of agrarian changes 
that could be grouped into three categories namely the ‘’socio’’ the ‘’economic’’ and 
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the ‘political’; all form the basis of issues related to society. The ‘’socio’’ trend 
stressed on the basic physical and material well being of people’s need. This is 
extended to the redistribution of land to the poor, with aim of keeping up the large 
modern form- sector. The ‘economic’ trend gives reasons or cites evidences in 
support of the poor, over the issue of redistributing the land so that there could be an 
efficient, small, commercial farmer. It is believed that this process will create 
employment as well as boosting domestic markets. The ‘’political’’ trend has been 
justifying and calling upon power to redistribute the land accordingly as to change 
the entire farming area which is assumed as a fundamental part   as well as the 
crucial vein in development techniques. 
 
The specific political and economic status quo....of a nation’s overtime and the 
widely varied trends related to the aim and approach to land reform could be 
combined. The merchant path combining the types of town petty bourgeois 
characteristics have acquired land as to form middle class who were involved on 
exporting commodities, linked to international agro-industry business; this is 
growing tremendously in several countries (Sukuma and Moyo 2003).  This has 
manifested the richer class emerging amid the semi-proletarianized, landless class 
though proletarianization is marked with differences. The middle to rich path peasant 
of petty commodity producers was created through rural differentiation and active 
state policies of land access and tenure, but subjected to contradictory agrarian 
policies, which under land market reform and neo liberalism have been restrictive. 
A rural poor path including fully proletarian and semi-proletarianized peasants has 
also occurred and is characterized by the contradictory tendencies of full 
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proletarianization (Undereconomic and demographic pressure) and retention / 
acquisition of a family plot for petty commodity production and social security 
(consistent with functionalized). These poor migrate from rural areas to urban places, 
across international boundaries and participate in the informal economic sector.  
Poverty reduction and intergrated rural development strategies seek to improve 
functional dualism in its moment of crisis (Moyo and Yeros 2007).  
 
Structural adjustment has led to the abandonment of the development agenda. Direct 
and indirect political action and social catastrophes have brought back land reform 
(Moyo and Sukume 2007). Development strategy entailed economic and agrarian 
policies that direct the the use of land for export purposes, rather than for developing 
the national market and related industries, while favouring distorted accumulation by 
a small elite and foreign capital (Moyo, 2004) leading to under consumption and 
mass unemployment. These policies repressed agricultural productivity among the 
peasantry, leading to depressed wages and peasants incomes. In addition 
liberalization led to the conversion of large tracts of farming land to exclusively 
wildlife and mature based land uses under even larger scale natural resources. 
 
There is a rush in Africa south of the Saharan desert by almost all countries in that 
zone. This rush is prompted by suggested opinion by the World Development Report 
(2008), which has provided a hint over the necessity of embarking on green 
revolution in agriculture for African countries. On the other side of that wise 
suggestion by the World Development Report, it appears that African countries are 
encouraging the traditional type of agriculture on farming sector in adopting to 
modern need of economic growth. Practically if they will not be careful, there will be 
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very little space left for the traditional small holder agriculture. This means that 
Tanzania for example has launched the Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture first) campaign 
in July 2009 (URT 2009) without being too scientific in its initial stages. 
 
This approach is a paradox in the midst of such widespread crises of production and 
reproduction partly manifested in the shrinkage of the peasant sector, combined with 
increasing differentiation between those able and unable to farm as a significant basis 
of their reproduction. There seems to be a mounting tension over land ownership. A 
wide range of recent evidence concerning competition for land and the conflicts it 
generates is presented by Peters (2004) who distinguishes the various types of agents 
and stands of this process as follows: Growing populations and movement of people 
looking for better/ more land or fleeing civil disturbances. Rural groups seek to 
intensify commodity production and food production while retrenched members of a 
downsized salaried look for land to improve food and income options. State   
demarcates forestry and other reserves and identify areas worthy of conservation 
(often under pressure from donors and international lobbying groups). 
Representatives of the state and political elites appropriate land through means 
ranging from the questionable to the illegal and valuable resources both on and under 
the land (timber, oil, gold and other minerals) attract intensifying exploitation by 
agents from the most local (unemployed youth or farmers seeking ways to obtain 
cash) to transnational networks (of multinational corporation, foreign governments 
and representative of African states (Peters, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
    
68 
2.8   Agrarian Issues in Tanzania 
The agrarian sector in Tanzania as other developing countries in which the majority 
of the population depend entirely on land for their live hood is said to be in chaos 
precisely because the great difficult has been caused by neoliberal economic reforms 
in the past decades, where it is intensified through the continuing forms of 
accumulation of capital, leaving many local communities in a state of destitution and 
impoverishment, while exposing them to what can be termed massive exploitation 
and marginalization ( Bernstein, 2005).  This status quo of affairs indicates pervasive 
agrarian crisis, various approaches and discussions on agrarian aspects are 
deliberated and by the multidisciplinary techniques.  Issues were advanced with 
regard to the occurrence of agrarianism in developing countries.  
 
According to Michael (2007) in the classical conception, the agrarian question was to 
be resolved by capital through particular class transformation process and political 
chances within each nation state. This state centric view discounted the role of   
imperialist relations during the era in which agrarian emerged.  Michael (2007) is of 
the view that post colonial states, with exceptions (including Tanzania and China) 
constructed in the western image, adapted the idealized national economic 
development model, founded on a dynamic commercial relationship between 
national, industrial and agricultural sectors. He states that within thus framework 
green revolution technology was transferred to the third world to modern its farms by 
constructing capitalist farming class to provide urban class with food. 
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Basically an adequate analysis of the agrarian issues, it should be traced within the 
colonial economy and the resultant efforts to integrate the country into the 
metropolitan capitalist structures.  On this aspect, Shivji (1975) argues that the 
development of agrarian capitalism in Tanganyika has to be distinguished from the 
kind of capitalist development in the European countries that Marx described. Thus 
Shivji and many others argue that the agrarian issues have their roots in the 
appropriation of land and entire changes to land tenure systems in Tanzania since the 
colonial era.  
 
The presidential commission report (1994) demonstrates the enactment of the famous 
imperial decree of 26 November 1895 instituted the philosophy of land ownership 
under German rule in terms of which all lands, whether occupied or not, were treated 
as crown lands Olenesha (2005) states that there was, however, an exceptional to this 
general rule in situations where private persons or communities could prove 
ownership. Private persons could prove ownership by documentary evidence; while 
traditional communities could prove the same through use and occupation. This spirit 
has shaped and regulated matters pertaining to land tenure system through out, 
British colonial rule and postcolonial era. 
 
During the British colonialism, they were few alternatives to the central principle of 
land of land tenure practiced by the former colonial power, with reference to special   
focus on the development of the colonial economy to facilitate the production of 
agricultural raw materials, while controlling and alienating indigenous land rights. 
The land ordinance of 1923(No3) for example declared all lands to be public lands. 
Shivji (1998) holds that this ordinance is still the prime basis of the land tenure 
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regime and it sought to become this by declaring and defining customary, tenure 
without securing and statutorily entrenching customary titles and rights and by 
authorizing the governor to make land grants in the form of temporally limited rights 
of occupancy. This meant in practice the alienation of indigenous lands to settlers 
and foreign- corporations and preserving the overarching control of the state over 
land by vesting the radical title in the state, which in turn was legitimized by the 
hortatory provision that land “shall be held and administered for the use and 
economic benefit, direct or indirect of the natives in   the territory”  
 
In 1928, there were major changes in the land tenure regime where the land 
ordinance of (1923) was amended to expand the meaning of the right of occupancy 
to recognize customary law title. Since 1928, the governor was authorized to make 
grants of land the form of rights of occupancy for a period of up to 99 years (this is 
also the case with the current land Act). This land ordinance of 1928 was the land 
tenure where the colonial state alienated the public lands occupied by indigenous 
natives to non- natives, including immigrant communities and foreign companies.  
 
Olenesha (2005) argues that the effect declaring land to be public land does not have 
a sufficient explanation in law and it would seem to have been just an administrative 
tactic to legitimize the dispossession of Africans of their lands. He is of the view that 
because land are public and further, because customary titles do not enjoy the same 
status as granted rights of occupancy, the British colonial state could implement its 
economic objectives without impartments. Thus, merging property and sovereignty 
in land through exercise of radical title was the best way to exploit and plunder the 
natural resources of Tanganyika colony. It was also to exacerbate the challenges 
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facing the traditional economy and intensifies the agrarian crisis. After the Second 
World War the British colonial rule concentrated on the exploitation of natural 
resources in order to reconstruct British wounded economy. This led to the use of 
force in the production of cash crops by peasants. A government circular of 1953 
(Tanganyika Government 1953) emphasized the need for indigenous people to 
initiate the use of modern methods of production used in non-native lands within the 
framework of modernization, whose intention, among other things was to rationalize 
further alienation of land to non- natives (shivji 1998). The motive behind the 
colonial land tenure systems in Tanganyika was therefore to abolish customary land 
tenure and enhance a freehold system. Through this system the indigenous peasants 
and pastoralists were to be alienated from their native surroundings in order to be 
integrated into the world capitalist economy though the production of cash crops to 
address the needs of the colonial power. 
 
The post colonial phase is characterized by villagization and the Arusha declaration. 
It was after independence in 1961, the newly independence state emphasized over 
the benefits of peasants living together in nuclear villages as opposed to the patterns 
of scattered settlements prevailing in most area in Tanzania .In relation to that the 
broad message of “Ujamaa” was introduced with the Arusha declaration in 1967 
(Bernstein 1981). Bernstein explains that from 1967 to 1973 the number of those 
living in officially designated ‘ujamaa villages increased from about half a million to 
about two million or 15 % of the rural population in addition, these operations that 
mobilized to form villages by local party and government officially provided the 
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prototype for villagization on a national scale, order at the end of 1923 and 
completed by 1976. 
After these operations people were resettled. The impact of which the land 
commission established that among the major features of the operations was the total 
disregard of existing customary land tenure systems as well as the fact that virtually 
no thought was given to the future land tenure in newly established villages (URT 
1994: VOL 1, 43) Vilagization and the whole operations were said to have had a 
major impact on both land tenure and deemed rights the peasants, pastoralist- 
communities rural land users. The result was confusion in tenure and the total 
undermining of security for customary land holders, and above the opening up of 
possibilities for alienation of village land on a scale greater than during colonial 
times (shivji 1998, Tenga 1987).  
 
2.8.1  Agrarian Issues During the Neoliberal Era 
Araghi (2000) and Mc Michael (2007) argue that this perspective is governed by the 
lens of capital accumulation essentially that capitalism follows a path dependent 
resolution   of social forms into the capital- labour relationship and that “peasants” 
are a historical anachronism, as scale is necessary to survive in the market or to 
realize the potential of “social labour”. Such arguments subscribe to not only the 
nature of the colonial powers but also the state, which inherited the role of landlord, 
hence mediating the relationship between producers (peasants) and consumers 
(industrial metropolitan) through merchant capital. 
 
It is clear now, that the current land tenure regime in Tanzania is an outcome of 
colonialism. Thus in the last one and half decades there were, however major 
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reforms to land tenure in Tanzania .All of which have contributed to the current 
agrarian issues. It is hereby where Olenesha (2005) has stated that the present 
reforms began with the appointment and work of the highly celebrated presidential 
commission of inquiry into land matters whose work led to the formulation of the 
national land policy 1995, which paved way for an enactment of two major pieces of 
legislation the land  law and village land acts of 1999 (Act No .4 and 5 respectively) 
(URT 1999)  In  2004 and 2008, the land Act was amended., Establishment of the 
land bank and its administration  by the Tanzania investment center (TIC) is said to 
be one of the significant administrative developments relevant to land tenure 
 
The commission, which was appointed in January 1991 was mandated to investigate 
the peoples complaints and grievances over land and to recommend new land policy 
and tenure system. Shivji (1999) noted that the commission visited all 9(then) 20 
regions of mainland Tanzania and all districts where he met 145 villages, 132 urban 
centers and finally he drafted the report   by documenting into several volumes. Over 
and above, shivji 1999 noted that both the national land policy and bills ignored the 
major recommendations of the commission, while taking in details in an ad hoc 
fashion. It is argued that instead of decentralizing and democratizing land tenure 
management the national land policy is viewed by the majority as centralized and 
reinforcing state power to control land (shivji 1995).   
 
As the result of that scholarly criticism, the actual land  and village land Act of 1999 
stipulate that all land in Mainland Tanzania” shall continue to be public land and  
remain  vested  in  the  President  as  trustee  for  and  on  behalf  of  all citizens of 
Tanzania”(c l .4 (1) ). This was also the basis of the land tenure system put in place 
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by the land ordinance of 1923 and proof that the Acts overtly continue the essential 
colonial principle of land tenure, namely integrating property with power. More over, 
as did the land ordinance, the Acts establish system rights of   occupancy relating to 
the use and occupation of land. This means the state is the final owner of land, grants 
rights of occupancy and bears customary occupation and use of land. However Acts 
acknowledge customary tenure as equivalent to granted rights of occupancy. The 
implication of this is that the president is given power ( as was the governor during 
the colonial rule ) to grant land to a foreigner or non native  or   reserved or general 
land for interests   pro claimed to be “public” including investment. 
 
This is also to say that Acts confirm foreign ownership of village lands under a long 
term lease under indigenous title, whether granted or customary, hence paving the 
way for various forms dispossession and displacement, with reference  to   the above 
the operating policy for example the land policy 1999 empowers the government to 
do same changes here  and   there. For example the environmental management Act 
of 2004 
 
The wildlife conservation Act No 12 of 1974 (as amended 1978) the wild life policy 
of 1998. These acts also grants power to the government to dispose pastoralists of 
their lands but it is silent on what should happen to those who had traditionally relied 
in such lands either by the way of compensation or otherwise. Furthermore these 
Acts places severe restrictions on accessing land declared a (Game Reserves or 
Game controlled area or protected area in the country). These areas or lands were 
either pastured land or were used by pastoralists in the past. Basically the 
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contemporary Acts in the country as mentioned above facilitate the marginalization 
of pastoralists by encouraging more land to be brought under wildlife resources. This 
tendency was earmarked by Bernstein (2005) where he gave a point of caution on 
consistency with related to peasants’ land being alienated. This has ended up in 
agrarian crisis. 
 
The roots of agrarian crisis as noted by shivji (1987) must be traced to the super 
exploitation of the peasantry by imperialism in alliance with the local composition of 
the peasantry by imperialism in enhance with the local compradorial -classes, in 
which the overall economy is characterized as a colonial, vertically integrated 
economy and the social formation as neocolonial, semi patriarchal one. During the 
colonial era, for example the colonial state through the mechanism of the law and 
market economy, greatly increased the cash requirement of peasantry (Tenga 1987) 
Tenga explains that the system of imposing fixed flat rate taxes required peasants 
even in the face of declining prices, to increase production of marketable crops. 
Tenga states that hand in hand with their taxation system, laws enacted that obliged 
peasants to cultivate a minimum acreage of export crops at the sometime marketing 
arrangements were erected through local government   -bodies, crop marketing 
boards later cooperative. Thus under native authority   Ordinance of 1926; native 
authorities made by laws to enforce agricultural cultivation and land use. This was 
also done under various crop ordinances including the native coffee (control and 
marketing) ordinance 1937, plant pest and disease ordinance 1921; native Tobacco 
control and marketing) ordinance 1940. Regulations were enacted on land use for 
specific crops, the breach of which was punishable by imprisonment and fines. These 
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made peasants to undertake economic activity favoring colonial rule. Throughout 
colonial rule there existed institutional arrangements and structures that suppressed 
the peasants productive activity and perpetuated exploitation in order for him/ her to 
produce for the colonial economy. After independence the situation still did not 
favour the peasants, despite the policy of “Ujamaa” which many scholars see as 
having failed to transform agriculture and peasantry. 
 
2.8.2 Agrarian Change in Tanzania 
The diverse ways in which capital and colonial state has included as part of the 
whole rural producers into production and consumption of commodities as the means 
of securing their subsistence, has been cross examined by scholars such as Bernstein 
(2005): De Janvry (1991). Bernstein, (2007) admits that regulations, services and 
monopoly of crop producers have been used to require an often recalcitrant peasantry 
to organize production   so as to meet the demand of international capital and the 
local state for particular commodities, trading profits, revenues and foreign 
exchange. 
 
Basically the peasantry ought to be evaluated along relations with capital and the 
state in various absolute conditions which sheerly means within capitalists relations 
of production (Bernstein, 2001) These are mediated not through wage relations but 
through various forms of households production by producers who are not fully 
expropriated of their lands and who are engaged in struggle with capital, effective 
possession and control of the conditions related to production process.  
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In principle; the relation between the state and the peasantry is that, component of 
the peasant labour product that is realized through the mechanism of exchange that is 
the state which is able to control and drive revenue from (Ibid2001). Thus Bernstein 
concluded that given the combination of the limit of agriculture based largely on 
household production on one hand and rapidly escalating costs of an expanding state 
on the other, increasing pressure by the state on the peasantry is a predictable 
outcome. It is exposed in the first place in the extention of the state control over the 
condition of exchange, charted in the institutional development of a kind of 
monopolistic state capital movement; this has contributed to the stagnation of 
marketed output thus intensifying the fiscal problems of the state. The current state 
of agrarian sector in Tanzania especially from structural adjustment programme as 
enshrined in the neoliberal policies, this status quo of affairs is deliberated by 
(Jansen, 2014)  where he noted that the neo liberal policies promote agricultural 
export inline with the comparative advantage of African economies; henceforth the 
programme  stressed on agricultural revival and productivity of income growth. In 
the way of implementing this programme some noteable measures are inflicted 
negatively on local community members such as displacing some peasants and 
pastoralists in the name of conservation and calling theses groups of people as agents 
of environmental degradation. The outcome of all these is nothing but intensifying 
farming problems in Tanzania. 
 
An explanation by De Janvey (1991), has informed us the the view of Mapolu 1990, 
that by the time of independence, the task of intergrating the rural people into 
capitalist market by the colonial powers had largely been accomplished. The social 
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economic structures had been built to ensure a more or less permanent flow of 
agricultural raw materials from Africa to Western Europe and Nothern America and 
a firm dependence on the world market. Mapolu (1990) argues that nevertheless 
nowhere there had been an intergration of rural people into the market economy been 
fully accomplished. Rural communities, often residing inaccessible areas or engaged 
in productive activities are not easily penetrated by the cash nexus, continued to lead 
traditional forms of life, more or less free of commodity-production and exchange.  
 
One of the most practical theories to the analysis of Agrarian society is the one 
advanced by Roberts and Williams (1984). It is guided by the Political Economy 
approach, which propounded that Agrarian society is arranged into hierarchy starting 
with Natural Economy type of production and Peasant Economy Model or primitive 
agrarian society; the produce or production is not for exchanges but purely for 
domestic use. As consequence, it was argued by Dalton (1967) that traditional 
production in primitive African Economies, the market exchanges are usually 
peripheral and all important output and factors flows are carried on via reciprocity 
and redistribution. In the absence of markets, resources are not allocated in accord 
with their values in exchange; rather, the patterns of allocation are determined by 
social relationships. Within this natural economy as argued by Marx (1978; 98) who 
asserted that an isolated individual could no more own land that he could speak of as 
own. 
 
The acquisition of property is thus a social act; it requires membership in a 
community or village. In the words of Eric Wolf (1969) such villages, maintain 
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religious system, enforce mechanisms, which ensure the redistribution or destruction 
of surplus wealth and uphold barriers against the outside. According to this theory as 
deliberated by Robert and Williams, (1984) the social instructions of the rural society 
facilitate the attainment of the basic cultural values. One such value is sense of 
membership; another is equality; a third is that all member of society posses’ an 
equal right to sufficient income to guarantee their survival. It is therefore the absence 
of the threat of individual starvation, whichmakes primitive society in the sense, 
more human that market economy at the same time less economic. 
 
2.8.3  Forms of Agrarian Accumulation  
In the attempt to reduce absolute mass poverty and improve the standard of living of 
its peoples the Tanzania state has adopted many agrarian policies with an expectation 
of increasing house hold level wealth and state revenue. By  1960’ the focus was on 
cooperatives and some success was registered. Later, cooperatives were abandoned 
in 1970’ infavour of more direct state accumulation through the Parastals –Crop 
Authorities and the state farms.  In  1980’ the cooperatives were reintroduced and the 
Crop Authorities were sidelined infavour of liberal markets.  These major policies 
are reviewed here in relationship to agrarian issues.  
 
2.8.4  Coo-peratives and Agriculture in Tanzania 
There were limited peasants economic associations in Tanganyika before 1932. The 
notorious Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA), formed in 1925 to 
protect and promote interests of indigenous coffee growers in the Kilimanjaro area. 
The KNPA Assisted in the proper control of coffee planting and in advising against 
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pests and disease.  It assists peasants to sell their coffee at the highest possible price 
and get supplies of chemicals and other inputs necessary for the improvement of 
coffee production (Kimario, 1992:4). The information of peasant associations to 
promote marketing and supply of inputs was an indication that differentiation was 
growing among the peasantry. There has never been a homogeneous peasantry as 
chayanov has argued. However Chayanov was also a strong supporter of peasant- 
Cooperatives and he believed that they would help the peasant economy to 
modernize and transforming the house hold basis of agriculture (Chaynov, 1966 and 
1991). 
 
Cooperative societies ordinance was enacted in March, 1932, based on the Indian 
cooperatives Acts of 1904 and 1912 (Kimaro, 1992:5) cooperatives started 
registering in January 1933 and KNPA transformed itself into the famous KNCU 
(Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Union) other cooperative societies and unions 
evolved from 1930s to the 1960s and the strong holds of the movements were 
Kilimanjaro (Coffee). Bukoba (coffee), Tukuyu (Coffee), Songea (Tobacco) 
Matengo (coffee), Ngara (coffee) Lake zone Mwanza, Shinyanga, Musoma (cotton) 
Meru, (coffee). 
 
Market cooperatives helped many peasants to accumulate wealth and in the area 
where the movement was strong, there were many rich peasants as Kulaks. One 
cooperative (the TFA or Tanganyika farmers Association) was constituted by 
commercial farmers. Some of its members become very successful farmers and 
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owned large commercial farms especially in Arusha region. Cooperatives help 
farmers to accumulate because they increase their share of the trade profit. 
 
The largest cooperative movement developed in Tanganyika for example the 
Victoria federation of cooperative unions limited (NFCU). By 1968 the cooperative 
movements on the mainland was handling 27.5 million worth or 45 percent of the 
countries annual export.  At the time ...this share was second only to Israel and 
Denmark (University Press, 1968:176). 
Cooperative channeled loans to individual members by acting as guarantors of loans. 
The cooperative Bank of Tanganyika was found: 1962 and changed its name to the     
National cooperative Bank (NCB) in 1964. The shareholders were Co-operative 
unions. By 1967, the bank had accumulated Tsh. 1.8 million as general reserves and 
Tsh, 1.1 million as statutory reserves. It had appropriated Tsh. 250,000/= for 
dividends, which was 7.3 percent of its paid up share capital. The bank provided 
overdrafts to cooperaties to finance the purchase of export and food crops from crop 
growers who were cooperative members and non members By 1970, the NCB had 
share capital of Tsh. 4.5 million and made profit of Tsh. 5 million (Kimario 1992). 
 
The NCB – operated side by side with National Development Credit Agency 
(NDCA)/. These... the two institutions operated under one parent body. The National 
Coopererative and Development Bank established in 1964.The NDC was used to 
grant credit to peasants. The funds were made available from the International 
development Agency (IDA) and other sources. The NDC was able to reach about 
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100,000 peasants annually. Considerable sums of money were injected into 
agricultural sector through the NDC. 
 
There appears to have been a contradiction between   those who controlled the 
cooperatives’s (rich peasants who were the nascent agrarian bourgeoisie) ... and the 
rising bureaucracy that controlled the state. This contradiction determined the future 
of agricultural development in the country. Cooperatives’s were bringing much 
revenue to government through export taxes and local government taxes. However 
the class contradiction between rising Agrarian and parasitic bureaucracy led to 
sharp changes in policy, the state bureaucracy sought an independent source of 
accumulation through state or parastatal companies which could be directly 
controlled by the state, unlike cooperatives which were democratic and controlled by 
the rising agrarian bourgeoisie. 
  
The NCB was abolished in 1971 following the creation of state Bank (NBC or 
national Bank of Commerce) and nationalization of foreign Banks. The NDCA had 
been dissolved earlier in 1970. The abolition of NCB and NDCA elicited strong 
opposition from cooperative members (Kimario 1992) however cooperative were 
abolished in 1976. And established crop marketing functions were allocated to 
parastatal – crop – Authorities. The state policy on agriculture is shifted from 
supporting peasants to supporting state farms. Thus the focuses of accumulation in 
agriculture by the state were the parastatals and crop authorities and state farms. 
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Since the abolition NDCA and NCB, the provision of   credit to peasants has been a 
major problem. This trend has not helped the agrarian sector in developing and 
shortage of capital to peasant farms. It remains one of the major hindrances to an 
agrarian revolution in Tanzania. 
 
2.8.5  Parastatal Crop Authorities and State Farms 
One parastatal crop authority was created for each major crop (cotton, Coffee, Sisal, 
Cash nuts, tea and pyrethrum) another crop parastatal (the NMC or National Milling 
Corporation) was created to buy grain from peasants, to sell in towns and to export.   
Yet another GAPEX or General Agricultural Export Company was created to buy 
and  export   nontraditional crop like simsim; sun flower, cardamom. 
Parastatall crop companies had a monopoly of buying crops direct from peasants. It 
was a governmental strategy to accumulate through using government agencies. 
There were 400 (agencies) parastatals directly under the government. Crop 
authorities made huge sses and become heavily dependent on hand outs from the 
treasury. It is argued that they contributed a great deal to the economic decline of the 
country (World Bank 1983:76-7) they failed to provide price incentives to peasanst; 
they were highly bureaucratic; and sometimes they failed to collect crops, which 
were already in village stores.  
 
They borrowed crops from the peasants and failed to supply, the inputs, the 
cooperatives had supplied in the past. The idea of accumulating through parastatal   
companies extended to direct farming and not only marketing, Organization such as 
crop authorities. In the first five year development plan of the country 1964 – 69, 
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agriculture was allocated 15% of the investment. Most of this money 70% went to 
support settlement schemes, which covered only a few thousand peasants. In the 
second five year plan (1969 – 74) more than 15% of estimated development 
expenditure was set aside for agriculture, but state farms and peasants were favored 
in the spending of this money.  
 
During the plan period, one agricultural parastatal that ran state farms (NAFCO – 
National Agricultural and food corporation) received larger investment budget than 
all communal (Ujamaa) villages put together. More than 80% of the total ministerial 
and parastatal development budget on direct agricultural production in the plan 
period   went to agricultural parastatal running large mechanized farms. This pattern 
of spending continued up at least 1990 (Freyhold 1979; Maghimbi, 1990). 
The state farms were very inefficient and over capitalized. Favoring these farms and 
crop authorities meant squeezing the peasants or agrarian-peasants. In 1974, the third 
five year plan could not be launched.  Agricultural production by peasants had 
represented the greater proportion of the country’s output and now peasants 
production/agrarian production was staggering, stagnating or declining for some   
crops. Cotton  production  wdropped  from  65,500 tones  in  1971-72  to  44,500  in  
1981.  Cashewnuts   dropped from 121,500 to 43,200   sissal from 181,100 to 72,000 
(Iane, 1984). The country also experienced large imports of food for the first time in 
1971-72 (92,000 tons of maize). While in the following year, 53,000 tons of maize 
was exported. However imports reached 317,000 tons in 1974-75 and 42,000 in 
1975-76(Loftchie, 1978). 
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The squeeze on the peasantry become worse, not only because of the government’s 
investment in agriculture was going to state farms and crop authorities but also 
because peasants were not able to accumulate because of the very low producer 
prices offered by the parastatal crop authorities. The marketing approach of   
monopolistic crop authorities was that the prices paid to peasants were calculated at a 
residue. The residue price for the peasants was reached after the crop authorities had 
deducted all its other costs from the estimated gross sales at exportations (Gibbon 
andNeocosmos 1985). Gibbon and Neocosmos argue that the parastatal crop 
authorities’ marketing style shifted from giving weight to the crop growers to 
calculating who took what, from the marketing margin. This style lent itself to the 
acceptance of uncritical marketing cost projections. The parastatal crop authority was 
able to systematically cheat the peasants out of the revenue realized from cash crops. 
In social analysis this “cheating “was viewed to be a consequence of the petty 
bourgeois form of organization of the state generally and its economic enterprises in 
particular. This form of organization allowed mismanagement and accumulation of 
wealth by individual managers of parastatals or organizations (Gibbon and 
Neoscosmos (1985). 
 
Many peasants become poorer due to low returns from their crops. Some peasants 
indulged in strategies of petty wealth creation by passing the state marketing 
monopolies. They attempted to sell their crops in an official markets including 
markets across borders. Other peasants replaced crops handled by crop authorities 
with crops with no marketing restrictions for example some peasants in Kilimanjaro 
area replace coffee with tomatoes and dairy cows. In the coast region, people 
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neglected their   cashewnuts   farms and opted for charcoal burning (Maghambi 
1990). 
 
The main argument here put forward is that many of the failed agrarian policies and 
practices in Tanzania lie in the petty bourgeois class character of the post colonial 
state. This is a state that displays the internal contradiction of petty bourgeoisie 
practices. Changes are needed in the agricultural policy if agricultural stagnation and 
decline were to be reversed. The snags that influence our underdevelopment should 
also be traced from within along poor management as well as poor policy-
formulation dimensions. 
 
2.8.6   Agrarian production  and Liberalization Policies  
The policies that succeeded the era state capitalism up to the present day have been 
describe as liberalization policies, which began in 1986 with the programme of 
structural adjustment. Basically, the World Bank had a hand in the policies  (Mduma 
2006). In the years of 1970s and 1980s Tanzania witnessed a severe food in security, 
decreased export earnings and general economic stagnation; this prevented the 
accumulation of wealth even by that small class that had formulated the state 
capitalism policies, which resulted in the state sponsored monopolistic companies in 
the form of crop authorities, state farms and regional companies were behind those 
changes, these policies of state capitalism were discouraging the growth of rural 
labor markets (op cit 2006).  
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Under favourable auspices of the new policy, peasants’ cooperatives were allowed to 
operate but crop merchants were also free to buy crops from peasants. Export tax 
was abolished for all items and in 1993; export licensing was abolished on 
everything except tax on traditional exports in 1996-1997 and in 2002. Zero rated 
value added tax (VAT) was imposed on all agricultural imports and outputs (op at 
2006). 
 
Some peasants have taken advantage of liberalization policies to their incomes.  
According to the Director Registrar of cooperatives in 2009, there were 7868 
primary cooperatives in the country.  From 2004, some primary cooperatives decided 
to by pass their cooperatives union in selling coffee. This was significant 
improvement the Tshs 600 offered to the cooperatives through traditional markets 
(Mduma 2006). This agrarian farming is facing a problem country wise in forms of 
scale. The problem of scale is still a obstacle in the way of increased weath creation. 
Given the scale of production for most agrarian peasants in Tanzania, even higher 
prices were offered, they  would  remain  poor, (Maghimbi, 2007).  
2.9 Tanzania’s Land Law Reform 
Land has reappeared on the political agenda in sub Saharan African countries in 
contemporary ways. With growing populations, the pressure on land is increasing. 
Investors domestic and foreign alike contribute to the competition over land as they 
seek land to grow crops for the market. Conflicts over land are fierce across the 
continent. African governments have sought to address the challenges posed by land 
use and land ownership. Since the end of cold war, the primary focus is on the series 
of reforms that have been introduced to streamline land legislation, land 
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administration, and land court system and facilitate, market in land. Since 1990 at 
least 32 out of sub Saharan Africa’s43 main land state have started land reforms 
processes (Wily, 2012). 
 
Land reforms have been introduced in a large number of countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa in the last couple of decades to streamline land administration and land 
dispute settlements. Prior to reforms, Countries have typically displayed a confusing 
mix of land law regimes, including pre-colonial customary practices, colonial land 
policies promoting large scale farming and post-colonial, state led redistribution and 
land nationalization- programs. Often this mix undermines. Tenure security: Reforms 
such to address the competing legal framework by simplifying and harmonizing land 
legislation (Perdersen, 2012) the term ‘’contemporary wave land reform has been 
used to describe these reforms.  
 
A crucial feature of the contemporary wave land reform is its immediate recognition 
of existing rights, including customary rights to land. This is important for two 
reasons: First, recognition of existing rights represents a break with the past, when 
colonial and post-colonial authorities alike seized land for development purposes, 
often without compensation. This reduced poor people whose rights were rarely 
formally recognized and documented to the status of second class citizens as 
compared to the wealthy who could access the formed system and secures land title-
deeds (Knight 2010:7). Secondly; recognition of customary rights is important 
because it is applied from the day a reform is enacted. With enactment, existing   is 
valid in land court cases and should color land administration and land dispute 
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settlement practices. It may still be difficult to prove customary ownership rights in 
practice, but de jure, the recognition is important. 
 
The following important common denomination of the contemporary wave land 
reforms is the decentralization of responsibility for the administration of land and 
land dispute settlement the local level (Lipton 200; Sikor and Mullar (2009). The 
choice of local level institutions to administer land administration varies widely as do 
decentralization models in general. Finally and more controversially, new wave land 
reforms facilitate the registration and titling of rights to land with the dual of 
enhancing tenure security and promoting markets in land. Indeed the registration of 
rights is often an important task of the current decentralized land administration 
bodies and has been described as; the driving force’’ behind decentralization (Wily, 
2003b).  
 
Whereas some scholars demonstrate a certain distrust towards the land markets 
which they see as potentially threatening the rights of the poor (Boone 2007, Lipton 
2009), Rachael Knight (2010) does not see this as an inherent contradiction to 
current reforms on the contrary she stresses that recognition and protection of rights 
is important both for the poor and for establishing stable investment environments 
which are attractive to investors. In fact, the Tanzania’s Contemporary land reform is 
somehow unique; basically each country chooses its own path towards the current 
wave land reform. In a way, Tanzania started its process in 1983, with the opening 
up of private land ownership after more than two decades of African socialism.  
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Practically, the reform came about as a response to an increase in the number of 
conflicts over land in the late 1980’s caused by private land ownership (Sundet 1997, 
unpublished). A Presidential commission of inquiry into land matters, established in 
1992 to investigate the increase, cited widespread confusion over and abuse of, 
power related to land allocations and land-services due to contradictory policies 
(URT 1994a, 1994b). However it was not until 1999 that the parliament passed the 
two land acts, the village land act governing village land in rural areas and the land 
Act governing land in cities and other types of land. Together with the court (land 
Disputes Settlements). Act from 2002, they constitute the core of Tanzania’s 
Contemporary   land   reform. 
 
Like other Contemporary land reforms, Tanzania’s reform is highly complex legal 
framework comprising both the streamlining of existing legislation and novel 
innovations. Patrick MC Auslan, who drafted the Acts, distinguishes between 
procedural and substantive matters (MC Auslan 2010). Substantive matters describe 
the nature of rights and obligations. With its recognition of existing rights land, the 
village land Act strengthens the protection of ordinary rights-holders Vis-a vis the 
state by elevating customary rights into the formed legal framework. Indeed the land 
Acts explicitly state that customary rights of occupying are on a poor with the 
security provided by the granted rights of occupying associated with titled land 
(Knight 2010) Procedural matters are about the procedures that describe the 
administrative and legal proceeding. Here, the reform represents a significant more 
forwards a more important role for the village authorities in managing natural 
resources (Willy 2003a 14). 
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In rural areas, they are part of the same broader trend towards decentralization of 
responsibility for the delivery of public services which has been going on in 
Tanzania for more than 30years, starting with establishment of village as an 
important unit in the local government system in 1975 and the reintroduction of 
district councils in 1982 (Max 1991). Whereas the authority over land allocation 
between rationed, district and village authorities was not earlier on the land Acts 
make it clear that it is the village authorities who are responsible in the main for 
administering village land (Sundet 2005).  
 
Similarly, the first stop in the   contemporary land dispute settlement system the 
village land councils is the responsibility of the village authorities. It is ironic that the 
village land Act vests so much power over land in village authorities when these 
authorities were largely by passed in recent decades by the 1998 local government 
reform programme and other programmes aimed at improving service (Lange, 2008; 
Tidemand and Msani, 2010). 
 
Finally the reform aims at facilitating a market in land by enabling registration of 
rights and the issuance of land title deeds. Indeed the reform has also been seem as 
first and foremost a response to an increase in demand for land administration 
services caused by a great demand for land (Daley 2008:72). Some scholars have 
described this as a vehicle for disempowerment because it supposedly strengthens 
the middle class and Marginalizes the poor (Pollotti 2008; Shivji 1998) However the 
village land Act also seeks to protect the rights of woman and some vulnerable 
groups, for instance through on sales of customary rights to land. It isTanzania’s 
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reform strikes a balance between creating the current legal framework for a land 
market and meeting the rights of Groups (Ikdahl et. al., 2005; Ikdahl, 2010; Knight, 
2010). 
 
Research and debates had been framed by scholars particularly when it became clear 
that not all the commission’s recommendations had been heeded (shivji 1998; shivji 
and Wuyts (2008). Subsequently much research focused on the making of the reform 
on its contacts (sundet 1997, Tsikata 2003, Auslan 2010). Thus scholars see these 
reforms a mere tools for national elites and international investors to grab land of the 
small scale land holders (Manfi, 2006; Moyo 2011; Amanor 2012). 
 
Another body of literature focused on the analysis and interpretation of the 
Contemporary legal framework. Thus Lic-Alden Wily had made a very positive 
evaluation of the land Acts for their devolution of administrative power set the tone 
(Wily 2003a) in the same of thinking, Fimbo was somehow worried about the 
reform’s land market elements (Fimbo, 2004).  In the   similar vein, Ingunn IKdahl 
and Rachel Knight’s rather positive evaluation of the protection of the land right of 
vulnerable groups, Knight is equally positive with regard to the reform’s rural 
elements and included this because of its streghthering of customary rights. She 
pointed that not recognizing rights may disadvantage the poor and ‘’relegates’’ them 
as to status as second class citizen (Knight, 2010). 
Other research were Bruce and Knox (2008) who based their observation on figures 
from a representative from the land users, households and human settlements plus 
comparing insight from experiences with decentralization reforms in 8 African 
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countries and noted that very little implementation had taken place in Tanzania.The 
program initiated by Tanzania’s former President Benjamin Mkapa. It meant, 
enhancement of economic growth and improvement of the poor is possible through 
formalization of property; that is issuance of title deeds which will enable the poor to 
get their land as collateral for credit. Ole Kosyando participated in two of the 
‘’MKURABITA’’. Pilot project as an NGO-representative: Kosyondo wrote about 
his experiences. The project was to test innovations within implementation and land 
administration. He said that the rushed character of the pilot project plus lack of 
understudy of the importance of local capacity caused many mistakes, made the 
programme - target to face problems. 
 
2.9.1  The Implementation of Tanzania’s Land Reform 
The implementation of Tanzania’s Contemporary Land Reform has proved to be 
slow, uneven and to a large extent-profit-driven (Perdersen 2010, Seled and Burns 
2012). The late defining of the strategic plan for the implementation of the land laws 
(SPILL) in 2005 and lack of funding provide part of the explanation why, from the 
outside. It was estimated that SPILL would cost over 300 billion Tsh. of which only 
about 3 billion are foreseen to come from the ordinary Government budget. 
Consequently, the remaining 297 billion would have to come from outside the 
government budget (Haki Kazi in collaboration with experts from the ministry of 
land, July 2006). By May 2012 two and half years before the end of SPILL, Only 
around 17% of the planned 300 Million had been spent (Byamugisha 2013) equally 
important to underfunding is that is the lack of coherence within the land 
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administration structure (Pedarson 2013), Decouping implementations and 
consequently institutionalization over time. 
 
2.10 Policy Review 
 2.10.1 National Policies- Governing Land Resource 
In principle, policies are proposed as a response to addressing and overcoming 
identified problems.  The whole process is to try and ensure that the root causes of   
problems are identified and subsequently addressed in the design of a policy. 
Generally, ideas may originate from individual, communities, organizations; NGO’s. 
These ideas are then worked up to become policies (Mattee, 2007). The history of 
land related policies in Tanzania could be traced far back in history where Hayuma 
and Conning (2004) argued that Tanzania, initially was subjected to colonialism and 
the land holding related policies were based customary land laws of different tribes 
(in all 120 tribes in Tanzania). Thereby, the title of land was based on traditional and 
customs of respective tribes. Ownership of land was predominantly communal 
owned by a tribes; clan or family; chiefs, headmen and elders had power on land 
administration in trust for the community. Theses powers continued through to 
colonial era though they were limited by the newly introduced Germany and later the 
British land tenure policies under which all land were declared to be subjected to the 
crown. Customary land tenure is still in place to this date but since 1963, the chiefs, 
headmen and elders were replaced by elected village councilors (Fimbo, 2000).    
 
Upon attainment of Tanzania mainland political independence 1961, the government 
realized that there was a need to develop a coherent and comprehensive land policy 
that would define the land tenure and enable proper management as well as 
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allocation of land in both rural and urban areas. Further on, it is argued by Hayuma 
and coming (2004) that such land policy could help to accommodate changes in land 
use and increasing human population in the country, control of large –stock 
population which indeed increased demand for grazing land and created serious land 
degradation and protect environment from extension to marginal areas. From such an 
instance this land policy forms cross-section that automatically works in 
collaboration with other policies in order to satisfy her basic objectives.   
 
2.10.2 Policy Instrument Governing Access of Land Resources 
A number of newly introduced policies, strategies, laws and other planned initiatives 
have direct or indirect impact on land use in terms of agriculture grazing animals 
plus livelihood. These included policies dealing with overall national developments: 
(i) The national strategy for growth and reduction of poverty (NSGRP) of 2004 
(ii) The rural development strategy (RDS) of 2001 
(iii) The agricultural sector development strategy (ASDS) of 2001 
 
The NSGRP (2004) recognizes the need to institutionalize community participation 
rather than as a one- off event. This offers an opportunity for land users to engage 
with government in various policies and strategies. This NSGRP recognizes farming 
as well as pastoralism as most sustainable live hood. Thus NSGRP (2004) further 
promotes efficient utilization of rangelands and aims at empowering land users 
institutions promote programmes that will increase income generating opportunities 
for women and men in rural areas; it also promotes services delivery for example 
construction of dams, improve access and quality of veterinary services, ensure 
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improved access to reliable water supply for livestock and human being at large 
basically land users right are easily asserted. 
 
RDS (2001) because of the pastoralist habits, consider pastoralist to have negative 
consequences like land degradation due to overgrazing land use conflict and spread 
of animal diseases. It proposes resettling pastoralists on permanent basis by 
identifying and demarcating pastoral land. It considers sedentarization as way of 
addressing the problems of land users mainly pastoralists. 
 
The ASDS (2001) aims at the creation of enabling and conducive environment for 
improving the productivity and profitability of the livestock sector as the basis for 
improved farm income and rural poverty reduction. The main purpose of ASDS was 
to create a favorite climate for commercial activities and clarifying public and private 
roles in improving support services. ASDS recommends stream lining procedure for 
gaining legal access to land in order to make it possible to use land tittles as 
collateral for loans. The implication of this strategy is the increase use of land 
alienation from local communities and increased potential conflicts among various 
resources users including pastoralist plus farmers 
 
Policies and laws dealing with conservation and pastoralism as well as farming were: 
The environmental management ACT of 2004, the wildlife conservation ACT No 12 
OF 1974 (as amended in 1978) and The wildlife policy of Tanzania 1998. The main 
objective of the environment management Act of 2004 is to promote the 
enhancement protection conservation and management of the environment. This Act 
identifies a number of areas as sensitive and closed for livestock keeping occupation 
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and cultivation. The act is not clear a measures to be taken in supporting and 
preserving mobile pastured system to help in conservation of land resources and 
politically natural resources and cultural heritage.  
 
The wild life conservation Act No 12 of 1974 (as amended in 1978) grants power to 
the government to dispose pastoralists of their lands but it is silent on what should 
happen to those who had traditionally relied on such lands, either by way of 
compensation or otherwise. Furthermore, the act places severe restrictions on 
accessing land declared a Game Reserves or Game controlled area. Most of the 
protected areas in the country are either pastured land or were used by the 
pastoralists in the past. The wildlife management policy 1998, while promoting local 
community participation in conserving and exploiting wildlife resources also 
facilitates the marginalization of pastoralists by encouraging more land to be brought 
under wildlife conservation at the expense of pastoral activities. 
 
The above elaboration on marginalization of pastoralists, agro-pastoralists was 
stressed more by Bernstein (2005) when he gave a remark on consistency with 
related to peasants’ land being alienated by ruling hegemonies by giving unfounded 
causes. Furthermore the following policies directly or indirectly affect agriculture as 
well as   pastoralism. 
 
The overall aim of the National policy 1995 (URT, 1995) is to promote and ensure a 
secure land tenure system to encourage the optimal use of land resources and to 
facilitate broad- based social and economic development without endangering the 
environment. Some of the specific objectives of the policy includes promoting an 
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equitable distribution of and access to land by all citizens and ensure distribution of 
and access to land by all citizens and ensure that existing customary rights of small 
holder peasants and herdsmen are recognized, clarified and secured in law. Others 
are streamlining the institutional arrangements in land administration and land 
disputes adjudication and also make them more transparent 
 
The village land Act of 1999 (URT, 1999) recognizes customary rights of occupancy 
for which a certificate may be issued and communal village land that could be shared 
between pastoralists and agriculturalists However, while this Act provides 
opportunities for security of tenure by small holders but customary titling may 
extend to the individualization of land holding and will interfere with communal use 
of pastoral resources. This will amount to fragment the commons, which will 
interfere with traditional arrangements for utilization of common grazing resources. 
Its enactment and the repeal of the range development and management Act, 1964 
and the rural lands (planning and utilization) Act of 1973 pose a great threat to 
pastoralists live hoods. 
 
The Tanzania investment Act of 1997 (URT, 1997) allows non-citizen to own land 
for the purpose if investment. Its enactment was followed setting aside land Bank 
under TIC. This in effect will take away land already occupied by people such as 
nomadic- pastoralists and other vulnerable communities; the grazing lands and 
Animal Feed Resources. Act No 3 of 2010 (URT, 2010) Aims at increased 
productivity of Tanzanian’s rangelands and livestock sector. The Act proposes to 
establish range development areas, where rangeland development shall be installed, 
used maintained or modified in a manner consistent with multiple use management. 
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However such vision fails to accommodate the highly dispersed and unpredictable 
nature of natural resources in Tanzania. 
 
2.10.3 The Ujamaa Village Related Policies 
The Arusha declaration of 1967 was unambiguously committed to the country to the 
ideals of equality, socialism, and self-reliance and gave rural development paramount 
importance of attaining these objectives. It was followed by a number of policy 
directives and measures.  A policy of the Village and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975 
(URT, 1975) marked a formal distinction between a village and Ujamaa Village. The 
Ujamaa Village is a village, which has advanced, sufficiently in its socialist style of 
life  (producing collectively and sharing the produce in common) and its merits to 
register as such. Upon registration the Ujamaa village is expected to conform to a 
certain political organizational structure and it becomes eligible for certain benefits 
like; Credit facilities. The village however is regarded as only having taken the very 
first step towards ujamaa living  (International Labour Office, 1978).  
 
2.10.4 Institutional Framework and Functioning of the Village Economy 
A major landmark is the villagisation – movement, which is the villages and Ujamaa 
villages, Act of 1975. This provides the legal basis of the institutional framework of 
the villages. The Act makes provision for the registration of the village by a Register, 
there by conferring legal status and considerable powers on a village. The village is 
deemed to be a multipurpose cooperative society.  The Act, further provides for the 
constitution of a village assembly, consisting of all persons aged 18 years and above 
and a village council to be elected by the village assembly. The village council is 
empowered to do all such acts and things as are necessary or expedient for the 
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economic and social development of the village. It can plan and coordinate the work 
of villagers engaged in agriculture; take of the land allocated to the village and other 
activities. It is also empowered to set up committee dealing with such subjects as 
finance and planning production and marketing, education, culture social welfare, all 
activities are undertaken on a communal basis (op cit, 1978). 
 
No country wide figures are available on the division of land between communal and 
private cultivation. But in the great upsurge of villagisation since 1974, the normal 
pattern has been the settlement of villagers on individual plots and cultivation of 
block farms or individual plots except for the more “advanced “it would seem that 
private plots account for the preponderant proportion of land under cultivation. 
Variation in land use pattern and the division of labour rules out any sweeping 
generalizations in this respect.  
 
In some villages by- laws have been enacted by the village council requiring 
compulsory work for a specified period on communal farms or other activities while 
in others only a proportion of the population participates in communal farming. The 
rest work on private farms, The Ujamaa villages policies were so ideal in the sense 
that people worked on land peacefully whereby farmers, pastoralists were living 
peacefully; separating areas for farming and livestock development (Mascrenhas, 
1979). 
 
Progressive scholars have done great work to explain the usefulness of the 
institutional framework created by villagisation, to have offered some evident 
advantages in accelerated and equitable rural development in the following ways: 
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The restriction of private land holdings to about three hectares greatly   limits the 
scope for economic differentiation among the peasantry; but differences would still 
exist because of yield variations and more importantly because of differences in 
cropping patterns; nevertheless the creation of villages represents a major effort to 
redistribute land from the more wealth to poorer farmers; thus contributing to a more 
egalitarian distribution of rural incomes, particularly in the relatively wealthy and 
densely populated area where economic differentiation has been more pronounced 
with the gradual increase in the importance of communal activities, the forces as to 
purpose workable solution for the problems that were caused by establishing of 
Ujamaa  villages for example where there were surplus land , shifting each 
household to sizeable plot of land was done. Usually three hectors such a way that 
each farm- stead was surrounded its farm; this idea minimized environmental 
hazards of concentrated villages. The villages adopted land use management style.  
 
Finally in area where mixed farming was done, large areas of land were left as 
permanent residences. It was believed that concentrated villages had added 
advantages of getting changes/new innovation in agricultural practices and 
introduction to new styles dealing with environmental /land hazards by following an 
integrated way.  
 
2.11 The Knowledge Gap    
Over and above, the literature shows that   the Land Resources Management strategy 
(LRMS) have their origins in the international conventions and paradigms - shifts in 
land Resource Management strategies which are in most cases adopted without a 
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critical analysis of their national compatibility with existing situation in the recipient 
country (Chikozho, 2016).   
Historically, the Literature reveals that community leadership was guaranteed, as 
well as land- access; land tenure security was therefore not individualized but was 
provided in collective way through clan, tribal leadership, (Kjeksus, 1977). The issue 
of land use and production for each homestead was given priority over ownership. 
The Literature tells us that many sub-Saharan Africa; individuals land right was 
respected within the communal land ownership – right. Individual family enjoyed 
fairly, clearly, defined spatial and temporal rights over different parcels of cultivated 
land and such family rights were transmitted to succeed generations in accordance 
with prevailing rules of succession which ordinarily allowed dividable inheritance, 
(Adholla and Bruce, 2009). 
 
During the Germans colonial rule 1.3 million acres of the customary land was 
alienated as contrasted to 3.5 million acres of the customary land during the British 
colonial rule. These colonizers introduced the right of occupancy and could only be 
granted by the governor; Mackerizie (1988) Chonock (1985). Colonial interventions 
declared all land as “not owned” left many natives labeled as trespassers on their 
ancestral lands.  
 
At Independence, Tanzania inherited the colonial laws and policies that had been in 
force on the land question. These continued to rest in the state as the ultimate 
landowner without any significant modification, upholding the new order such as the 
leasehold system where these existed. Land reforms were to the politics of the day 
but were largely cosmetic and often of trial and error type of land administration and 
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reforms worked towards often diminishing influence of customs and tradition of 
local people, (Coulson, 1982). 
Along such interpretations, Olukoshi (1997) indicated that excessive emphasis on 
formalizing propertyrules is diversionary and irresponsible in African land context. It 
is true that from titling programme those small holders have somehow gained access 
funds for investments while undermining communal ownership system and fail to 
reduce litigation. In fact, the people have challenged the basis on which property 
rights are acquired through titling. 
 
Thus, the critics of de-Soto programme-views have aggravated the existing 
inequality producing more rather than less insecurity for many land dwellers. Above 
all, it is feared that the de-Soto inspired approach will replay these processes by 
accelerating market based or land – transfer with potentially negative consequence 
for the poor land users or land occupiers of land rights prone to distress sales 
(Chimhowu and Woodhouse (2006). However, there is no proper Institutional 
arrangement related to agrarian systems to ensure their continued access and use 
overtime. 
 
It is against this background information as stipulated above; the controversies that 
are confronting poor small land holders are vividly being created day after day by 
state bureaucracy and Petty bourgeoisie.  The contradiction between the two groups 
have determined the future agricultural development in the country henceforth their 
failure to solve their differences has resulted into marginalizing these land users or 
farmers up to this date. No discourse has shown categorically that the contemporary 
regulations in Tanzania have helped the poor land users or poor landholders. The 
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overall review shows that there is little theoretical, conceptual or empirical Literature 
on rural land management Institutions in Tanzania to guide policy makers on how to 
develop efficient and equitable Institutions to serve communal farmers and 
pastoralists from the study area e.g. Missenyi and Muleba districts. This is the 
research gap that the study attempted to fill. The above context has attempted to 
describe the research gap. 
  
2.12 Summary 
Generally, the literature review has shown real role of informal and formal 
arrangements at large but the operation of these arrangements are not strictily  
impartial, particularly formal arrangements. In the whole process of operation related 
to formal arrangements the poor small land holders have been denied of their land 
rights in terms of access, ownership, use or transfer of land. Secondly there had 
never been initiatives to rectify this embrassments over land perspectives since the 
colonial times up to date. It is my thinking that land policies today should affirm 
existing rights in land holding especially customary rights of small holders in rural 
areas. The rights should also be recognized, clarified and secured in law. Policies 
must also provide for provision of civil Education aimed at increasing awareness on 
land information-management. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1    Overview 
This chapter describes the methodology that the researcher used in conducting the 
study. It also outlines the research study area, design, sample size and sampling 
techniques, data collection methods and data analysis.  
3.2      Description of the study Area and Justification of the Study Area 
The study was conducted in two districts of Kagera Region, namely Muleba and 
Missenyi, located in interlacustrine area.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Map of the Study Area. 
Key :           denotes study- villages 
 
                             Denotes study districts  
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The study area has been selected due to two basic reasons; in the first place there has 
been a lot of land use conflicts and disputes in the two districts. Secondly, the areas 
have rich experiences in land gorvanance issues, which were historically well 
managed under traditional centralized chiefdoms. Figure 3.1 is a map of this study 
area.  Missenyi district; boarder Uganda on the North and Karagwe district on the the 
west. 
 
3.3  Study Population 
The    majority   of the people in the study area     are    of   Bantu ethnic background. 
The Haya – people   constitutes the major   ethnic group in both Muleba and 
Missenyi district (Raining, 1972). According to population census of 2012, Missenyi 
district is the second heavily populated district in the region with 386,328 people. 
Among the two districts, Missenyi district exhibits the highest population growth rate 
(42%). The population of Missenyi district is said to have increased by almost (50%) 
with a decade. 
 
It is also known from that census records that, it is likely that the population pressure 
on land has been caused by movements of people who move from other neighboring 
countries such as Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda. This has also apparently contributed 
to an increase of the population in Missenyi District   as well as Muleba district. 
 
3.4  Study Design  
The study employed a cross-sectional research design that entails collection of data 
at one point in time, i.e a snapshot of data collection This design was selected 
because is leat costly in terms of time and other resources.  
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The study further adopted a descriptive research approach. The main purpose of 
descriptive research is explanation of a state of affairs as it exists. The researcher 
reports the findings, however, kerlinger (1969) points out that descriptive studies are 
not only restricted to fact – findings but may often result in the formulation of 
important principles of knowledge and solution to significant problem. They are 
more than just a collection of data. They involve measurement, classification, 
analysis, comparison and interpretation of data.  
 
3.4 Sampling Procedure and Sample Size   
3.4.1  Sampling Procedure 
A purposive sampling was adopted for selecting respondents in this study. 
Therespondents were drawn from different categories of famers in the study villages 
through simple random sampling. Three villages were selected purposively from 
each of the study district. The villages with high imcidences of land –use conflicts 
were earmarked for this study. 
 
The village governmet, ward and district officials considered as information rich 
individuals were selected as key informants including:  Village chairmen (one from 
each village), Village land tribunal officials, Ward executive officers, Ward land 
tribunal members, district land officials, district land court officials, the District 
Magistrate, Advocate,   
 
3.4.2  Sample Size 
Three study villages were selected purposively from each of the study district.A non-
probability approach was employed to select the respondents from each study 
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village. The sampling frame was most recent official register of names of residents 
for each study village. A rotary method was used to select names of 22 respondents 
from each study village. The name of each family head was given a unique number 
starting at one, the number was written on separate paper, then folded separately and 
mixed up in a box. Thereafter 22 names were picked at random from a box in each 
study village. A total of 66 and 67 respondents were selected from Muleba and 
Missenyi districts, respectively. 
 
3.5 Data Collection Methods  
The primary data were collected by using the following methods: Interviews, 
questionnaire survey, Focus Group Discussion (FGD), non-participant observation. 
 
3.5.1  Key-informant Interviews 
Face to face communication and discussions between researcher and respondents 
were of crucial importance in adding to investigations a sense of reality that accrues 
from dimensions of human interactions and human dynamism that gives analysis, 
interpretation of prospective, events and added advantage of third party views as well 
as feelings. This is a two-way systematic conversation between the researcher and 
the informant, initiated for obtaining information relevant to the specific study 
(Kadder, 1981). In order to supplement the information from the questionnaire, the 
researcher conducted in-depth interviews with key informants.  
 
The key informants are the knowledge rich individuals in the study area.  Key 
informants were carefully selected within the local study areas on account of their 
acquaintance with the local area and their intimate knowledge of the Institutional 
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arrangements related to land issues. These  included  the  village  chairmen  and  
Ward  officials  the  village  tribunal officials Ward tribunal  officials District  land  
officials, Ward land  officials, District-Court officials, District land Court magistrate 
and a  Judge of the high Court.  
 
3.5.2   Focus Group Discussions 
The Focus Group Discussions are like interviews but this method is more focused to 
particular or specific people. The aim is not to replace the interview method but 
rather to complement it (Kreuger, 1988). The members of focus group discussions 
were selected adult females and adult- male- individuals. Discussion groups mainly 
address issues that required a collective memory   are like interview, but this method 
is more focused to particular or specific people. The members of the focus group 
discussion were selected purposively. In this study, the focus group members were 
composed by females and male adults. 
 
A Focus discussion group (FGD) was formed in each of the study villages. Each 
group consisted of ten members including: five males, five females. The groups 
ensured a gender balance and inter-generational representation by including the 
females and youth. The FGD were guided by a checklist of questions to address the 
emerging contentious issues in the study villages. 
 
3.5.3  Non- Participant Observations 
Observations are the most obvious advantage in the facilitation of the researcher’s 
eyes and mind in sensing, feeling and getting full impression on the subject of the 
study. Observation enables the researcher’s sight to complement the other four 
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senses of (hearing; touching, feeling and even tasting in gaining a comprehensive 
understanding of the study that is made possible by an interplay of those sense in 
one’s interpretation; conclusion; prediction or action. The direct observation of land  
use activities and locl communities interactions  was carried out  in order to establish 
the relationships of local communities and their interactions when utilizing the land 
resources  
 
3.5.4  Questionnaire – Survey 
The questionnaires are considered to be the most effective means of data collection. 
The researcher developed open and closed ended questions to be included in the 
questionnaire. Closed ended questions were prepared in the form of multiple choices 
where the respondents were supposed to tick in front of the appropriate choice. Open 
– ended questions allowed the respondents to answer the posed questions in 
employing space provided in the questionnaire – method such as effectiveness in 
data collection, respondents answer in their own words and respondents have 
adequate time to give well thought out answers. The questionnaires were 
administered to a total sample of 308 from the six villages, local government- 
officials and investors from Muleba and Missenyi-districts. Two research- assistants 
assisted in administering the questionnaires to the respondents.  
 
3.6  Secondary Data Collection  
The documentary review was conducted to obtain information relevant to this study.  
The documents reviewed include the villahe meeting reports, ward land tribunal 
reports, village maps, farmland sketches; the district land departs reports, and the 
district land court case reports. 
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3.7 Data Analysis 
Prior to the processing of data, data collected from the field has been checked so as 
to ensure that all information has been properly collected and recorded. Data has 
been also checked for completeness and internal consistency. Data has been ordered 
in relations to the objectives and research questions. Respondents’ answers with 
similar characteristics or patterns have been categorized or labeled. 
 
For the purpose of discovering underlying meaning and patterns of relationship, non-
numerical qualitative analysis and interpretations methods were used. The most 
common form of tables display of qualitative data were used plus other displays such 
as interview- results and focus-group discussions views.   In ordering information in 
many ways such as according to location of data collection and reason for certain 
trends. 
 
Some qualitative data has not been reduced to tables but it has been included in the 
write – up. This has included direct quotation from informants in their local 
language, which means, I sometimes made use of professional language translator. 
Quantitative data were analysed using of SPSS version 13 software.  
 
3.8 Data Quality Control and Ethical Consideration 
Prior to data collection process the research assistants were trained on data collection 
and the questionnaires were pretested in a pilot study. This is important for ensuring 
accuracy level of data collection. Additionally, as a matter of ethical consideration, 
an informed consent has been sought from the relevant personnel before beginning 
data collection process.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter is organized in sections.  The    sections   include, land uses in terms of 
farmhold characteristics.  It also elaborates existing land tenure systems that 
influence access to land.  Others include the strategies used to strengthen the existing 
formal arrangements in the administration of land resources.  This chapter also 
evaluates the actual evolution of customary arrangements in land resources 
management.  
 
4.2  Land uses Characteristics 
The results in Table 4.1 show that the majority (72.7%) of respondents in Muleba 
were practicing small holdings–farming. Other land uses were gardening (13.6%), 
pastoralism (6.1%) and Agro-forestation (7.6%) pastoralism was the least practiced 
in Muleba District.  
 
Table 4.1(A): Responses on Main Land uses in Muleba District 
Land use type Number of Respondents 
Muleba District  n=66 
        Frequency                      Percent 
Farming 48 72.7 
Pastoralism 4 6.1 
Small hold gardening 9 13.6 
Afforestation 5 7.6 
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Total 66 140.0 
Source: Field Result 2010 
Table 4.1(b): Responses on Main Land use-activities in Misenyi District 
Land use type  Number of Respondents 
Misenyi District n=67 
Frequency                     Percent 
Farming  27 40.3 
Pastoralism 2 3.0 
Small- holding gardening 33 49.3 
Afforestation 5 9.9 
Total 67 100.0 
 
In Missenyi District, on the other hand, the majority of respondents were practicing 
smallhold gardening (49.3%), farming (40.3), where as Agro-forestation was carried 
on by a small number of respondents (74%). Pastoralism   was practiced by (3.0%) 
of respondents. The communities under study are predominantly rural and highly 
dependent on land resources for sustenance. This is a typical characteristic of 
agrarian systems, where the majority depends entirely on agricultural production to 
meet their livelihood   requirements. 
 
It was noted that this typical state of affairs was caused by different factors..Key- 
informants who were interviewed   from the study area revealed that the farming- 
land used to be abundant and people were used to cultivate on substantial sized farms 
which guaranteed self sustaining economy. It was also disclosed by these key-
informants  that at the  arrival  of the Germans and British- Colonialists,  indigenous 
people were forced to be victims by being placed under the yoke of perpetual 
exploitative relations of production. Alienating the local peoples’ lands was an order 
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of the day. It was concluded   by these  informants  that such: ..”circumstances, have 
marked the starting point of land scarcity up to date”.   Thus…..   “ this evil behavior 
to our land has been worsen by establishing unfriendly land policies, regulations as 
well as related laws and land acts”…  the  Key  informants deliberated. 
 
4.2.2  Farm Holdings Characteristics 
It has  been  revealed  by  the  data  from  the  study  area  that dominant land 
holdings in Missenyi district ranges from less than one acre (19.7%); 1-2 acres 
(10.6%); 2-5 acres (7.6%) to above 5 acres (7.6%). This is indeed an alarming 
situation as most of respondents own very small pieces of land. Similarly, in Muleba 
District, the distribution of farm- holdings size was not promising either because the 
number of people owning reasonable acres of land was small. As pointed out by 
10.6% of the respondents, most of the people own between 1 and 2 acres, (7.6%) 
own between 2 and 5 acres and only (7.6%) own more than 5 acres. 
 
On the other hand in Missenyi, the distribution of land holding was not far from the 
worst. Findings show that 13.4% of the respondents own below 1acre; 1.9% own 2 to 
5 acres; only 6.1% own more than 5 acres whereas 34.3% own between 1to 2 acres. 
Results shown above in words imply that land parcels owned by respondents from 
both districts are very small. Such small land holdings suggest unsustainable land 
parceling, which is caused by high population increase as well as land fragmentation.  
 
This may in turn, affect the peoples’ livelihood and tranquility. If people cannot get 
expected opportunity of exploiting the land for their survival, the impact of land 
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fragmentation is terrible in the sense that it hinders agricultural mechanization and 
causes insufficiency in production as commented by (Maghimbi, 1999b, Majafi 
2013). 
The first fundamental implication is that peasant agriculture is facing two processes 
which prevent growth at grass root level, due to limited land for farming and 
contradicting customary law, guidelines. These policies have helped the minority in 
this society to a accumulate wealth through the sale of surveyed lands. This means 
that the minority business in land does not provide chance for the majority to benefit 
on this business. This state of affairs has been noted elsewhere (Maghimbi and 
Senga, 2003).  
 
Secondly, the results imply that land parcels owned by respondents in the study area 
are very small landholdings, this shows an indication of unsustainable land parceling, 
which is necessitated by population pressure increase. This may in turn affect the 
people livelihood and can result in high level of social unrest if people cannot get 
expected opportunity of exploiting the land for their survival. This is equally argued 
by Robert and Kanaley, (2006) when clarifying case studies from Laos, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Thailand, explaining their local government implementing effective 
land use arrangements that limited land fragmentation. 
 
4.2.3  Main Sources of Income in the Study Area 
Table. 4.2 show that 29.5% respondents said that the majority of the people from the 
study area depend on agricultural production partly by working as wage labourers in 
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commercial coffee banana farms or working on family plots as pointed out by 
23.7%. 
 
The results from Table 4.2 indicate the collective action, sort of spirit, towards work 
or labour in different forms. Each household member is involved in either activity to 
earn a living as wage laborers on commercial farms or as working on family farms. 
On the other hand, some household members decided to engage in business or selling 
agricultural products or rearing animals and selling animal products. Finally some 
household -members indulged in casual labour. 
 
Table 4.2: Responses Distribution of Opinions on Sources of Household Income 
Opinions on Sources of Household Income Number of Respondents Muleba 
and Missenyi Districts (n= 139) 
Frequency Percent 
Wage labour in commercial coffee – Banana 
farms 
41 29.5 
By working on family farms 33 23.7 
Petty Business 21 15.1 
Selling Agricultural products and rearing Animals 30 21.6 
Sales of animal products 8 5.8 
Casual labour 6 4.3 
Total 139 100 
 
This approach enabled household members to survive despite of ruthless capitalist 
exploitative relations of production that was superimposed on our society. Generally, 
this attitude showed a constructive or positive response towards the created challenge 
by the capitalistic relations of production that have impacted the agrarian system 
negatively through land alienation. 
 
Table 4.3: Response Distributions on Household Livestock Ownership 
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Livestock 
type 
Number of Respondents  
Total Muleba District 
(n=66) 
Missenyi District 
(n= 67) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Cows 28 42.5 29 43.3 57 42.9 
Goats 18 27.3 29 43.2 47 35.3 
Sheep 9 13.6 6 9.0 15 11.3 
Chicken 3 4.5 2 3.0 5 3.8 
Pigs 8 12.1 1 1.5 9 6.8 
Total 66 100 67 100 133 100 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
4.2.4  Livestock Ownership in the Study Area 
There is generally differential distribution of livestock ownership in the study area. 
Where by respondents owning livestock in Muleba district (42.5%) owned cows; 
(27.3%) owned goats; (13.6%) owned sheep; while (4.5%)owned chickens; in 
Missenyi districts (43.3%)of respondents owned cows; (43.3%) own goats; 9.0% 
owned sheep; 3.0% owned chickens and finally (1.5%) owned pigs so the highest 
rates of livestock owned by the majority of responds were the cows, their main 
reasons for owning livestock were presented in Table. 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4:  Responses Distribution on Reasons for Livestock Ownership in 
Study Area 
            
Reasons for Raising Livestock 
Number of Respondents Muleba and 
Missenyi District (n=133) 
Frequency Percent 
Raise Capital 85 63.9 
In heritance 5 3.8 
Improve living standards 43 32.3 
Total 133 100 
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4.2.5  Reasons for Keeping Livestock 
Findings in the Table. 4.5 show that respondents had different reasons for keeping 
livestock. As revealed by 63.6% of the respondents, the majority of farmers were 
keeping livestock with prior intentions of rising their capital just to strengthen their 
financial position in order to get involved in commercial activities. Furthermore, 
3.8% of the respondents said farmers were keeping livestock obtained from 
inheritance while 32.3% of the respondents said that farmers keep livestock in order 
to improve their living standards. 
Table 4.5: Reasons for Raising Livestock as Revealed by FGD 
 
Reasons 
for raising 
Livestock 
Muleba District Missenyi District 
Karambi 
Village 
Luhija 
Village 
Bubale 
Village 
Kakunyu 
Village 
Bugango 
Village 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
 F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
F/M: 
(20) 
Raising 
capital 
16 2 15 2 12 2 14 2 10 2 
Inheritances 12 3 13 3 11 3 10 3 9 3 
Improve 
Living 
Standard 
18 1 
 
16 
 
1 
 
17 
 
1 
 
 
15 
 
1 
14 1 
Supply 
animal 
products 
11 4 11 4 10 4 9 4 8 4 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
Key: F----Means   Female,M---Means  Male, FGD -Means Focus Group  
Discussions 
Similar reasons for keeping livestock were pointed out by respondents in the focus 
group discussions. More specifically, findings from two third of the respondents ( 
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See Table( 4.5) revealed that raising of livestock enabled land users to improve their 
standards of living despite a number of challenges facing livestock keeping in their 
villages. The focus – group discussions results show that most of study   villages, 
members raise livestock as a capital resources for improving their living standards. 
Keeping livestock for the purpose of improving the nutrition status was ranked very 
low. 
 
On probing further, during the interview with Key–informants especially the village 
chairmen, it was revealed that: “ ….respondents wanted to establish their local 
market for their animal products such as meat, skins and milk. Some of the village 
members were sellers and others were buyers. It was believed that this would 
facilitate business   among village–members”. 
 
Table 4.6: Responses Distribution on Limitations of Raising Livestock 
 
Limitations 
Number of Respondents  
Total Muleba District 
(n= 66) 
Missenyi District 
(n=67) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Poverty 7 10.6 24 35.8 29 21.8 
Inadequate grazing 
land for livestock 
34 51.5 20 29.9 54 40.6 
Lack entrepreneurial 
skills 
25 37.9 25 37.3 50 37.6 
Total 66 100 67 100 133 100 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
 
This trend could be looked upon as market processes transactions. This stage was 
reached at by village – members after being fed up by being exploited to the 
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maximum in selling their limited amount of coffee to their respective cooperatives 
where they were highly taxed. 
 
4.2.5  The Challenges Faced by Livestock Keepers   
Findings from Figigure 4.6 show that 37.3% of the respondents identified lack of 
entrepreneurial skills as one of the main stumbling block in livestock keeping. 
Nearly, 51.5% and 29.9% of the respondents from Muleba and Missenyi respectively 
said that inadequate land for grazing was one of the main problems in relation to 
livestock keeping. Finally, 10.6% of the respondents from Muleba and 35.8% of the 
respondents from Missenyi said that the prevalence of poverty is one of the problems 
that faced the livestock-keepers in the study area. 
Table 4.7: Responses on Challenges Faced by Livestock – Keepers 
 
Presence of 
land shortage 
Number of Respondents  
Total Muleba District 
(n= 66) 
Missenyi District 
(n=67) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
YES 66 100.0 65 97.0 131 98.5 
NO - - 2 3.0 2 1.5 
Total 66 100 67 100 133 100 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
 
Generally, there were a number of problems that face livestock keepers today as it 
was substantiated by key informants particularly village- chairmen who argued that 
this neoliberal era has witnessed the articulation of new forms of land alienation and 
their technical disguised features. They stressed that the outcome of the said new 
forms of alienation has completely changed land ownership that is based on private 
basis.  
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As the result of that, they added that no more of open- land or communal land. Land 
is tied to specific individuals, land hoarding is an order of the day; and land is held 
under speculative purpose; small pieces of land are parcelled out by children of 
peasants. Over and above, they concluded by saying that the government in power 
has failed to prioritize the needs of the land users’ practically; Though they argued 
that the government officials claim that prioritization has already been done on paper 
work or at theoretical level.  
 
A similar assignation was given by Robert and Kenaly (2006) who argued that the 
prerequisites of the community will normally tally with positive land use procedure 
which will be accepted by the majority. This academic assertion amplifies, 
accordingly the situation faced by the local communities in the study area where the 
land use programmes are distorted by the government through land use and town- 
planning procedures, the village around Muleba Township were forced to shift from 
their ancestors land in order to give way for an expansion of Muleba Township by 
1992. 
 
From the above account, the government accountability and efficiency is lacking 
whose outcome is nothing but poor land governance. A factor that may discredit our 
government   if this scenario is examined.. in terms of expected  national integrity. 
Furthermore the community members in the study area face a perennial land shortage 
Fig. 4.9 shows, the perceived   land shortage in the study area. A large number of 
respondents in both districts reveal that there were land shortages. The majority of 
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respondents (97.0%) in Missenyi and (100%) from Muleba districts reported 
prevalence of land shortage in the area and only a very  small  proportion  of  three  
percent  of  respondents  said  that  there  was  no  land  shortage  as  such.  
 
4.2.6  Perceived Land Shortages in the Study Area 
Overall, findings show that 97.0% of the respondents in the study area revealed a 
prevalence of land shortage. A noticeably small number (3%) of respondents refuted 
the existence of land shortage in the study area. Additionally, findings from Key 
Informant Interview revealed a similar situation. More specifically, Village 
Chairman said that: 
 “ there was substantial open grass land, forests that have been 
grabbed and expropriated by individuals these individuals do not 
allow any body to utilize it in anyway” (10th – 15th July 2010).  
This could be a plausible reason as to why a small group of respondents. “land users” 
from Missenyi who said that there was no land shortage in true sense. Despite of 
such varied perceptions on land shortage, the material conditions in the study area 
showed that people were physically facing an acute land shortage even from more 
observation that could be noticed. This observation was substantiated through verbal 
communication where people talked among themselves on issues related to land 
governance in the study area. To such instances, Bruce and Adholla (2002) argued 
that separating the have not and the rich people could be facilitated by having strata... 
in human community.   The  outcome  of  which  opportunity  for  the   minority  in  
a  community.This state of affairs has created untrustworthy  style of the modern 
process, related  to  land acquisition. The issue of land shortage is clarified by 
Gruneworld (2013) that it could be resolved by implementing land reform process by 
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including the institutional framework programme, design implementation and 
finding issues. Land reform should not be about redistributing land but rather needs 
to be viewed as whole basket of services that include supply of inputs; marketing 
services, financial services and research. 
 
Table 4.8: Perceived Land Shortages in the Study Area 
 
Reasons 
Number of respondents  
Total Muleba District 
(n=66) 
Missenyi District 
(n=67) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Destitution 14 21.2 2 3.0 16 12 
Deficiency in 
land policy 
50 75.8 65 97.0 115 86.5 
Others 2 3.0 0 0 2 1.5 
Total 66 100 67 100 133 100 
Source: Field Results (2010)  
The above mentioned view point was summarized by opinions from Key Informants’ 
Interview from both districts (Muleba and Mussenyi). More clearly, they said: 
… “the contemporary land law has not been in line with the 
principles of fairness and equity as far as land distribution is 
concerned “  
 
or this land law is said to be on principles far removed from the local principles for 
land management, thus it has resulted in a situation of legal pluralism giving rise to 
many contradictions. 
 
In view of data in Table 4.8, most of the respondents (75.8%) from Muleba 
mentioned the inadequacy of the existing land policy and Acts in promoting equity.  
The existing land policy and Acts have not helped to promote equity among land 
users. 21.2% of the respondents said that destitution was another cause as contrasted 
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to 3% of the respondents who had different views on the causes of land shortage, 
including population pressure. On average, the issue of land laws deviating from its 
basic characteristics of fairness deprives indigenous people, the decision and rights to 
the use natural resources such as land. The outcome of which create retrogressive   
process of production   relations over the life style of the local land users.  
 
Table 4.9: FGD Scores on Reasons of Land Shortage in the Study Area 
 
Reason 
Muleba District Missenyi District 
Luhija 
Village 
Karambia 
Village 
Mugango 
Village 
Kakunyu 
Village 
Bubale 
Village 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Planned 
Procedure 
13 2 12 2 11 2 14 2 13 2 
Unplanned 
Procedure 
11 3 13 1 3 3 6 3 2 3 
Colluding 
with land 
officers 
16 1 9 3 17 1 16 1 15 1 
Key: F/M means Female and Male combined, F--- Female, M---- Male, FGD—   
Focus Group Discussions 
This has also been stressed by Nelson and Sulle (2013) who have warned the state  
hegemonies by cautioning that the flourishing agri-food, operation of holidays, 
natural  energy (fields) have generated pressures on the farmers’ land and this trend 
has influenced the state to give extra land  to big investors where from rural 
population has been left without enough land for cultivation.  
 
Results in Table 4.10 show that investors’ grabbing indigenous land as another cause 
of land shortage in the study area. More specifically, data from Focus Group 
Discussions with respondents suggests that that investors grabbing indigenous land 
was of highest level in Luhija village as well as in Kakunyu village where as 
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corruptive behavior in land issues was common in Karambi village as well as in 
Kakunyu village. 
 
Table 4.10: Reasons for Land shortage 
 
Farm size 
categories 
Number or Respondents  
Muleba District 
(n = 66) 
Missenyi District 
(n= 67) 
Total 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Below 1 
acres 
13 19.7 9 13.4 22 16.5 
Between 1 – 
2 acres  
7 10.6 23 34.3 30 22.6 
Between 2 – 
5 acres 
5 7.6 8 11.9 13 9.8 
More than 5 
acres 
5 7.6 4 6.1 9 6.8 
Don’t know 36 54.5 23 34.3 59 44.4 
Total 66 100 67 100 133 100 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
Infact, corrupt behavior in land issues is related to lack of equity as well as fairness. 
It is generally shown that these two reasons are of the highest rank in Karambi and 
Kakunyu, but less moderate in other villages such as Luhija, Bubale, and Mugango 
villages. The aspect of unplanned survey exercise has somehow disturbed a limited 
number of land users- activities in different places though whose impact was not felt 
by the majority of land users. 
 
In view of the results by FGD on  Table 4.11,  there have ended up in shaking the 
social status of these villages by destabilizing the tranquility that has prevailed earlier 
in those villages; where from the village leaders namely village chairmen have 
declared openly that the village land act No5. Of 1999, has not operated in favors of 
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land users. Based on FGD – results on Table. 4.11, the village land in both, districts 
respectively was grabbed in large proportions by the so called investors and rich 
people. 
 
The village chairmen  mentioned categorically that government officials have been 
reported that they had acquired extraordinary large acreages of land. Over and   
above proverbial investors such as Kagera sugar factory owner has practically 
acquired large hectors of public and villages’ land. The Bubale and Kakunyu village 
chairmen have reported to the researcher that Kagera Sugar factory has an area   that 
ranges from 2000 – 4000 hectares of land. Secondly these village – chairmen have 
also reported the village land to have been appropriated by the Missenyi Ranch, 
though, it has   recently been privatized whereby, parts of the ranch were sub – 
leased to private individuals who have grabbed much of the village land without 
following procedures of land acquisition in the line with the village land Act No. 5 of 
1999. 
On the above incidences, Ostrom (2001) argued that land policy governance should 
stress on the service delivery by land institutions and land policy. The policy 
therefore, should establish   the way forward and the process to be done as well as its 
related problems. In actual reality the land policy has provided the basis for 
stakeholders of land matters to twist up and down land law, henceforth overlooking 
the aspect of equality in land matters. The implication of the above is nothing but 
perpetuation of land use conflicts and disputes among land users. This view was 
stressed by Bernstein (2005) when he tried to speak of that consistency on the 
ongoing steps to alienate the land of local land users or farmers, livestock grazing 
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lands as well as specific areas, on fictious reasons dominated by self interests, and by 
using either ways such as force, law and influence. 
 
4.3  Existing Land Tenure Systems that Influence Access to Land 
At this material time of Neoliberal era, land users from the study area  have  
witnessed  Neoliberal  land  tenure  institutional arrangements to have created co-
existence of the indigenous land tenure systems sometimes known as informal land 
system or  traditional land system  operating jointly with formal land systems. Now 
the dominant peasant economy system is the one that has superimposed on the 
natural economy system or (traditional economy system). 
 
4.3.1  Perception on the Meaning of Land Tenure  
The unique aspect of traditional economy system is that customary tenure rights 
evolve towards stronger and more alienable, individual rights as population pressure 
increases, technology changes and agriculture become commercialized. Basically, 
customary land tenure system does not break down but evolve. Findings from Focus 
Group Discussions (FGD) revealed that villages were having differentiated views on 
how they understood the essence of land as clarified by superimposed codes (See 
Also Table. (4.10). 
 
Table 4.11: Perceptions on the Meaning of Land Tenure from the FGD 
 
Perceived 
meaning 
Muleba District Missenyi District 
Karambi 
Village 
Luhija 
Village 
Mugango 
Village 
Bubala 
Village 
Kakunyu 
Village 
Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank Score Rank 
Right to occupy 
and use land 
14 2 11 2 14 2 16 1 12 1 
Right to 
develop land 
11 3 8 3 6 3 9 3 8 3 
 
 
 
 
    
128 
Right to transfer   
and inherit land 
17 1 16 1 15 1 11 2 10             2 
Source: Field Results (2010 
Key: F/M----Means  Female  and  Male  combined, F----- Female, M----Stands  for   
Male, FGD----Means   Focus  Group  Discussions  
More specifically, findings show that nearly three quarter of the respondents in FGD 
defined land tenure as the right to occupy and use land. This ranked the highest as 
shown in Table 4.10. A few, that is, about a quarter of the respondents in FGD 
defined   land  tenure  as   the right to develop land. Finally, somehow averagely, 
about half of the respondents in FGD from all villages (Table. 4.10) have explained 
land tenure as to mean the right to transfer and inherit land. From the perceptions,  it  
appears  that  the essence of land  tenure  has varied options . The above views on the 
definitions of land tenure are also shared by Cumby and Gerber (2007) where they 
argued that land is administered in a number of various systems that register private 
right in land, public land rights, reserved rights in land; forest land rights and guided 
by the traditional land law rights related to farming rights, natural resources rights 
and land used for mining rights. Henceforth, the interactions between the various 
separate systems may differ from nation to nation due to material conditions 
pertaining at the time. 
 
4.3.2  Types of Traditional Institutions Governing Access to Land 
A number of traditional arrangements (Table. 4.12) were found to be used to link 
access to land as noted from the study area. However, it was noted that access to land 
resources has been changing overtime with rising population pressure, increased 
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commercialization of farming and growing urbanization as pointed out by the 
majority of respondents (over three quarters) in FGD.  
Table 4.12: FGD Scores on the Type of Traditional Institutions Determining 
Access to Land in the Study Area 
 
The type of 
Institution 
 
Category 
Muleba Missenyi 
Karambi 
Village 
Lihija Village Mugango Village Bubale Village Kakunyu 
Village 
  
Scores 
   Rank    Score     Rank   Scores    Ranks   Scores   
Ranks 
  Scores    
Ranks 
F/M (20) F/M (20) F/M (20) F/M (20) F/M (20) 
Tenancy 
between 
family 
members 
alsowith 
outsiders 
Tradition
al 
arrangem
ents 
15 1 14 1 14 1 12 2 13 2 
Gift between 
Indigenous in 
habitants, 
local people 
and migrants  
Tradition
al 
arrangem
ents 
13 2 13 2 11 3 13 1 11 3 
Custodian 
contracts 
Tradition
al  
Arrange
ments 
11 4 10 3 12 2 10 3 10 4 
Share 
cropping  
Tradition
al 
arrangem
ents 
10 4 8 4 11 3 8 4 9 5 
Guarantee/ 
Mortgage  
Formal 
arrangem
ents 
0 5 0 5 0 5 0 5 0 6 
Inheritance  Tradition
al 
arrangem
ents 
12 3 13 2 12 2 12 2 14 1 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
Key: F/M----Means   Female  and  Male  combined, F—Female, M---- Male, FGD-- 
Focus  Group   Discussions 
Over and above, respondents in FGD said that land has become a very marketable 
asset, which means that people use it to raise money and gain access to other 
resources. Table. 4.12 show that in Muleba and Missenyi, as in other African 
communities, the most common traditional arrangements used to access land 
includes: custodian contacts, inheritance and tenancy as pointed out in the Table 
4.12. 
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4.3.2.1 Custodian Contracts 
Custodian contract is a traditional arrangement involving absentee land owners who 
live in town and ask their dependants to guard their plantation/land in return, for their 
maintenance and protection. The guardian can farm the land between trees, collect 
fruits of food crops and cereals. During in-depth interview and FGDs held dissenting 
opinion on how guardian guard the land, the informants said: 
”custodian contracts or arrangements are particularly frequent in 
villages where much of land is still owned by absentee noble – families. 
The guardian can do weeding or farm the land between trees but not 
entitled to sell cash crop.  The right to cultivate can also be delegated by 
the guardian to a third party. Once the trees have grown so much that 
they shade the crops the guardian needs to move his plantation 
elsewhere”…..   
This arrangement is based on verbal or oral transaction.  There is no involvement of 
cash. Another type of   traditional arrangement is……  
“share-cropping which was formerly found in traditional food crop 
farming during the pre colonial period,   when the labourer worked in 
the morning for the farming owner and cultivated his own plot of land 
in the afternoon”…..  
These contracts now cover in particular banana or coffee, manioc farms. Responses 
from FGDs revealed that farmers say that they ….”prefer to take land through share-
cropping rather than other contracts since all extra efforts are reaped by the 
farmer”…. The owner of the share-cropped land also tends to monitor interference 
on how land is being farmed; this share-cropping system does not involve money. It 
is also based in verbal or oral agreement. 
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4.3.2.2 Loan of Land 
Another traditional arrangement is based on loan of land. Findings from interview 
with elderly male informants revealed that this….  
“Contract is made of the explicit understanding that the land owner 
can take back the land whenever they so wish. No cash passes hands 
and this arrangement is not written down”.  
 
In fact this loan of land type of traditional arrangement involves the temporary 
ceding of land with no explicit payment. The rights usually cover farming and 
collection of cereals, wood but not tree planting, now delegation of right to a third 
party. Some form of customary gift is usually made as a means of confirming of the 
claims of the land owner. Today, information from the study area, loans are   
increasingly rare.  In most cases, they have been transformed into share– cropping. 
The fee exacted is now assessed on a much more systematic basis, loans within the 
family are recognized but the relative may insist that they have acquired firm claim 
to the land. 
 
4.3.2.3 Traditional Institution Based on Inheritance 
 Traditional arrangement based on inheritance, is also providing procedure as to 
access land between kin, clan members among local inhabitants. This system is now 
loosing meaning since the colonial legacy on land has reduced the size of land 
ownership. During a FGD with informants they remarked that a substantial number 
of families no longer practice this. This is due to land scarcity. It was noted that a 
bigger of land was owned by the minority. One of the informants said: 
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The minorities who have substantial bigger portion of land were 
known by different names in different areas of Kagera region. For 
example in Muleba District they were referred to as “Omulangila” or 
“Omwami”. In Missenyi District they were referred to as 
“Omutwale”. 
 
4.3.2.4 Tenancy 
During a FGD with elder’s tenancy tenure arrangement was clarified. Tenancy was 
clearly described as a contract between the land owner or family members and tenant 
or the outsiders. Customary, tenancy was an agreement that intensified exploitative 
agreement or relations of patronage. When attempting to describe traditional tenure 
arrangements and their actual content, the conventional terms used the FGD – 
Members defined an arrangement as it follows here below: 
 
An arrangement to delegate tenure rights refers to an agreement between two parties, 
who have different but complimentary assets, including land. From an economic 
point of view, this is a form of Institutional arrangement, defined as a specific pattern 
of coordination between economic units. However, the economic logic of agrarian 
contract is usually deeply embedded in a web of social relationship and networks. 
Similarly, while coordination between contracting parties relates to factors, such as 
land and labour of course, other more specific elements may also come into play. 
 
A certain number of “Traditional” arrangements have the same rationale: an 
“Outsider” or “Tenant” requests land and the right to settle in a village. He enters 
into an alliance for example by marriage or as a client of a family head, who 
becomes his patron and offers him or negotiates for him, land to cultivate. In 
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acknowledgement, the “tenant” gives a few bundles of maize or millet from the 
harvest each year. For the land or village chief and even for the family head, it means 
fulfilling the duty of hospitality while at the same time extending hos patronage. This 
type of arrangement, which is more social than tenure based in the strict sense, is 
found in most areas of the study area. It creates relations of patronage between host 
and recipient which may then become relationship by marriage, marrying in – being 
a favored way of consolidating one’s position within the host lineage. 
 
This traditional Institution of Tenancy has however, changed considerably depending 
on national or local circumstances as a result of the changing demand for labour, 
growing monetization of dues owed to the guardian and the influence of national 
policy on development of rural areas eg, substantial flows of settlers – have opened 
up new areas, pioneer farming etc. 
 
4.3.2.5 Gift 
Traditional agreement of Gift of Land was between an indigenous inhabitant and 
migrants. Nearly two third of informants in FGD said in gift of land agreement 
migrants were obliged to offer labour services to their host as well as other forms of 
support, in recognition of the land owner’s prior claim to the land. In most cases 
migrant locally known as “abafuruki” from neighboring countries of Rwanda and 
Burundi used to provide cheap labour. In Haya tradition, anybody who did not speak 
their language was regarded as “nyamahanga” meaning a foreigner. These 
constituted most of the migrants. Gift of land between indigenous inhabitants and 
migrants have disappeared or have been transformed into “sales” migrants coming 
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prior to the 1960s could receive gift of land, in return for ritual gifts and small gifts 
in kind. 
 
4.3.2.6 The Formal Arrangement of Mortgage or Pledge of Land 
Findings from FGDs revealed Missenyi and Muleba the formal arrangement of 
mortgage or pledge of land was used in leasing out of land for an indeterminate 
period in return for cash loan. On probing further, it was confirmed that the land in 
this regard would only be returned when the cash sum is repaid. The land acts as 
guarantee for the loan while cultivation rights are as a form of interest payment on 
the capital sum granted. In times of crisis, many turn to pledge of land as means to 
raise money. Creditors include urban dwellers often  emigrants  from  villages;  
fishermen   seeking way to diversify their assets and activities. In case of cumulative 
fine total of loans given to the original land owner reaches sum equivalent to the 
value of the   land    and   the transaction become ineffective sale. 
 
The findings above illustrate how traditional arrangements worked and allowed 
people to negotiate conditions which suit their circumstances to gain access to land. 
This was stopped during the colonial government when legacy of land tenure system 
had indeed vested radical title to the head of state. This has directed the root cause of 
conflicts, disputes, difficulties on ownership of resources that are found on land to 
day. Owing to such circumstances, the general consensus in Tanzania is that the 
national land tenure system corresponds to the existing material conditions of the 
land users and the existing legal framework is out model, unworkable and full of 
contradictions in many areas (URT 1994). These conflicts are many and various 
depending on parties concerned. Claims they are asserting. Such conflicts are noticed 
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precisely when different land users were asked to identify the most problematic 
traditional arrangements; at this particular material time of neoliberal era. 
 
Respondents from FGDs in the study areas have shown on average that there were 
various forms of conflicts and difficulties in the operation of these traditional 
arrangements. The general trend of scores shows almost equal distribution of various 
ranks when equated to score (Table. 4.14). 
 
It was further reported from FGDs from all villages in the study area that conflicts 
associated with the various forms of traditional arrangements are many and diverse. 
There were few reported cases of conflicts/disputes that involved these delegated 
rights to land acquisition, definite loans of land had caused difficulties when original 
land owner returns and wishes to reclaim the plot.  
 
Table 4.13: FGD Scores on Institutional Arrangements Characterized by Land 
Conflicts in the Study Area 
 
Problematic 
Institutional 
arrangements 
Muleba District Missenyi District 
Karambi Village Luhija 
Village 
Mugango Village Bubale Village Kakunyu 
Village 
Scores Rank Scores Rank Scores Rank Scores Rank Scores Rank 
Institutionl of Tenancy  12 2 13 1 13 2 14 1 13 1 
Institutionof Custodian 12 2 11 2 11 3 13 2 10 2 
Institutional of share / 
copping  
13 1 9 3 14 1 11 3 7 3 
Institutional Mortgage/ 
people  
0 4 0 5 1 5 0 5 2 5 
Institution of loan of 
land  
1 3 4 4 2 4 6 4 5 4 
Key: F ---- Female   ,M--- Male, FGD----Means  Focus  Group  Discussions 
The difficult moments come up when disputes are taken to the family head or to the 
village – head and sometimes to district land  court officials and whereby the rare 
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cases of no solution being found then disputant finally goes to high court. All these 
instances may cause unnecessary inconveniences to the parties concerned. 
 
Findings from respondents showed that FGD– members reported of people when 
they take land back and throw the tenant of the land, either to sell the land or rent it 
to someone else for more money. In some cases, land has been sold to two different 
people by different members of the family. Land transactions rarely have formal 
legal status, since by law are not legal. Hence there are no certificates of occupancy 
or deeds of conveyance.  
 
Moreover, respondent’s members notified that a number of problems are expressed 
by parties, to these contracts. One tenants remarked on the tendency of some land 
owners to harass them to weed more intensively. They also noted incidences of theft 
by children of land owners. It was henceforth, concluded that these contracts lack 
transparency in various deductions made from their harvest to cover repayment of 
credit and other prior to receiving their shares. 
 
Furthermore, here had been a rising number of open conflicts between different 
stakeholders regarding access to and control over land. The youth are contesting the 
validity of transactions carried out by their elders and demanding that these 
agreements be revoked. They reproach their parents for having allowed too many 
people to come and settle plus selling of their land for personal gain. This has led to a 
loss of authority amongst elders, who are seen as having profited personally from 
land sales and rentals at the expense of the family inheritance. As argued by Lund, 
(2000), Kasanga and Kotey (2001), young men in Africa are now denying the 
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legitimacy of past transactions particular on the death of one of the parties, calling 
into question, those where there is no paper evidence and demanding additional 
payment and share in the land. As the result, the customary law, in many villages, 
from the study area, has imposed a ban on all sales and rental of land to strangers, 
this was observed by the researcher through participatory process. 
 
As pointed out by FGD, an access to other land resources for example: water, 
grazing land, firewood, thatching grass plus gardening of some annual crops, people 
are free to exploit those land resources provided they abide to the laid down 
regulations or by laws that govern the use of those land resources. Over and above 
the failure to comply leads to punishment and deprived of the right to exploit the 
commons (Cory 1945). In fact, Figure 4.14 shows that scores by FGD – members on 
most problematic arrangement, it is clear that today, in all arrangements, there are 
major changes that have formulated various difficulties for these traditional 
arrangements to play their former role of providing accepted procedure to gain 
access to land though in real terms these traditional arrangements are somehow 
dominant as compared to formal arrangements. Practically, some of these 
difficulties, accompanying these arrangements have created a situation of land tenure 
insecurity, this view point is highly clarified by Hollingsworth (1997) and Hudson 
(2004), where they argued that these traditional arrangements cannot be transferred 
to another society, for they are embedded into systems of production that is societal 
distinct. 
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4.3.3  Land Acquisition Methods 
Findings (Table. 4.14) show methods of land acquisition in the study area, The main 
method of acquiring land as pointed out by 42.4% of the respondents was through 
inheritance mostly of customary lands; followed by buying land or hiring (30.3%), 
that was the case of Muleba district. On the other land Missenyi farmers mostly 
acquired land through inheritance (37.3%) then followed by buying land hiring land 
by (61.2%). 
 
The key informants reported that immigrants farmers  from  nearby  districts  moved  
into  these  districts  in  search  of  land  for  cultivation. The immigrants mainly 
acquired land through buying or through hiring village land from village government 
leaders while some of the pastoralists were illegally accommodated in the area. 
These illegal immigrants’ pastoralists were somehow given opportunity in Kakunyu 
village in Missenyi district and   in Rutoro and Karambi villages in Muleba district. 
Other immigrants into the area were the pastoralists from the neighbouring countries 
of Rwanda and Uganda.  The key informants reported that the immigrants 
pastoralists were hiring village land from village government leaders. While some of 
the pastoralists were illegally accommodated in the area.  During time of this study 
the illegal immigrants and pastoralists were being forcibly evicted by the police 
officers.     
 
Table 4.14: Methods of Land Acquisition in the Study Area as Revealed by FGD 
Techniques to 
achieve tenure 
security 
Muleba District Missenyi District 
Karambi 
village 
Luhija village Mugango 
Village 
Bubale 
Village 
Kakunyu 
Village 
Scores Ranks Scores Rank
s 
Scores Rank
s 
Scores Rank
s 
Scores Rank
s 
By means of 
witnesses 
16 1 15 1 13 2 12 2 14 2 
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By means of 
written 
document  
13 2 14 2 15 1 14 1 16 1 
Through social 
relations 
between parties  
12 3 13 3 12 3 8 4 9 3 
Through 
consolidation of 
status  
10 4 12 3 11 4 10 3 8 4 
Key:  F –  Female ,.M--- Male ,  FGD--.Means   Focus-Group  Discussions 
Few villages were established during the Ujamaa village operation of late 1960s. In 
such villages  their  village- governments had mandate  to allocate land, however, 
only a mere 1.5% of the respondents were allocated land during villagisation 
operation in Missenyi and (27.3%) of respondents were allocated land during 
villagization operation in Muleba district. The results imply that the customary land 
tenure- system is predominant in the study area. Again where as the law prohibits the 
sale of land but in practice the land market is well established in the area. 
 
A customary land right is common in Muleba and Mussenyi where it is widely 
acceptable as the legitimate one. This echoes the position taken by Bruce and Migot-
Adholla (1994) who demonstrate that customary land rights are secure and 
acceptable in Africa as the legal ones.  Similarly, Burns and Mainzen-Dick (2000) 
noted that traditional land rights are equally powerful. The findings are in line with 
those of Benajaminsen and Lund (2003) who argue that a substantial proportions of 
the population in Africa hold land under customary arrangements..  
 
4.3.4  Legitimacy and Efficiency of Traditional Institutions 
On modalities of legitimacy and efficiency of derived rights emanating from 
traditional arrangements, Bubale Village Chairman said that: 
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”people with unequal access to production factors seek to negotiate a 
deal from which both hope to benefit, they are quantitatively significant 
and sometimes even   predominant. They have co- existed with and helped 
to generate dramatic rises in cash crop production (e.g., groundnuts, 
coffee etc.). Arrangements   take many different forms, depending on 
context, but fit into some broad categories which can be identified”.  
Dissociation of rights to trees and to land and the social relations between parties that 
accompany such arrangements are crucial aspects.  Apart from land and labor, the 
arrangements can bring various other scarce factors into play such as food, technical 
know-how, equipment and credit.  The range of arrangements and other detailed 
clauses are closely linked to local circumstances.  
 
The chairman stressed that:  
 ……”derived  rights  are  evolving,  thus  these  new  arrangements  
develop  in  response  to  emerging  local  opportunities  often  more  
monetarized.  They remain strongly dependent on social ties from the  
study  villages  called (Emiteko)” . 
 
These associations looked like armorphous, temporary and difficult to appreciate, 
they did not have written constitution or registration numbers, but they elected 
committees, which were rather abstract.  Basically, these associations had powerful 
rules of the game that were operating accordingly.  Unlike the formal associations 
that may be rigid and difficult to enter into or exist but local associations are flexible 
and dynamic.  One can join or quit association at his/her convenience.  One common 
feature of local informal associations in Muleba and Missenyi were influencial, 
powerful and attractive to communities most people identified with them than formal 
associations.  
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It was also reported of the major features of these local associations as being 
rotational labor based associations in the village.  They were class-based groups that 
managed their land resources and they were income-generating groups, which 
produce (local brew) to raise money for group  -members.  Finally, these groups 
enhanced work relationship in entire community.  
 
 Apart  from  the  above  practical  case  of  local  associations,  the  chairman  went  
on describing the range of delegated rights emanating from: “traditional  
arrangements  that   enable  efficient  adjustment  between  different  parties,  given  
their  unequal  access  to  land,  labor  and  capital  technical  economic  capacity  
,integration  within  commercial  networks”  etc.,  in  a  context  where  market  are  
imperfect  or  non-existent  and  there  is  a  risk  of  opportunistic  behavior  (as  well  
as  production  related  risk).   
 
Their impact on equity is more variable and cannot be analysed out of context.  
Generally speaking, systems of delegating rights from traditional arrangements do 
not involve a scenario in which a (large land owner), grants use rights to 
economically disadvantaged groups.  It often happens that the beneficiaries of use 
rights are in a better position that the small customary (owners) who have granted 
them such rights.  It is mainly in capital intensive cropping system that delegated 
rights may favour large farms.  The impact on equity depends as much on the prior 
distribution of resources and local balance of power than on the contracts 
themselves.  The same type of contract may in different context, have the opposite 
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effect.  Finally the degree of insecurity tenure involved in derived rights 
arrangements is also quite variable strongly context specific.  Overall, derived rights 
arrangements do not appear to be particularly insecure, for arrangements are based 
on the quality of that relationship.       
 
Summarily, from a more theoretical point of view, it is quite clear that system of 
delegation rights from traditional arrangements are not only becoming more 
monetarized but also are being seen more and more as bilateral contractual 
arrangements, requiring the use of witnesses and increasingly written contracts. 
Although the provisions underpinning to local contracts and framework of derived 
rights... arrangements do not come under official legislation, legal rules and 
institutional judicial environment. In general, there has been a growing influence in 
terms of negotiation and implementation of agreements. Finally, while it may be that 
the contractual diversion, in clarifying the   clauses of derived rights arrangements, 
contributes towards equity in the conclusion and implementation of Contracts.  This 
in no way prevents dominant parties from exploiting the balance of power in their 
favor. 
 
4.3.5  Occurrence of Land use Conflicts 
Findings in Table 4.15 show that most respondents (97%) acknowledged the 
existence of land use conflicts in the study area. Highest incidences of conflicts were 
reported both in Missenyi (98.5%) then followed by Muleba (95.0%). The key 
informants in Missenyi reported that pastoralists from Uganda were colluding with 
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some residents in the border villages of Mugango, Bubale   to graze their livestock in 
village-land at night.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
Table 4.15: Responses Distribution on Occurrence of Land use Conflicts 
 
Existence of Land 
use Disputes 
Number of Respondents  
Total 
Muleba district 
(n=66) 
Missenyi district 
(n=67) 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Yes 63 95.5 66 98.5 129 97.0 
No 3 4.5 1 1.5 4 3.0 
Total 66 100 67 100 133 100 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
The type   of   land   use   conflicts that were identified through FGD were as 
follows:- 
(i) Farmers against   pastoralists’   conflicts. 
(ii) Farmers against   farmers’     conflicts. 
(iii) Farmers against   investors’     conflicts. 
(iv) Farmers against state conflicts. 
 
During Key Informant Interview with village chairman at Rutoro village: 
“it was reported that Kagoma ranch in Muleba district, farmers 
against pastoralists conflicts had been ranging on since 2005 up to 
date”.  
 
In this case, pastoralists owning large herds of cattle from Karagwe District, were 
sub-leased part of Rutoro village by Kagoma national ranch. Previously, Kagoma 
ranch had expropriated the Rutoro village –land into the ranch’ surveyed area and 
sub – divided into eighteen cattle rearing blocks. These blocks have since been hired 
to rich pastoralists from Karagwe who came into the area as investors. 
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Again during interview with the Rutoro village chairman and village government 
officials it was reported that:  
….”the indigenous people in Rutoro village were left to suffer, where by 
their coffee – plots and banana plots plus cereal crops had been 
destroyed by large herds of cattle. Their houses   had  been  destroyed  
by  the  new  investors,  who  claimed  to  clear  the  grazing area and 
setting the boundaries of their hired blocks”.  (Appendix A-6 Rutoro: 
Effects of land use conflicts). 
 
The dispute over ownership of Rutoro village land has been shrouded in doubts, as 
the Bukoba District Land Court failed to file up the Rutoro village case against 
Kagoma ranch.  Rutoro village was not surveyed; whereas Kagoma ranch had been 
surveyed. This is despite the fact that Rutoro village is a registered village 
established during settlement schemes of 1970s but it was not surveyed; the Rutoro 
village does not posses certificate of land occupancy.  The Land Court at Bukoba 
argued that   the Kagoma ranch had undisputed right to act in a way they did.  The 
Court explained the centrality of this case and the resident magistrate ruled in favour 
of the ranch.  
 
The second nature of conflict reported during FGD (between August 2010 and 
September 2011), involved mostly the village government officials who were selling 
off village land to individuals without following the laid down procedures as 
stipulated in the land law. A point in case includes village government – officials at 
Karambi (Muleba district) Bubale and Kakunyu villages (Missenyi district). This 
practice has created serious land shortage in respective villages. Through such 
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corruptive means, rich people have acquired large portions of land in Missenyi 
district due to their political influence or connections.  
 
Lastly the key informant from Luhija village in Muleba district reported incidence of 
verbal and physical confrontations between the Luhija villagers and a Greek white 
farmer who attempted practically to include the Luhija village land into his surveyed 
farm area as opposed to his actual certificate of title to leasehold land according to 
the registry ordinance 1923 – 1926 (See Appendix A-5). Findings from interview 
with key informants show that rich people, in most cases, were protected from 
prosecution by government officials at district land court level. 
 
The   above scenario of land use conflicts in the study area could be referred to what 
Mc Michael (2008) has argued that logically the land users have created their own 
records in different forms.  This is because of nationl resources use, such as land, Mc 
Michael stressed that resource-users mobilized in any form precisely to act as to 
determine the direction of the process of circumstances. During interviews with 
village study- chairmen of Muleba and Missenyi; it was reported that there were 
operational local mechanism to resolve land use conflicts. Meanwhile the focus 
group discussions (FGD) in Karambi Luhija Bubale Bugango and Kakunyu villages 
participants referred to informal negotiations   mediated by local leaders that 
appeared to   be the most affective method to resolve land use conflicts.  Infact to 
some extent informal negotiations were fair and produced desired results that were   
lebelled   with goodness and justice, Lei (2007).  
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However, to date such   customary agreements have been eroded and somehow    
undermined because of the superimposed land policies of the peasant economy 
system on the traditional economy system.  Thus, that is why most of the people are 
increasingly resorting to the informal procedure.  Moreover, there is lack of coherent 
institutional mechanism to support customary arrangements due to the absence of 
traditional chiefs; a system abolished by independent national government by 1962. 
These chiefs could be used to oversee the customary institutions. Furthermore, some 
of the customary laws are gender biased in favour of males.  In some instances, these 
provisions have been misinterpreted. 
 
During interviews with key informants and   officials from the village tribunal, Ward 
tribunal and district land court – leaders, it was reported: 
….” that both village tribunal and Ward tribunals are being confronted 
by two set- backs mainly by poor working conditions and constraints of 
resources. They are also lacking the legal professionals” 
The office life span in these tribunals is also three years hence the issue of 
trainability appears to be a problem. Furthermore, the tribunal officials do not have 
specific allowances and they don’t have official salaries either, though they deal with 
crucial and sensitive issues of land. 
In principle all village tribunal and ward tribunals were controlled by local 
government while district land and housing courts are controlled by the Ministry of 
Constitution and Judiciary As there is no clear line of demarcation such agreements 
may give rise to conflicts of interest. Over and above, it was reported that all 
tribunals were facing poor administration under district level governments.  They  
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complained that  they  were  marginalized  by  local  government  which  has  denied  
them  official allowances or salaries.  Hence, most of them failed to meet their basic 
needs because they spent a lot of time in unpaid labour activities, which have a 
negative effect on their job performance.  
It was reported   that their knowledge on land law was limited, over   this; they 
argued that they needed extra skills related to land law in order to operate as 
specialist. They deliberate that their poor knowledge of land law makes them face 
hard time in trying to work on resolving land disputes. They stated clearly that they 
had at times been challenged by their clients. Infact, these officials from the village 
and ward tribunals reported of shortage of working tools such as paper, pens files 
office gadgets to keep case files safely.  
Thus, the implications of all these short- comings had impaired their working 
efficiency. Henceforth, their performance in discharging their mandatory duties was 
doubtful and justice over land matters had failed in a practical sense. Finally, the key 
informants from the study villages reported on allegations of corruption in both 
village tribunals and ward tribunals. 
 
4.4 Strategies for Strengthening Formal Institutions in the Administration of 
Land Resource 
Findings from Figure 4.1 show that the majority (81.3%) of the respondent preferred 
sufficiently resourced tribunals that are provided with office equipments, provision 
of the official allowances or incentives; sound not temporary offices. On the other 
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hand a substantial number of respondents (14.4) percent preferred to introduce 
training on the mechanism for non judicial resolution as a practical strategy lastly a 
fairly moderate number of respondents (4.3%) suggested for a strategy of 
strengthening tribunals namely the village and ward tribunals and sometime district 
land court.  
 
Figure 4.1: Strategies used to Strengthen Existing Formal Institutions in the 
Administration of Land Resource in the Study Area 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
All these instances have suffered from almost the some problems linked to poor 
administration as we have already mentioned. A total of these facts deprive these 
tribunals the possibilities of providing access to dispute resolution mechanism as 
well as   transparent dispute resolution. 
 
It is high time now to accept Johnson’s (2005) suggestion that equitable and 
transparent land use disputes resolution mechanism should be linked with tribunals 
as well as court system to provide access to justice. In processing a mechanism for 
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sustainable frame work to manage the agrarian system in the study area an 
elaboration is organized in the following section. This section deals with evolution of 
arrangements. In order to find out whether or not there are any changes in these 
customary arrangements; the key informants particularly the village chairmen of the 
study area and the focus group discussions members were asked to indicate the 
sustainable features of evolution related to the institutions in their respective villages.  
The aim was to closely explore whether or not there is a significant relationship 
between these changes and possibility of pushing for any legal coherent approach 
aspiring at preparing the base for formulating appropriate and practical    
arrangements or official procedure to guide these institutions.    
 
4.5  Features Linked to the Evolution of Customary Institutions in the Land 
Resource Management 
The penetration of capital that led to rising land value as marketable asset ranks first 
in both disticts of Muleba and Missenyi. The issues of commoditization of labour 
power rank –second in Muleba as well as in Missenyi district. Finally monetization 
of exchange rank third in both districts (Table. 4.16). 
Penetration of capital: - involves a lot of aspects but one key-informant defined it as 
to mean – integration of capitalist mode of production with traditional system of 
production. He described capitalist production as a social mode of production. He 
described capitalist mode of production as a social mode of production of material 
benefit, based on private capitalist ownership of the means of production and it is 
based on the exploitation of wage labor. Practically this key-informant, clarified this 
capitalist mode as a social mode of production under which the process of production 
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is subordinated to capital. For example “this production process of capitalist mode is 
found on the relationship between capital and hired labor”. This capitalist mode of 
production replaced the traditional mode of production/ pre-capitalist modes of 
production. 
 
Table 4.16: Features Linked to the Evolution of Customary Institutions in the 
Land Resource Management as Given by FGD 
Features of 
evolution 
linked 
informal 
institutions 
Muleba District Missenyi 
 
Karambi 
 
Luhija 
 
 
 
Bubala 
 
Bugongo 
 
Kakunyu 
Score 
(20) 
  Ranks  Scores 
(20) 
  Ranks Scores 
 
 Ranks Score 
(20) 
  Ranks Scores 
(20) 
Ranks Score 
(20) 
 Rank 
Rising land 
values  
16 1 14 2   18 1 18 1 14 1 
Control over 
land 
12 3 10 3   14 3 14 2 12 2 
Land 
marketable 
asset   
14 2 13 1   16 2 12 3 11 3 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
Key: F----- female;  M---- Male, FGD------Means  Focus  Group  Discussions 
Under capitalism, this society was divided in two main antagonistic classes:  The 
class of capitalists or owners of the means of production, who exploit the working 
people and a class of proletarians who are deprived of the means of production and 
mass of livelihood and are therefore compelled to constantly sell their labor to the 
capitalists. The main economic target of the capitalist mode of production is the 
creation of the surplus value; compared to previous modes of production (primitive; 
communal slave owning and feudal). The key informant, elaborated more of 
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capitalist mode as being more progressive since it ensured the higher level of 
development for society’s productive forces, radically raised the productivity of 
social labor, completed the socialization of production and labor on a huge scale; 
sharply increased the volume of production.  
 
Finally her basic contradiction of capitalism is giving a social character to production 
but results of labor are appropriated by the capitalists per se. This is seen in the 
anarchy of production and the lagging of the society’s effective demand behind 
expanding production; an outcome is also seen along destructive periodic economic 
crises. All the capitalists’ aspirations/ inclinations are acquired by these capitalists 
per se, because of employing force, regulations, rules spearheaded by their 
hegemonies and constitutions aiming at exploiting different states in terms of their 
national, natural resources. 
 
The term monetization of exchange or introduction of medium of exchange has been 
elaborated by one key informant from the focus group discussions from kakunyu 
village, Missenyi district – on 15th October 2010, that monetizing of exchange/ 
medium of exchange was nothing but monetary control looked upon, as a specific 
form, dictated by the existence of commodity money relations, just established as an 
official universal medium of exchange; as differentiated from rent in kind. This 
monetary control has helped the carrying out activities of capitalist-enterprises 
working on the principle of cost accounting. It is implemented, above all, through a 
plan that established the expenses to incomes ratio for the enterprise. Besides, subject 
to control are also labor and means of production-inputs, implementation of plan for 
volume and variety of output-sold and profitability; the ratio between the social 
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values of the products; their production costs and the money to be transferred into 
enterprise.  
 
Eg; economic incentives funds, the correspondence between the financial state and 
the course of plan implementation. It was also argued by that key informant that 
consequently, the collectives of enterprises are encouraged to do better in serving the 
interests of all the people by manufacturing products, society needs, to maintain the 
aspired socially-necessary labor-inputs and work for their reduction and increase the 
productivity of social labor. Bank and financial bodies also employ monetary 
controls in collecting payment, granting short and long term loans, allocating funds 
for capital investment. 
 
Lastly the bank allows enterprises exercise mutual monetary control in the 
framework of economic agreements with suppliers of materials and buyers of output. 
Financial penalties such as fines, forfeits are applied for failure to honor agreement 
obligations. Then monetary control is a major tool for consolidating cost-accounting. 
The term commoditization of labor power, has been as deliberated here below in the 
following manner: Basically, the key informant from the ministry’s department from 
the district level at Muleba Township managed to define the above mentioned term: 
He defined by giving clarification of the term by applying particular words involved. 
Labour power was clarified as the “individual’s ability to work, the totality of the 
individuals physical and spiritual abilities used in “material production”.   
 
The labour power is the basic motive of production in any society. In the production 
process, man develops his production experience and working habit as well as 
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influence the environment. In antagonistic class societies, the workers are deprived 
of means of production and exploited. The forms of exploitation depends on the 
prevailing form of ownership under capitalism, labor power becomes “a 
Commodity”.  
 
The necessary conditions for the labor power becoming a commodity are: (i) 
Personal freedom to use one’s labor power 2 Not owning any means production, as a 
result of which the worker must sell his ability to work or obtain the means of 
substance like any commodity, labour power under capitalism has a value and a use 
value. The use value of the labour power as a commodity is the ability of the worker 
to create in course of labor a value greater than its own, or surplus value, which is the 
principal objective of the capitalist who sees in this the sole point of purchasing and 
consuming labour power. The value of labour power is a sum of the means of 
subsistence to maintain the normal labour productivity of its possessor, the up keep 
of the workers family and the cost of satisfying the worker’s cultural needs such as 
education and the acquisition of working skills. 
 
This informant mentioned categorically the general characteristics of labour power 
that varies with development of society because the level of requirements, the means 
needed by the worker and his family and the cost of these means change. The value 
of labour power varies significantly from country to country since it depends on the 
level of economic development and the natural and climatic conditions. 
 
As production develops the level of the worker’s requirement and the value of labour 
power tend to rise eg. Clarified by the level of higher consumption standards). The 
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price of labour power tends to deviate below the cost of labour power, which is 
explained primary by the availability of an army of the unemployed which depresses 
the labour market. This can be proved by status of wages under capitalism. 
 
The capitalists try to reduce the material and cultural needs of the workers to the 
minimum. However this key – informant – added that the struggles of the working 
class is a factor which counters this trend, especially in the presence of the world 
socialist system, when workers are winning important concessions from the 
capitalists, including higher wages. 
 
In socialist society labour power is not a commodity, because the means of 
production are public owned, the working people are masters of all the wealth. 
Relations between individual workers and the socialist state and cooperatives are 
aimed at the planned and balanced use of labour resources in the interest of all 
members of the society. Socialist production relations create the potential for the 
comprehensive evolution of the physical and spiritual powers of the working people 
and the continuous improvement of their cultural, professional and material 
standards.   
 
The implication of these findings denote that there has been a marked decline in trust  
in  some traditional arrangements such as loan of land due to rising importance of 
land rent; lease and share cropping increasing. These were also difficult in gaining 
access to necessary credit, as well as inputs.  This also implies that people are 
choosing to let out their land rather than use it themselves. It was reported by both 
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key-informants namely the village-chairmen from the study-area that the outcome of 
this: 
 “evolution of customary arrangements  resulted  into  the   creating 
new  conditions  that necessitated the formulation certain economic 
activities which practically  engaged  the  majority  of  the  farmers  in 
the study  area” .  
 
On account of such occurrences, the life style changed   although the    land was 
basically subjected to colonial land administration and tightly changed that 
traditional economy system by controlling land along colonial land laws.  The 
essence of tightly controlled land administration; the key informants (village-
chairmen) clarified that, by saying that the colonial land administration just 
introduced extra measures to control these landusers such as: Introduction of medium 
exchange, introduction of colonial rules related to land and other, regulations. Land 
turned to be a scarce commodity. Big portions of land were now left in the hands of 
the minority and the majority was left with much smaller parcels of land.  
 
Furthermore, the key-informants remarked that such instances have been the reasons 
behind land crisis from the study area. This state of affairs has initiated occurrence of 
limited pieces of land that were somehow utilized by young men in various 
development projects like: tomato-business, onions growing business, brew- making 
business. Finally the key –informants informed by providing an example of these 
progressive opportunities that necessitated for the formation of associations to guide 
those economic activities over scarce pieces of land. These associations were locally 
known as “EMITEKO” in the language of farmers from the study area. Data on 
Table 4.17 shows further probing by land users (farmers) as reported by respondents 
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on the issue of evolution of customary arrangements by proposing a sustainable 
institutional framework. That being the case, Table 4.17 shows that most of the 
respondents (42.5%) suggest that a sustainable institutional frame work could be 
possible in  case,  there  is  an  improvement  of  an   ability  to  capitalize  on   and 
support development of our rural communities in terms of rights related to the use of 
land resources which should be clearly defined and enforced under statutory and 
customary law. 
 
Findings from Table 4.17 show that 4.5% of the respondents indicate that most of the 
respondents suggest that a sustainable institutional framework could be possible in 
case there is an improvement of an ability to capitalize and support development of 
rural communities in terms of rights related to the use of land resources, which 
should be clearly defined and enforced under statutory an customary law. Similarly a 
moderate number of respondents (37.3%) were of the opinion that insurance of 
capitalization on land market and sustainable development practices by making sure 
that legal system provides for fair, equitable efficient transparent trading in land use 
right could create a sustainable use of resources and which might built up a 
sustainable institutional frame work. 
 
Equally important, just a small number of respondents (13.6%) proposed enactment 
of a law in the parliament which might upgrade the status of land tenure so as to 
provide a basis for efficient registration, exchange and trade of resources 
development and other tradable land, land use rights 
Table 4.17: Opinions a Sustainable Institutional Framework 
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Opinions 
 
Number of respondents  (133) 
Muleba district  Missenyi  Distict  Total  
 Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Improvement 
communities tenure 
security 
28 42.5 29 43.3 57 85.8 
Ensure efficient land 
market 
18 27.3 29 43.2 47 35.6 
Upgrade status of 
land tenure 
9 13.6 6 9.0 15 11.9 
Enhance local land 
despute resolution 
and restructure 
10 15.1 3 4.5 13.0 6.8 
Total 66 100 66 100 133 100 
Source: Field Results (2010) 
 
An almost similar number respondent (10.6%) was for improvement of efficient 
community administration and judicial mechanism to resolve land disputes. Finally  
(15.1%)of respondents stressed that improvement of land administration mechanism 
so that there is transparent and clear service standards which might control other 
factors such as time and quality for key processes. The data on table 4.19 has shown 
basic issues in the creation of sustainable institutional framework. However the 
reality should be understood that all four factors outlined are significant for the 
useful institutional framework that has been proposed.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The study conclusions arise from   the implications of study findings and analyses 
conducted on various elements in chapters 1 to 4. Also the conclusion was drawn in 
respect to the study specific objectives.  
 
5.1.1 The Implications from Farm Holdings Characteristics  
The study findings show that all respondents were rural based and owned land 
whilethe production system is predominantly agrarian. One of the main setbacks 
among farmers in the study area is serious land scarcity.  Whereby the majority of 
respondents own below one acre of land.  This imply unsustainable land parceling 
which is probably ows to high population increase and non-equitable land 
distribution, Customary tenurial system is predominant in the study area where it is 
widely acceptable as legitimate, in both Muleba district is  one  of  the oldest  district 
in  the region  and Missenyi district which is    newly established and sparsely 
populated. 
 
5.1.2  Implications on Existing Land Tenure System and Evolving Land 
Tenure Institutions 
The institutions that influence access to land in the study area, are changing as lamd 
is increasingly viewed as a commodity. The study found that land is a commodity 
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whose value is determined by the market dimensions. Land is now owned by 
individuals on private basis. 
There were institutional evolutions whereby the traditional clan; family heads who 
were traditionally responsible for the management and maintenance of land resources 
were getting dysfunction. The study also established that the evolution Process of 
land use resources arrangement is an outcome of nothing but manipulation of the 
peasant economy system, which has been superimposed on the traditional natural 
economy system.  
 
However, the rules and regulations changed not only to facilitate land use allocation 
and distribution, but also restrictive land use principle were established ;over and 
above, the study demonstrated that implemented formal land laws and regulations 
stood stead in stark contrast to the socially embedded traditional arrangements 
relating to traditional beliefs and normative ideas about the right system for land 
management and use.  
 
The study has shown how land users in the study area are trusting more traditional 
mechanism in resolving land use disputes rather than the formal land use dispute 
resolutions, furthermore, the study revealed that farmers are not passive recipient of 
the government’ designed rules.  They are active in assessing the formal rules or 
regulations in the way that they either adapted or contested or remolded them based 
on their experiences and skill to suit their local setting and conditions A clear case 
from the study is the traditional, social net- working or (neighborhood farm group 
and self help groups, which still prevail and remains a strong domestic norm often 
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operating alongside the formal organizational utilities at the community level. A   
particular name given to those neighbor hood labour-groups were referred to  as 
“EMITEKO”. The neighbor hood labour- group is embedded, multipurpose 
organizations that combine production and social functions. Members in the group 
not only cooperate in farm activities but also join together helping each other in 
times of sickness and for traditional ceremonies and functions. Once key- informants 
from the study are explained how the neighborhood farm group helped him in the 
building of   his house when heavy rains plus wind pulled down the roof of his house 
 
5.1.3  Factors Driving Changes on Traditional Institutions for Administering 
Land Resources 
The findings from the study show that land tenure institutions have changed over 
time and space. There was a significant or tangible relationship between traditional 
institutions changes and production systems. Earlier on, traditional arrangements 
were seen from the level of family, clan and villages. These traditional arrangements 
controlled land user resources basic needs. At present land had turned into a 
commodity as expressed by commoditization process and there increasing land 
scarcity where Land resources was increasingly accessed through sales.  
 
 The trend of the political situation also changed very substantially by bringing up 
major shift in   the land   rights where intruders, migrants businessmen, merchants 
were able to secure their claims to land. This situation had to increasing land use 
conflicts betwee the rich immigrants ho had bought the traditional village lands.  
 
 
 
 
 
    
161 
5.1.4 The Implication on the Strength of Existing Institutions for Management 
of Land Resources  
The study findings on land use conflicts resolution showed that informal institutions 
were performing more effectively. Furthermore the local communities in the study 
villages have artist on the local institutions and cultural ethics for resolving conflicts 
despite of erosion by introduced formal institutions.   
 
5.2 Recommendations 
Based on n study results and and conclusion above, the following are study 
recommendations 
(i) Sustenance of land resources depends on the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
policies and regulations of land allocation, utilization and management. It is 
therefore necessary to introduce holistic land use- policies that are inclusive and 
sensitive to the needs of more vulnerable groups in a particular locality. It is 
recommended that the policy interventions in in rural area should ensure both 
social economic and ecological sustainability in both agricultural and pastoral 
systems 
(ii) The policy makers when formulating new land policies ought to take into account 
the local institutions and norms that have positive impact on harmonizing land 
use allocation and distribution, at the grass root level. These could be 
accommodated into new land laws and the related regulations.  
(iii) The local government authorizes ought to find ways to incorporate the local 
mechanisms for settlement of land use conflicts and disputes/ The local 
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mechanisms are widely accepted by local communities and are considered to be 
nore effective at local level.   
 
(iv) We recommend that the government should engage seriously in policy dialogues 
and processes with stakeholders through public debates, differences could be 
realized in local policies and practices taking into consideration issues common 
people.  
 
5.3   Recommendetion for Further Research  
The research on the extent and nature of agrarian systems, need to be conducted 
especially in areas where the phenomena of “land use related conflicts/ disputes of 
laws was found to exist “ can be appropriate area for a research action. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1a (Footnotes) 
|*v 
“Irungu”:- is a name in Haya language referring to public land is unoccupied. The 
acquisition of this land is acquired by paying the fee amounting to sh 5/=, (pg 20)  
“Kisi”:- is name in Haya language, given to identify arable land. This piece of land is 
acquired only on payment of sh 5/=, to the native authority (pg. 20) 
“Muhikya” is a name given to person who collects information about the newcomer 
who wants to acquire land through payment of sh 5/= as her fee (pg. 20) 
“Mwami” is a name given to sub-chief who was normally approving whoever wants 
to buy any pieces of arable from the village. 
“Mkungu” is name Haya language referring to Ward-leader. (pg. 20) 
“Gombolola” is name in Haya language referring to mean the primary court (pg. 20) 
“Mwate” is name in Haya language, / 
\*r-vgiven to pieces of land, which is normally acquired by anybody after being 
allocated from the chief on payment to Native Authority of sh 5/= (pg., 22)     
Kikamba is a name in Haya language, referring, to pieces land, which   had been 
under perennical crop but it has allowed going back to grass (pg.22) 
“Nyarubanja” is a name in Haya language, referring to is given to a group of 
plantations, owned by one individual/land lord who is known as “mtwazi”. The 
tenant is known as “Mtwarwa”. (Nyarubanja-Tenure)  (pg. 22) 
“Kibanja kio ruganda” is a name in Haya language, referring to plantation under 
family tenure it is always acquired by inheritance only. (Family Tenure) 
“Rweya Rwaluganda” This is a name in Haya language given to open land owned by 
the community under the clan, where people do plant seasonal crops (pg 22) 
(communal tenure) 
“Kibira kya Nanka”:- This is a name in Haya language, referring to clan owned 
forest.  
“Biteme”:- This is a name in Haya language referring to a squatter. 
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“Nzike” : This is a name in Haya language referring to forced labor  by  the chiefs 
subjects. 
“Emiteko” This is a name in Haya language referring to the neighborhood labor-
group which is embedded, multipurpose organizations that combine production and 
social function. (pg 145) 
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HOUSE HOLLD SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE ON INSTITUTIONS FOR 
MANAGEMENT OF THE AGRARIAN SYSTEM 
 
SECTION 1: Questions Clarifying Land Uses and Farm Holding Characteristics in 
the Study Area 
 
1. Do you practice agriculture? 
a) Yes     ( ) 
b) No    ( ) 
 
2. If yes, what type of the system do you use? Tick against your choice(s)  
a) Large scale farming     ( ) 
b) Traditional small-holder – farm   ( ) 
c) External modified irrigation system    ( ) 
d) Large small holder irrigation scheme  ( ) 
e) Others (please mention)    ( ) 
 
3. How big is your farm/cultivated area?  
a) 1 – 3 acres         ( )  
b) 4 – 9 acres         (  )  
c) 10 – 2- acres         ( )  
d) 21 – 30 acres         ( )  
 
4. What crops did you grow in wet/dry season?  
a) Maize and bowman trees   ( ) 
b) Beans and cassava    ( ) 
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c) Millet and sorghum    ( ) 
d) Sweet potatoes    ( ) 
e) Others specify    ( ) 
5. How much did you harvest?  
a) 1 – 5 bags     ( ) 
b) 6 – 10 bags     ( )  
c) 11 – 20 bags    (  )  
d) 20 and above     ( )  
 
6. If you have a bumper harvest, what factors were conducive for you?  
a) Good rains/good weather     ( ) 
b) Availability of conducive lands    ( ) 
c) Uninterrupted season’s by animals in Formal lands  ( ) 
d) Other than those above factors (specify)   ( )  
 
7. Do you keep livestock?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   (  )  
 
8. If yes, how many cattle did you have some 5 years?  
a) 1 – 5     ( )  
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b) 6 – 15     ( )  
c) 16 – 30    (  )  
d) 30 – 50    (  )  
e) 51 and above    (  )  
f) Other issues (please specify)  (  )  
 
 
9. How many cattle do you have now?  
a) 1 – 5     (  )  
b) 6 – 15     ( )  
c) 16 – 30   (  )  
d) 31 – 50    ( )  
e) 51 and above    (  )  
 
10. How many cows were born this year?  
a) 1 – 5     ( )  
b) 6 – 15    (  )  
c) 16 – 30   ( )  
d) 30 – 50    (  )  
e) 31 and above    ( )  
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11. How many cattle were sold two years back?  
a) 1 – 5     ( )  
b) 6 – 15     (  )  
c) 16 – 30    (  )  
d) 30 – 50    (  )  
e) 31 and above    (  )  
 
12. Do you sell your cattle regularly?  
a) Yes    (  )  
b) No     (  )  
 
13. If yes, what are the circumstances of decreasing the number of your cattle?  
a) Limited grazing area         ( ) 
b) Harsh village by laws        ( ) 
c) Economic demand         ( ) 
 
14. How much money did you get from selling cattle this year?  
a) 10,000 – 50,000         ( ) 
b) 51,000 – 100,000         ( )  
c) 100,000 – 200,000        ( )  
d) 200,000 and above         ( ) 
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15. Are you comfortable with the cattle rearing?  
a) Yes          ( )  
b) No           ( )  
If, No, please explain why?
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SECTION I: QUESTIONS ON LAND TENURE SYSTEM AND 
                           LAND USES IN THE STUDY AREA 
 
1. What is the source of the domestic land use?  
a) Traditional land         ( )  
b) Hired Land          ( )  
c) Bought land          ( )  
 
2. Are these problems experienced when you utilize traditional land?  
a) Yes           ( ) 
b) No           ( ) 
 
3. If yes, what are the causes of those problems?  
a) Limited land          ( )  
b) Abundant land         ( )  
c) Sharing of the products to classmen       ( )  
d) Disturbed by animals / border crisis       ( )  
 
4. Are there problems experienced when you utilize the hired land?  
a) Yes           ( )  
b) No           ( )  
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5. If yes, what are the sources of problems experienced when you utilize the 
hired land?  
a) Limited maximization        (  )  
b) Limited land          ( ) 
c) Unfriendly behavior of land owners       ( ) 
d) Disturbed by animals        ( ) 
 
6. Are there problems experienced when you utilize the bought land?  
a) Yes           ( ) 
b) No           ( )  
 
7. If yes, what are types of problems encountered when you utilize the bought 
land?  
a) Limited land for farms        ( ) 
b) Border /boundary crisis with neighbors ( ) 
c) Disturbed by animals         ( ) 
 
8. What is the source of land for brick making?  
a) Clan land/public land         ( ) 
b) Personal land          ( )  
c) Hired land          ( ) 
d) Bought land          ( )  
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e) Public land          ( )  
 
9. What problems do you face from the following? 
a) Public land     1. .……………………… 
      2. ………………………. 
b) Clan land      1. ….…………………… 
      2 ……………………….. 
c) Personal land     1. .……………….……… 
      2. .……………….……… 
d) Hired land     1………………………… 
      2. .…………….………… 
e) Bought land     1. .………….…………… 
       2. ……………………….. 
 
10. Are there any local formal grouping associations which are formed in the 
study area?  
a) Yes       ( )  
b) No         ( )  
 
11. If yes, what is the purpose behind their formation?  
a) For managing lands    ( )  
b) For land allocation    ( )  
c) For land distribution    ( )  
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d) For storage of land    ( )  
 
12. Are there informal arrangements in the study area?  
a) Yes      ( )  
b) No       ( ) 
If yes, what are the functions of these informal arrangements?  
c) Help in accessing allocation of land  ( )  
d) Help in distribution of land   ( )  
e) Help in the using if land   ( )  
13. Is there any role displayed by the village, government and its committee 
related to land?  
a) Yes    ( ) 
b) No     ( )  
 
14. If yes, specify the role by mention the major functions.  
 
15. Is there any role displayed by the ward or division level leaders and 
organizations in land resource management in the study area?  
a) Yes    ( ) 
b) No     ( )  
 
16. If yes specify the crucial roles that are displayed by the ward and division 
leaders and some existing organizations.
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SECTION II: Questions Clarifying the Strength of Existing Institutions in the 
Administration of Land Resource  
 
1. Do you know informal and formal institutions that influence land uses?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No   ( )  
 
2. If yes, what are the traditions, norms, folklore and customs that influence 
land use in the area?  
 
3. Do you know of land rights and land user fees?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   ( )  
If yes, what have you heard about land rights?  
 
4. Do you have a stake in any land rights; explain?  
5. Have you applied for one as an individual or as group?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   ( )  
If yes, please what did you do in terms of procedures? 
 
6. Do you pay for the land you use?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   ( )  
7. If yes, how much do you pay for your land? And to whom? Specify  
8. Do you benefit from paying for land?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   ( )  
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9. If yes, please specify.  
10. Are there basic outcomes / effects of paying for the land? 
a)  Yes   ( )  
b)  No   ( )  
 
11. If yes, please explain.  
12. Do you think informal institutions can resolve conflict resolution?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   ( )  
 
13. If yes, please explain how.  
 
14. Do you think primary courts play significant role in the administration of land 
resource-mechanism?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   ( )  
If yes, please specify how.  
15. Do you think the customary arrangement plays any role in the administration 
of land resources – mechanism in this area?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
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If yes, please specify.  
 
16. Have you ever heard about land fees/charge/ tariffs to be paid to any level of 
authority?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
If yes, please specify any and why to whom and how.  
 
17. Do you think there is any advantage / problem inherent in land fees, land 
charges/ tariffs/ and tax?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
18. Can we improve on land fees/charges/tariffs, being covered on users?  
a) Yes    ( ) 
b) No    ( ) 
If yes, please explain how.
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SECTION III: QUESTIONS CLARIFYING THE STRENGTH OF  
 EXISTING INSTITUTIONS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 
 OF LAND RESOURCE  
 
1. Do you know any informal and formal institutions that influence land uses?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
2. If, yes, what are the Traditions, norms, folklore and customs that influence 
land use in the area? 
 
3. Do you know land rights and land – user fees?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
4. If yes, what have you heard about land rights?  
 
5. Do you have a stake in any land rights? (Explain)  
 
6. Have you applied for one as an individual or as group?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No   ( )  
If yes, please what you did in terms of procedures? Explain 
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7. Do you pay for the land you use?  
a) Yes     ( )  
b) No      ( ) 
 
8. If yes, how much do you pay for your land? And to whom? (Specify)  
 
9. Do you benefit from paying for land? 
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
10. If yes, please specify.  
 
11. Are there basic outcomes / effects of paying for the land?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No    ( )  
If yes, please explain.  
 
12. Do you think informal institutions can resolve conflicts?  
a) Yes     ( )  
b) No      ( )  
If yes, please explain how.  
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13. Do you think primary courts play a significant role in the administration of 
land resource-mechanism?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No     ( )  
If yes, please specify how.  
 
14. Do you think the customary arrangement play on role in the administration of 
land resource – mechanism in study area?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No     ( )  
If yes, please specify.  
 
15. Have you ever heard about land fees/charge/tariffs to be paid to any level of 
authority?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No     ( )  
If yes, please specify any and why, to whom and how.  
 
16. Do you think there is any advantage / problem inherent in land fees, land 
charges/ tariffs/; and tax?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
17. Can we improve on land fees/charges/tariffs, being covered on users?  
a) Yes   ( )  
b) No    ( )  
If yes, please explain how.
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SECTION IV: Questions Clarifying the Types and Causes of Land use Conflicts  and 
Their Mitigation Pathway in the Study Area 
 
1. Have you experienced land conflicts is this area?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
2. If yes, please explain.  
3. Do you remember when there were land conflicts in the area?  
a)  1985 – 1990    ( ) 
b)  1991 – 1995    ( ) 
c)  1996 – 2000    ( ) 
d)  2001 – 2006    ( ) 
e)  2007 – 2008    ( ) 
 
4. Who were major parties in that conflict that you had experienced this area?  
a) Farmers and pastoralist   ( ) 
b) Farmers (individuals) businessmen  ( )  
c) Pastoralist (individuals) company   ( )  
 
5. Where these land conflicts handled by the various forms of informal 
institutions or formal institutions.  
a) Yes     ( )  
b) No     ( )  
If yes, please explain.  
6. Can you distinguish how the two authorities handled that land conflicts?  
a) Yes      ( )  
b) No      ( )  
 
7. If yes, please explain how the village, ward, district levels handled the 
conflicts and how the primary court and ward tribunes handled the conflict.  
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8. Do you know land conflicts resolution?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No   ( )  
 
9. If yes, please specify  
10. Is there any inadequacy in land law?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
11. If yes, please specify what and why.  
 
12. Do you accept the strength weakness or opportunities of your regional 
executive officers, district executive officers, and division executive officers 
or ward executive officers in relation to land matters?  
a) Yes     ( )  
b) No     ( )  
 
13. If yes, please specify the issue.  
 
14. Do you understand the constraints/challenges/problems facing community 
participation in relation to land issue / land user conflicts resolution in your 
area?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
If yes, please explain.  
 
15. Mention the various possibilities of changing institutional framework for 
sound management of land in the study area as opposed to the conventional 
sub-village, ward, district, regional approach.  
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…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
16. What should be done to improve land user conflict resolution?  
 
17. Are there the most critical regulatory land related issues for communities 
which the municipality must/should ensure compliance?  
a) Yes    ( )  
b) No    ( )  
 
18. If yes, please specify.  
 
19. What is your village capacity in terms of? 
 
a) Personnel 
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
b) Skills related to land matters  
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
c) Village organizational set up  
……………………………………………………….…………………………
.…………………………………………………………………………………
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…………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
20. What are the capacity gaps as per the following schedule?  
Items 1: adequate 2: Cap. /deficit; quantity 
Capacity gap/deficit i.e. No Capacity GAP 
Personal  
Skill/Knowledge 
Village organization setup 
Human (      ) 
Skills                                 (       ) 
Communication (      ) 
Briefly explain  
• Personal  
• Skills  
• Village organization setup  
Briefly elaborate below, the nature of the gap, 
if any ………………………………………….. 
………………………………………….……… 
…………………………………………………. 
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